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VOLUME I

A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON
UTILIZATION OF NEGRO MANPOWER

BY
ORO STAFF
CONSULTANTS
AND
SUBCONTRACTORS

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By author *Reg. Memo. 59-45*
et al 90 Sept 59
For *E.V.M. [unclear] [unclear]*
Date *13 Oct. 62*

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
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Project CLEAR

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ORO-T-99
June 1951

A Preliminary Report

on

UTILIZATION OF NEGRO MANPOWER

by

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The tentative conclusions and provisional recommendations of the Preliminary Report are those of the project staff engaged in the study. Final conclusions and recommendations are reserved for the more complete report to be submitted at a later date. Comments and criticism of the contents are invited. Remarks should be addressed to:

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The members of the ORO project staff wish to express their appreciation and thanks to the many agencies and individuals for their helpful cooperation and for extremely valuable data, material, and advice.

The project staff desires to acknowledge the special assistance given by the following Department of the Army and Department of Defense agencies; Utilization Branch, G-1, General Staff; Analysis Section, Troop Program Branch, G-1; Personnel Research and Procedures Branch, the Adjutant General's office; the General Reference Section, Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's Office; the Surgeon General's office; the Office of the Chief of Military History; Library Services, Command and General Staff School; Library, Army War College; Classified Unit, National War College; and Classified Records Section, Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Other agencies which supplied valuable information include; The Bureau of the Census; The Headquarters, Selective Service; The Bureau of Labor Statistics; The Library of Congress; The National Archives; The Ford Foundation; The Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University; and the Cornell University Social Science Research Center. A group of ORO consultants were a constant resource of advice in planning the study.

Invaluable assistance was given by staff members of the Department of the Army and of Operations Research Office in an advisory capacity and by the staff of the ORO Library.

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FOREWORD

A Progress Report on Project CLEAR, dated 18 May 1951, indicated that a preliminary report on the project could be delivered on 1 July 1951 and outlined the anticipated scope of that report. The following preliminary report fulfills the predictions of the progress report. It includes:

1. A review of existing Army studies.
2. A preliminary judgment of the data reported by the Gillem Board and the Chamberlin Committee based upon the conclusions of "outside" investigators who have made somewhat similar general studies.
3. A quick review of the most cited studies done in the Army and a report on their general "findings."
4. A collection of a limited amount of existing *(preliminary data)* statistical data from the 1950 census, the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the AGO which provides basic data on such factors as population ratios, learning ability as measured by AGCT scores, educational levels, etc.
5. A quick and rather superficial summary of an attitude survey and reports of performance in Korea and a report prepared covering some of the more obvious generalizations of the investigators as a result of their experience in collecting the data.
6. Tentative conclusions inferred from the evidence considered.

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A final report on this study will be delivered on 1 October 1951. It is anticipated that this report will include:

1. A review and analysis of related studies made outside the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense for their bearing on the problem.
2. An evaluation in terms of scientific evidence and the application of the methods of science of the data reported, the conclusions drawn and the recommendations made by the Gillem and Chamberlin groups.
3. A more comprehensive review and an evaluation in terms of scientific evidence of all Army studies.
4. A further study, including important cross-comparisons, of existing statistical data.
5. A comprehensive summary and evaluation of the Attitude Survey and of the reports of performance in Korea, plus a full interpretation of the findings.
6. Other phases of the investigation which opportunity permits.
7. Final conclusions justified by evidence.

Alfred H. Hausrath

30 June 1951

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A Preliminary Report
on
UTILIZATION OF NEGRO MANPOWER

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Volume I
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SUMMARY

PROBLEM

To determine How to utilize Negro manpower to best advantage in the Army.

FACTS

Objective Data

Historical accounts show: segregation in all-Negro units has been the prevailing practice from 1861 to date; and that Negroes were restricted to a quota of not more than 9 or 10% of the Army.

In 1950 the quota was lifted, and Negroes rose to 13.5% of the 8th Army. For the first time since the Revolutionary War Negro replacement troops were accepted in white units and fought alongside whites in integrated units.

There are wide differences in the percentage of Negroes in the various arms and services, brought about in part by the traditional views that they were suited primarily to service type units, the limited number of military occupational specialties open to Negroes, and because Negroes could be assigned only to specially designated Negro units.

Negroes as a group in the Army are inferior to whites as a group in their qualifications, when measured in terms of literacy, amount of education, Army General Classification Test scores, and occupational skills. Of those accepted for service, both races are roughly equal physically, but the Negro VD rate is 7 to 10 times as high as the white rate.

Of all Negroes in the Army in World War II, 83% were in AGCT grades IV and V (sub-standard) whereas only 32% of whites were in these grades. In 1949, the percentages were 62 and 32 respectively.

Subjective Data

Historical records report that Negro combat units, particularly of regimental size, performed unsatisfactorily in World Wars I & II and that Negroes performed best in services of supply.

Testimony of officers on combat duty in Korea indicated that Negroes in large segregated units performed poorly in combat and creditably but less satisfactorily than whites in combat support and service duties.

Performance of Negroes in integrated combat units in Korea was reported by officers as equal to whites, and, as a result of such experiences, most officers concluded that integration was successful and preferable to segregation.

Attitude surveys among officers and men indicated that racial prejudice diminished under integration.

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Negro units are reputed to require closer supervision, greater officer strength and a longer time for training.

One Staff College study alleges that Negroes in the Army fall short of whites in producing a proportionate percentage of leaders.

DISCUSSION

This is a preliminary memorandum based upon an initial analysis of recently available data.

In the limited time available for this study an attempt was made to find and report the objective facts pertaining to the problem. Census data, Army statistics, and research studies were used as sources. The substantive facts they yielded were regarded as relatively firm bases from which to draw conclusions. Certain aspects of the problem required the use of more subjective information, such as historical records, and personal observations, opinions and attitudes. Generalizations have been made from such information, but with due allowance for their lower order of reliability.

There has been marked change in the last few years in the attitude of the American people to the Negro. Laws, policies and customs relative to civil rights, anti-discrimination, fair employment practices, equality of treatment and improved opportunities for education have marked the advancement of the status of the Negro.

While American Negroes are making rapid improvement in their level of qualifications, the military-age Negro falls far below the similar white age group. For these reasons, the problem of utilizing Negro manpower in the Army appears to be largely a problem of using poorly qualified personnel.

The problem of using poorly qualified personnel in the Army can be avoided or it can be met. It can be avoided by not accepting such personnel for service -- a policy now partly in force with the 2 April 1951 directive on Qualitative Distribution in Military Manpower, which screens out the lowest group on the Armed Forces Qualification Test and distributes selectees equitably to the various services. Or the problem of using poorly qualified personnel can be faced by modifications in MOS's, by special training methods, and by spreading the less able among the more able where they may learn by imitation.

Both of these procedures for using poorly qualified personnel are independent of race. It is probable that some of the Army's problem of utilizing Negroes has nothing to do with race per se.

There are some aspects which seem to be unavoidably associated with race. Among these are social and recreational activities where marked differences are to be found in state and local laws and the mores of the groups.

The announcement by the President of his policy of equality of treatment and opportunity, the activities of the Fahy Committee he created to work out an improved policy for the armed forces, and the favorable publicity received by the Navy and Air Force for their efforts toward integration brought pressure on the Army to modify its traditional policy of segregation.

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Because of the differences in the number of personnel required, the appeal of the other services to more highly qualified men, and the percentage of their strength obtained by voluntary enlistment the Army has been overloaded with less well qualified personnel.

Attention is called to some political considerations which may have bearing on the problem of utilizing Negro manpower.

National Guard units, because of their state affiliations, present a special problem in integration.

A special study was made in Korea during May and June 1951 by International Public Opinion Research, Inc., (IPOR) under subcontract with ORO. Approximately 150 officers and 450 enlisted men were personally interviewed, many of them in the front lines at the time. An additional 3,000 enlisted men filled out questionnaires in foxholes and rear areas. The results of this field survey are reported in full in Appendix A which IPOR prepared under pressure to be included in this report. Accordingly there may be some minor inconsistencies in detail between the conclusions and recommendations of this appendix and those of the main report. The evidence gathered in Korea, however, firmly supports the broad findings of the overall report.

It was recognized from the start that the situation in an active theater such as Korea is quite different from conditions in occupied areas or the ZI. It is not safe to generalize from the Korean experience without conducting similar studies in other areas.

Another special study was made by the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, under sub-contract to ORO. It covered demographic data drawn from statistical sources and is reported in Appendix B.

Scientific data of anthropological, and sociological types were reported by civilian consultants to the Operations Research Office. However, because of limitations of time, their reports have been subjected only to cursory examination for the purposes of this preliminary memorandum.

From the evidence considered to date in this study a number of tentative conclusions may be inferred. It is believed that further investigation will validate them.

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CONCLUSIONS

1. The efficiency of the Army has been hampered by the following practices:
 - a. A maximum quota for Negroes in the Army.
 - b. The restriction of Negroes to certain Military Occupational Specialties.
 - c. The concentration of Negroes in segregated units.
 - d. The concentration of Negroes in only a few branches of the Army.
 - e. The practice of assigning Negroes to Negro units in substantial over-strength.
2. The utilization of Negroes in the Army is to a greater extent a problem of utilization of poorly qualified personnel rather than a problem of race.
3. The problem of race, where it arises in the Army, appears to be primarily a social problem, intensified by:
 - a. Social contacts involving women
 - b. Existence of diverse state and local laws and customs relating to race.
4. The Army's classification and assignment techniques are adapted to the utilization of individual skills, but have not been equally applied to white and Negro soldiers, as in the case of MOS restrictions.
5. If personnel ^{is} accepted and assigned on the basis of their qualifications, no racial quota is needed.
6. The performance of Negro troops appears to improve in relation to the closeness with which they work with white troops.
7. Integration of Negroes in white units appears to offer a more efficient method of raising the level of performance of Negro troops than to assign officers in overstrength to Negro units.
8. Utilization of Negroes in all-Negro combat units larger than battalion size involves unwarranted military risks.

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9. Recent testimony of combat officers in Korea supports the belief that integration in combat units is preferable to segregation.
10. No critical maximum Negro-white ratio for effective integration is known at present.
11. The Department of the Army's Special Regulation No.600-629-1 issued 16 January 1950 appears to be in accord with the preliminary findings of this study. Any suggested changes in content or wording are deferred until more data has been gathered in this study.
12. Preliminary evidence suggests that S.R.600-629-1 is not thoroughly understood by officers at all levels in the field and many diverse "interpretations" have resulted.
13. The Secretary of Defense's directive on Qualitative Distribution of Military Manpower appears to be an effective instrument for reducing:
 - a. the inflow of poorly qualified personnel, and
 - b. the concentration of poorly qualified personnel in the Army.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Department of the Army should make it perfectly clear to all officers of all levels that SR 600-629-1 is designed to achieve integration and that officers will be held responsible for compliance therewith.
2. Integration should be carried on gradually in existing combat and service units, except National Guard, by means of the normal replacement stream without regard to race or color.

(This will furnish experience needed to assess the results of integration in various types of units and in various ratios of Negroes to whites. More experience is also required to assess the results of assignment of white personnel in low ratio to predominantly Negro service units. Studies on these problems should be continued.)

3. For the present, pending further study, the composition and character of National Guard units should be preserved insofar as military efficiency permits.
4. Classification by Military Occupational Specialty should be made without reference to race or color, and all MOS's should be immediately opened to Negro personnel by direct and explicit announcement.
5. The number of Negro units in the Army should not be increased as a means of accommodating larger numbers of Negro selectees.
6. No Negro combat unit larger than battalion size should be continued on a segregated basis.
7. A special study of the problem of reducing the Negro VD rate should be made.
8. Because of political implications, the Army Board or Staff Section responsible for Negro manpower policy should have the benefit of advice from a group of eminent civilians whose judgments on this problem would be respected.

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UTILIZATION OF NEGRO MANPOWER IN THE ARMY

A Preliminary Report

P R O B L E M

Introduction:

This study was undertaken in response to a request to the Director, Operations Research Office, from Maj. Gen. Ward H. Maris, G-4/F2, 29 March 1951 stating that - "The Department of the Army has an urgent requirement for information concerning the most effective utilization of Negro manpower. A report was requested by 1 July 1951. Subsequent authorization was received to extend the due date of the final report to 1 October 1951, with a preliminary report to be submitted on 1 July 1951. This is the manuscript copy of the preliminary report.

In order to meet the requested reporting date in spite of numerous obstacles and unavoidable delays, this report has been assembled from drafts prepared by individual analysts, consultants, and sub-contractors without benefit of editorial revision and graphic interpretation. A subsequent edition will correct these deficiencies.

The Problem:

The mission of the study as specified by the Department of the Army reads; "The Operations Research Office is requested to initiate a project to determine how best to utilize Negro personnel within the Army.

The analysis will include:

- (a) A review of World War II historical data on operations pertaining to the subject.
- (b) A review of existing Department of the Army studies, reports, and other publications pertaining to the subject.
- (c) A review of studies made by Service Institutions on the subject, to include the Command and General Staff College and the National War College.
- (d) A review of Negro participation in Korean operations."

Analysis of the Problem:

The present world situation, developing as it has at a time of maximum civilian employment in the United States, makes imperative the fullest and most effective utilization of all manpower that may become available to the Army, either by voluntary enlistment or by the operation

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of the Selective Service System.

Because one-tenth of the population of the United States is Negro, approximately one-tenth of the Army's manpower will be Negro. This large manpower fraction cannot be wasted, especially in a time, like the present, of a critical manpower shortage. Therefore, effective ways of utilizing it must be found.

Since the Revolutionary War, Negroes have served in the Armed Forces of the United States. Their utilization has varied and their value has been the subject of much debate. World War II taxed the manpower of the United States for the first time in our history and changed the nature of the problem of the utilization of the Negro from whether they should or could be used to how they must be used in order to achieve maximum military performance and efficiency.

In this study, the Negro as an individual and as a soldier is considered from three points of view:

1. The qualifications of the individual Negro as a soldier, including:

Physical fitness
Social, economic, and educational background
Ability to adapt to Army requirements

2. Past and present utilization of the Negro soldier, including:

Justification or lack of justification for using Negro troops primarily in service-type units

3. The individual and in-unit performance of the Negro as a soldier, including:

Sizes and types of units in which Negroes have served and are serving.
Their contribution in combat, in support of combat, and rear areas.
Their adaptability to group training
Their capacity for the development of leadership
Their attitudes toward military service

Against this background, the three major problems confronting the Army in the utilization of Negro manpower are analysed:

1. Segregation vs. Integration as military policy, including:

The merits claimed for each
The relative effectiveness of each
The problems of command and control under each
The attitudes of the personnel involved toward each
Morale and efficiency under the two systems

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2. Quotas, including:

- Advantages and disadvantages
- Criticisms of the "Quota System"
- Practical impact on effective utilization of Negro manpower
- Military traditions
- Existing laws and court decisions
- Public attitudes

3. The problem of leadership with Negro troops, including:

- Relative requirements of time and personnel for training Negroes and whites
- Relative requirements for and casualties among officers assigned to Negro and white units
- Relative availability of Negro and white commissioned and noncommissioned personnel

Attitudes of Negroes toward white and Negro leadership

Of primary importance in the analysis of these problems is the rapidly changing status of the Negro in the United States. The rise in social, economic, and educational standards achieved by the Negro in the last thirty years, and especially in the last ten years, must be given the weight which it deserves. The Army is not intended to be an instrument of social control and cannot afford to place itself in the position of sponsoring or of retarding basic social trends. Rather, it may be expected to reflect, as closely as the requirements of military efficiency permit, the existing social situation in the nation. The achievement of such harmonious phasing in a period of rapid social change, is difficult. In this study, this difficulty is recognized and a major emphasis is placed on the implications of social change for the Army.

It is the purpose of this preliminary report to explore as many aspects of the direct and indirect problems concerned with the utilization of Negro manpower as the time allotted to the project to date has permitted. Until the existing sources and current studies have been evaluated more fully, the observations, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report must be regarded as tentative and subject to re-examination.

Factual Basis of the Report:

In preparing this report, the following materials have been prepared and/or digested as completely as time permitted:

- Direct
A*
1. Historical Review of the utilization of Negroes in the Army from 1776 to 1951. Special attention has been given to Army experience with Negroes in units which participated in World War II and in units in the Army since that time.

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2. Review of Army Policy, tracing the main developments, 1776 to 1951, ~~with a tentative evaluation as a guide for this study. For comparative purposes, the policies of the Air Force and the Navy are also presented.~~
3. Review of Army Procedures, covering such aspects as classification and assignment during World War II and since, with special attention to changes.
4. Department of the Army Studies, including reports of Boards and Committees, Research studies conducted by the Department of the Army, opinions and testimony of officers, and surveys.

8. The Korean Study of troop attitudes and of the utilization of Negroes. ~~(The complete preliminary report is included in the Appendix to this study.)~~

5. Studies at Service Schools, including the Command and General Staff College, the National War College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces were reviewed and digested.

11 3. Review of Actions of the President and of the Secretary of Defense, including the President's policy on equality of opportunity, the Report of the Fahy Committee, and the recent directive of the Secretary of Defense.

12 2. Recent Supreme Court Decisions bearing on the civil rights of Negroes have been identified and noted.

13. Press Reports reaching large groups of interested citizens were reviewed.

9. Demographic Studies based a) on census and related statistical data relating to population distribution and trends; education, health, economic status, and employment of Negroes in relation to whites, and b) on selective service and related statistical data covering numbers examined and rejected, causes of rejection, and standards, ~~were prepared and presented in this study. (The complete reports are included in the Appendix.)~~

10. Research Findings on the social aspects of the problem of the utilization of Negroes ~~were condensed into a brief report and are included in this study.~~

4

6. Statistics on the Composition of the Army ~~with~~ with figures on the numbers of Negro and white personnel by branches for the entire Army, and for the 8th Army in Korea, as of May and June 1951.

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F A C T S

Introduction

This section is divided into two parts: A. Military Consideration, and B. Civilian Consideration, with information presented according to its source.

MILITARY CONSIDERATION

HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE USE OF NEGRO TROOPS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

I. Introduction

Negro troops have been used in the United States Army in ever-increasing numbers since the American Revolution. Until the period following World War II, there was a tendency to look upon them as second-class soldiers, despite the brilliant exploits of a few of the Negro units. For the most part they were used in service units. In 1945 a re-examination of the use of Negro soldiers was begun, and in 1950 recommendations were made that resulted in a shift of Army policy designed to make more efficient use of the Negro soldier. Under this new policy, Negro troops are taking part in the war in Korea and their experiences there are being carefully studied with a view to possible changes in the employment of Negro forces in the future.

II. Negro Troops in the Revolution and the War of 1812

Negro troops were held liable to service with the local militia in several colonies prior to the American Revolution. With the outbreak of hostilities in 1775, proposals were made that they be brought into the Revolutionary Army. General Washington suggested caution in adopting this measure because of a fear of political disharmony which might arise from the proposal, and a decision was made to delay any action in this matter. While the step was being debated, however, Negroes as individuals were being taken into white battalions. No attempt was made to stop this action, and Negroes served throughout the war as slave substitutes or as freemen in integrated units. A strength report of August 24, 1778 showed that 755 Negroes were being carried on the rolls of fourteen units in that part of the Continental Army under Washington's immediate control. In addition to these forces, there were other Negroes used for service duties and at least one colony had a separate Negro battalion. It appears that several thousand Negroes in all may have been used by the Continental forces. ^{1/}

Start here

^{1/} Elton A. Woodward (Chief, Colored Troops Division, AGO, 1888), "The Negro in the Military Service of the United States," Ms. in War Records Branch, National Archives. On estimate of total see L. D. Reddick, "Negro Policy of the United States Army," Journal of Negro History, Vol. 34 (1949), p. 14.

State, Rhode Island, ~~SECRET~~ on an integrated basis and in separate units

Negro units were not used in great numbers in the War of 1812. The chief occasion of their employment seems to have been near the end of 1814 when General Andrew Jackson issued a call for Negro freedmen in the vicinity of Mobile to form a volunteer unit. The men thus raised fought in engagements around New Orleans at the close of the year. 1/

III. Negro Troops in the Civil War and Spanish-American War

With the coming of Civil War, the Negro was considered far more seriously as a soldier than he had been previously. Motivated in part by the idea that the Negro should have a right to fight for the freedom of his colored brothers in the South, the Federal Government decided in 1863 to employ Negro regiments in the Union Army. Altogether some 154 Negro combat units were set up, totalling 123,000 soldiers. Nearly 200,000 Negro soldiers were employed in Services of Supply activities.2/ Use of the Negro for military duties was not confined to the North. The Southern leaders, who had always feared the prospect of arming Negroes, came gradually to favor their use in labor battalions and later for supply services. 3/

Northern Negro units fought with distinction at Fort Pillow and at the Battle of the Crater at Petersburg. In an effort to honor the Negroes for their efforts, Congress at the end of the Civil War created six Negro regiments in the Regular Army. The number was later reduced to two Infantry and two Cavalry regiments. The later act, passed in 1869, had the effect of compelling the Army to keep some elements of these regiments on the rolls at all times. 4/

Negro units served for a number of years in the western frontier posts and proved valuable in actions against the Indians. Frequent complaints were made by their officers, however, because of the lack of literate Negro troops who could make out routine records and reports. During the Spanish-American War, the four Regular Army Negro regiments, the 9th and 10th Cavalry and the 24th and 25th Infantry, fought creditably in Cuba under white officers. The 10th Cavalry won particular acclaim because of its service in the battle of San Juan Hill.

1/Elon A. Woodward (Chief, Colored Troops Division, AGO, 1888), "The Negro in the Military Service of the United States," Ms. in War Records Branch, National Archives. On estimate of total see L. D. Reddick, "Negro Policy of the United States Army," Journal of Negro History, Vol. 34, (1949), p.14.

2/Gillem Board Report, Part II A.

3/Douglas S. Freeman, Robert E. Lee, III, pp. 499, 507, 512, 544, 542.

4/Major Ulysses G. Lee, "The Employment of Negro Troops," Ch I, (Ms in Office of Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army).

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IV. Negro Troops in World War I

With the coming of World War I and the passage of the draft act, the number of the Negroes taken into the Army rapidly increased. Ultimately, some 404,348 were inducted. Over 300,000 of this number were used in services of supply. Difficulties arose in regard to their use because of several factors. Little effort had been made during the years between wars to train Negro officers for the Negro units. Only three Negroes had graduated from West Point during the period, 1866-1917, and the only one of these on duty, Colonel Charles Young, was transferred at the outbreak of war from a position of command. Since many of the Negroes fell into low intelligence groupings, and lacked many skills needed for new types of warfare, there was a tendency to shift most of them into unskilled jobs in Negro service units. Despite this tendency, two Negro divisions, the 92d and 93d, were activated under white officers and sent to France. Their record was generally regarded as a failure by whites and Negroes, although Negro observers charged the failure to lack of proper organization, poor morale, and the unwillingness of white officers to make a fighting unit out of the division. Their chief target for attack was Major General Robert Lee Bullard, commander of the American Second Army. General Bullard in his memoirs published after the war and in several speeches declared that Negro troops were decidedly inferior to whites, and held that the Negroes had failed completely as combat soldiers. ^{1/}

As a result of the unfavorable experiences with Negro units in World War I and the widespread opinion among Regular Army officers that Negroes could not be depended on in close combat, the Army developed the view that Negro soldiers should for the most part be placed in services of supply, that they be used in segregated units, and that not more than 9 or 10 percent of soldiers in the Army should be Negroes. In the years between World War I and II, therefore, the number of Negroes taken into the Army was severely limited, the four Negro regiments which had been kept on the rolls since 1869 were reduced to skeleton organizations, and the number of Negro Regular Army officers was kept at a minimum. In 1937 and 1938 some relaxation of the policy was made, but not until the Selective Service Act was passed was there any major change in the Army's attitude towards Negro troops. The period found only five Regular Army Negro officers on duty, and of this number three were chaplains. Of the 360,000 Regular Army and National Guard strength in 1937, only 6500 or approximately 1.8 percent were Negroes. ^{2/}

V. Negro Soldiers in World War II

The approach of World War II brought sharp attacks by the Negro Press on the President and the Army for their failure to make better use of Negro manpower. The appointment of Colonel Benjamin C. Davis to the post of Brigadier General, the first Negro ever to be so honored, and the naming

^{1/} Lee, Draft History, Ch I.^{2/} Ibid**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**~~SECRET~~

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of Dean William Hastie of the Howard University Law School as civilian adviser on Negro problems to the Secretary of War were regarded in some quarters as political tricks made with an eye to coming elections. Special efforts were made by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, General George Marshall, and other personnel of the War Department to give greater opportunities to the Negro soldier, and to make possible more openings for Negro officers and for enlisted men with special skills. A special Advisory Committee on Troop Policies was set up under Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy to advise the Secretary of War on policies relating to Negro troops. Inasmuch as the Army decided to hold fast to its traditional policies regarding segregation and the quota system, Dean Hastie finally resigned. His successor, was widely assailed by the Negro press for taking the office.

More than 2.5 million Negroes registered for the draft in World War II. Of this number, about 909,000 served in the Army. The peak strength came in September 1944 when 701,678 officers and men were listed on the Army's rolls. This amounted to 8.7 percent of the total strength of the Army at that time. The Negro percentage of total strength had varied on a quarterly basis from 5.9 percent in December in 1941 to a high of 8.7 percent in September 1944 and then dropped to 8.4 percent in June 1945, shortly after the close of the war in Europe. The percentage actually rose slightly--to 8.6 percent in September 1945--shortly after the Japanese surrender. Thus at no time during the war, even under selective service, did the percentage of Negroes to whites in the Army ever rise to the 9 or 10 percent to which they had been restricted.

| | | | |
|------|-----------|-------|------|
| 1941 | December | | 5.9% |
| 1942 | March | | 6.0% |
| | June | | 5.8% |
| | September | | 6.4% |
| | December | | 7.4% |
| 1943 | March | | 7.8% |
| | June | | 7.9% |
| | September | | 8.2% |
| | December | | 8.5% |
| 1944 | March | | 8.7% |
| | June | | 8.7% |
| | September | | 8.7% |
| | December | | 8.5% |
| 1945 | March | | 8.5% |
| | June | | 8.4% |
| | September | | 8.6% |

The experience of the Army with Negro troops in World War I was repeated to a considerable degree in World War II. At peak strength at the close of the war in Europe, only 12 percent of the Negroes were in the ground combat arms of the Army. This number, moreover, constituted only 1.2 percent of the entire army strength in these forces. A large part of them were in the 92d and 93d Divisions,^{1/} which had been activated near the

^{1/} The 2d Cavalry had also been activated, but was converted into non-combatant units in 1943.

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beginning of the war despite some protest by Negroes that the Army was strengthening its segregation policy.

The 92d Division, committed to combat in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, gained the reputation of lacking the will to fight in close combat. Its record throughout the War was disappointing and a special Board set up to study its actions suggested that Negro troops could not be made into satisfactory infantry soldiers. The 93d Division and the 24th Infantry Regiment in the Pacific area saw little combat action, and there was little data on which to base any final conclusions as to their performance under battle conditions.

In smaller units, Negro troops performed more satisfactorily. A tank battalion, an anti-aircraft battalion, tank destroyer units, and field artillery units all gained praise for their work in the European Theater of Operations. Also commended were the 2,500 Negro volunteers who were organized into platoons at the time of the Ardennes counterattack and assigned to divisions of the First and Seventh Armies. While praising the work of these platoons, there was a tendency for commanders to point out that the troops in these units were of somewhat higher intelligence than the average Negro soldier, and that they were not typical.

The total reaction on the part of commanders was that large Negro units were not effective, that they were not dependable in close combat, and that they were best fitted for services of supply assignments. For these and other reasons, the Army tended to shift the bulk of the Negroes to the services of supply. As a result 78.1 percent of all male Negro strength in the Army was in the service branches. This was in contrast to the 39.7 percent of white troops in the service branches of the Army. Both the Quartermaster Corps and the Transportation Corps had large percentages of Negro personnel. (For a comparison of Male Negro and White strengths of the Army by Branch and Service as of 30 June, 1945 see the following table)

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TABLE Ia

COMPARISON OF MALE NEGRO AND WHITE* STRENGTHS OF THE ARMY -
BY BRANCH AND SERVICE AS OF 30 JUNE 1945

| (1) | (2) | | (3) | | (4) | | (5) | | (6) | | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|-----|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------|------|-------|------|------|
| | OFFICERS NEGRO | OFFICERS WHITE | ENLISTED MEN NEGRO | ENLISTED MEN WHITE | NEGRO | WHITE | NEGRO | WHITE | NEGRO | WHITE | | | | | |
| | 0 | 0 | 2,456 | 110,170 | 2,456 | 110,170 | 110,170 | 110,170 | 112,626 | 2.2 | 3.2 | 97.8 | 4.1 | | |
| | 37 | 9,488 | 650 | 81,023 | 687 | 90,211 | 90,898 | 90,898 | 90,898 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 99.1 | 3.4 | | |
| | 169 | 22,105 | 10,426 | 283,391 | 10,625 | 305,496 | 316,121 | 316,121 | 316,121 | 3.4 | 14.0 | 96.6 | 11.4 | | |
| | 241 | 38,566 | 11,061 | 445,670 | 11,302 | 485,538 | 495,538 | 495,538 | 495,538 | 2.3 | 14.9 | 97.7 | 18.0 | | |
| | 1,173 | 103,336 | 49,673 | 1,590,800 | 50,846 | 1,694,136 | 1,744,982 | 1,744,982 | 1,744,982 | 2.9 | 67.0 | 97.1 | 63.1 | | |
| | 1,620 | 173,195 | 74,296 | 2,511,054 | 75,916 | 2,684,249 | 2,760,165 | 2,760,165 | 2,760,165 | 2.8 | 100.0 | 97.2 | 100.0 | | |
| | 1,242 | 342,338 | 74,426 | 1,451,779 | 75,568 | 1,794,117 | 1,869,685 | 1,869,685 | 1,869,685 | 4.0 | - | 96.0 | - | | |
| | 749 | 28,487 | 216,419 | 231,389 | 217,168 | 259,576 | 476,744 | 476,744 | 476,744 | 45.6 | 40.3 | 54.4 | 8.8 | | |
| | 485 | 40,191 | 134,295 | 515,750 | 134,780 | 555,941 | 690,721 | 690,721 | 690,721 | 19.5 | 25.0 | 80.5 | 18.9 | | |
| | 296 | 22,152 | 84,622 | 156,069 | 84,918 | 178,221 | 253,139 | 253,139 | 253,139 | 32.3 | 15.8 | 67.7 | 6.0 | | |
| | 166 | 24,932 | 29,748 | 255,111 | 29,914 | 280,043 | 309,957 | 309,957 | 309,957 | 9.7 | 5.5 | 90.3 | 9.5 | | |
| | 24 | 10,718 | 25,554 | 359,886 | 25,578 | 370,604 | 396,182 | 396,182 | 396,182 | 6.5 | 4.8 | 93.5 | 12.7 | | |
| | 0 | 0 | 18,534 | 502,748 | 18,534 | 502,748 | 521,282 | 521,282 | 521,282 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 96.4 | 17.1 | | |
| | 73 | 26,944 | 14,927 | 276,297 | 16,000 | 303,241 | 318,241 | 318,241 | 318,241 | 4.7 | 2.8 | 95.3 | 10.3 | | |
| | 1,739 | 97,532 | 11,370 | 396,016 | 13,109 | 493,548 | 506,657 | 506,657 | 506,657 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 97.4 | 16.8 | | |
| | 3,532 | 250,656 | 535,469 | 2,693,266 | 539,001 | 2,943,922 | 3,482,923 | 3,482,923 | 3,482,923 | 15.5 | 100.0 | 84.5 | 100.0 | | |
| | 6,398 | 766,489 | 684,091 | 6,656,099 | 690,485 | 7,422,288 | 8,112,773 | 8,112,773 | 8,112,773 | 8.5 | - | - | - | | |
| | 5,152 | 423,851 | 609,765 | 5,204,320 | 614,917 | 5,628,171 | 6,243,088 | 6,243,088 | 6,243,088 | 9.8 | - | - | - | | |

*Includes all races other than Negro.

COMBAT ARMS

GROUP I

TOTALS

USAAF

SERVICES

GROUP II

TOTALS

TOTAL MALE STRENGTH, ALL BRANCHES

TOTAL MALE STRENGTH, LESS USAAF PERSONNEL

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


Figure 2. COMPARISON NEGRO WHITE STRENGTH IN GROUND SERVICE BRANCHES
June 1945

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


Figure ²/₂. PERCENT IN COMBAT UNITS





Figure ³/₂. GROUND COMBAT STRENGTH OF THE ARMY
June 1945


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


**Figure 4. MALE STRENGTH OF THE ARMY
June 1945**



**Figure 5. COMPARISON OF NEGRO AND WHITE STRENGTH
IN GROUND COMBAT ARMS
June 1945**

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


Figure 4. DISTRIBUTION OF NEGRO STRENGTH IN THE GROUND COMBAT ARMS AND SERVICES. June 1945

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VI. Negroes in the Post-war Period, 1945-50

The post-war period, 1945-50, saw a number of challenges to the traditional Army views relative to the use of the Negro in the armed forces and a re-examination of his position in the light of World War II experience. A special board headed by Lieutenant General Alvan H. Gillem, Jr., in 1945 recommended that additional opportunities be opened to the Negro in the Army, but held firmly to the policies of racial quotas and segregation.

In 1949-50, the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, a civilian body, attacked the policy held previously by the Army, and made recommendations for the abolition of segregation and the dropping of racial quotas. An Army board, headed by Lieutenant General S. J. Chamberlain, favored improved conditions for Negro troops, but protested against attempts to use the Army for purposes of social experimentation. A number of changes were introduced by the Army in late 1949 and in 1950, and special regulations were issued which directed "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Army without regard to race, color, religion or national origins." ^{1/} Among the important changes were the integration of some white and Negro troops and abolishing the racial quota system. The new policies were put into effect, however, with strong doubts on the part of many officers as to the wisdom of the new developments.

VII. The Negro Soldier in Korea

The war in Korea brought an increase in the number of Negroes taken into the Army. The outbreak of hostilities coincided almost exactly with the beginning of integrated units and the abolition of the racial quota. These two new policies were to be tested, therefore, under conditions somewhat different from those envisaged by the policy makers.

The lifting of the quota system was accompanied by a sharp rise in the percentage which Negro troops bore to the total strength of the Army. Negro enlistments in the first few months after the quota was removed jumped rapidly to 28 percent of the total number of enlistments, although at the end of nine months this percentage began to level off (See table). It is possible that the rush to enlist was, as in the case of many whites, due to a belief that enlistees could get their choice of branches of service much more easily than could draftees. In the case of Negro draftees the rise was not as sharp, the percentage levelling off to an average of 11 to 14 percent of the total intake of draftees and new enlistments.

The Korean war permitted the Army to start integration of white and Negro troops under combat conditions, and to contrast the activities of all-Negro units like the 24th Infantry Regiment under almost identical conditions with the performance of Negroes in integrated units. Studies even now in progress have pointed to the acceptance of Negroes by whites in integrated units, and indicate that Negroes in such units are giving better accounts of themselves than those in segregated units.

^{1/} War Dept. Special Regulations 600-629-1, 16 Jan 50.

TABLE I

INPUT FROM SELECTIVE SERVICE AND ORIGINAL ENLISTMENTS

| Month | Total SS and Enlistment | | | Selective Service | | | | Original Enlistment | | | |
|--------|-------------------------|-------|-------|-------------------|-------|-------|------|---------------------|-------|-------|------|
| | Total | White | Negro | Total | White | Negro | % | Total | White | Negro | % |
| Feb 50 | | | | | | | | 4831 | 4327 | 504 | 10.4 |
| Mar | | | | | | | | 6344 | 5824 | 520 | 8.2 |
| Apr | | | | Not Used | | | | 6187 | 4833 | 1354 | 21.9 |
| May | | | | | | | | 6044 | 4721 | 1323 | 21.9 |
| June | | | | | | | | 6344 | 4861 | 1483 | 23.4 |
| July | | | | | | | | 15595 | 11684 | 3911 | 25.1 |
| Aug | 15351 | 11634 | 3717 | 1558 | 1315 | 243 | 15.6 | 13793 | 10319 | 3474 | 25.2 |
| Sept | 60056 | 50979 | 9077 | 49499 | 42613 | 6886 | 13.9 | 10557 | 8366 | 2191 | 20.8 |
| Oct | 66940 | 57464 | 9476 | 55667 | 48365 | 7302 | 13.1 | 11273 | 9099 | 2174 | 19.3 |
| Nov | 82774 | 71804 | 10970 | 71980 | 63217 | 8763 | 12.2 | 10794 | 8587 | 2207 | 20.4 |
| Dec | 50159 | 43042 | 7117 | 42225 | 36784 | 5441 | 12.9 | 7934 | 6258 | 1676 | 21.1 |
| Jan 51 | 113183 | 98909 | 14274 | 86171 | 75363 | 10808 | 12.5 | 27012 | 23546 | 3466 | 12.8 |
| Feb | 104777 | 92441 | 12336 | 84512 | 74512 | 10000 | 11.8 | 20265 | 17929 | 2336 | 11.5 |
| Mar | 103274 | 90530 | 12744 | 86583 | 76583 | 10000 | 11.5 | 16691 | 13947 | 2744 | 16.4 |

Totals from Selective Service for February and March are based on preliminary reports.

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This testimony has not sufficed to change the views of some Army commanders, who feel that the Korean experience merely emphasizes the need to return to the Army's traditional practices relative to the use of Negro troops.

Negroes are being used in Korea in more varied fields than ever before and greater opportunities have been offered for their advancement. Despite these efforts, however, the great majority have found themselves in service units. At the outbreak of war in Korea, Negroes overseas furnished 36.3 percent of special services, and 61.6 percent of the transportation corps, as compared to 17.1 percent of anti-aircraft artillery units, 12.6 percent of engineer units, 9.6 percent infantry, and 13.5 percent quartermaster units. (See table).

The Korean War has given the Army an excellent opportunity to experiment with its new policies and to test their workings. To a greater extent than ever before, the Negro has been used with white troops. He has been thrown into combat in many cases because there was no alternative, and has been accepted into white divisions because of a real need for his services. Conditions have, therefore, been conducive to a fair test of the system. Observers conducting studies have found their tasks somewhat lightened because of the absence of tensions which often exist in the Zone of Interior between white and Negro troops. The sharing of combat perils, the lack of a native white or Negro population, and the lack of any off-duty social contacts eliminated several factors which otherwise might have prejudiced the success of the integration program.

Negro enlisted strength in the 8th Army and X Corps in Korea, for the week of 17 May 1951, was approximately 27,500 or 13.5% of the total U. S. Army enlisted strength of the 8th Army.^{1/}

In Table II Negro strength is broken down by reporting command into combat or service. In this particular table all divisional units are carried under the combat heading. Using this breakdown, Negro combat strength is 47.8% of the total Negro strength in the 8th Army and X Corps. However, Table III contains a more detailed breakdown by branch. The total Negro combat strength by this system still remains at 46.0% of their total in these organizations. These percentages contrast remarkably close to that of whites during World War II.

A discrepancy of 107 exists between Tables II and III. This is due to the errors in the basic data used.

^{1/} All Korean strength figures are based on an uncorrected copy of MRU strength report for the week of 17 May 1951.

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TABLE II

NEGRO STRENGTH - KOREA - MAY 1951

(based on 8th Army weekly report of 17 May 1951)

| | <u>Combat</u> | <u>Service</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|----------------|---------------|
| 8th Army (with attachments) | 189 | 9501 | 9690 |
| I Corps " " | 749 | 46 | 795 |
| IX Corps " " | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| X Corps " " | 588 | 0 | 588 |
| 1st Cav. Div " | 191 | 0 | 191 |
| 2nd Inf. Div " | 1895 ^{1/} | 0 | 1895 |
| 7th Inf Div " | 351 | 0 | 351 |
| 24th Inf Div " | 241 | 0 | 241 |
| 25th Inf Div " | 5553 | 0 | 5553 |
| 3rd Inf Div " | 3027 | 0 | 3027 |
| 187th RCT " | 198 | 0 | 198 |
| 2nd Log Command " | 260 | 4904 | 5164 |
| 3rd Log Command " | 0 | 17 | 17 |
| | <u>13,242</u> | <u>14,468</u> | <u>27,710</u> |

| | |
|--|---------|
| Total White enlisted strength | 177,532 |
| Total Enlisted strength | 205,752 |
| Negro enlisted strength as % of total enlisted strength | 13.5% |
| % Combat to total | 47.8 |
| % Service to total | 52.2 |

1/ 1 unit - 9th Inf Regt

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TABLE III

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NEGRO STRENGTHS BY BRANCHES AS PERCENT OF TOTAL NEGRO STRENGTH
IN KOREA 17 MAY 1951

| <u>Combat Arms</u> | <u>Negro Strength</u> | <u>Branch-Strength as % of Grand Total</u> |
|--------------------|---------------------------|--|
| Infantry | 7752 | 28.1 |
| Field Artillery | 3275 | 11.9 |
| Antiaircraft | 903 | 3.3 |
| Armor | <u>759</u> | <u>2.7</u> |
| Total | 12,689 | 46.0 |
| | | |
| <u>Services</u> | | |
| Engineers | 4629 | 16.8 |
| Transportation | 4042 | 14.6 |
| Quartermaster | 1965 | 7.1 |
| Ordnance | 1698 | 6.2 |
| Medical | 1093 | 4.0 |
| Military Police | 729 | 2.6 |
| Signal Corps | 522 | 1.9 |
| Chemical | 128 | 0.4 |
| Miscell. | <u>108</u> | <u>0.4</u> |
| | 14,914 | 54.0 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 27,603 | |

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TABLE IV

DISTRIBUTION OF NEGRO PERSONNEL BY ARM
AND SERVICE AS OF KOREA - MAY 17, 1951

| | <u>Integrated</u> | <u>Reverse Integ.</u> ^{1/} | <u>Segregated</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------|
| Infantry | 1995 | 767 | 4990 | 7752 |
| Engineers | 82 | 489 | 4058 | 4629 |
| Transportation | 0 | 415 | 3627 | 4042 |
| Field Artillery | 137 | 0 | 3138 | 3275 |
| Quartermaster | 135 | 105 | 1725 | 1965 |
| Ordnance | 31 | 364 | 1303 | 1698 |
| Medical | 234 | 165 | 694 | 1093 |
| Antiaircraft | 51 | 0 | 852 | 903 |
| Armor | 21 | 325 | 413 | 759 |
| Military Police | 101 | 0 | 628 | 729 |
| Signal Corps | 48 | 0 | 474 | 522 |
| Chemical | 42 | 0 | 86 | 128 |
| Miscell. | <u>43</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>65</u> | <u>108</u> |
| Totals | 2920 | 2630 | 22,053 | 27,603 |

^{1/} These are Negroes who are in predominantly Negro units, but which units have a limited number of whites assigned.

EVOLUTION OF U. S. ARMY POLICY RELATING
TO THE USE OF THE NEGRO SOLDIER^{1/}I. Introduction

The United States Army policy relative to the use of the Negro as a soldier has undergone extensive re-examination since 1941 as a result of the experience of World War II, current military commitments which require the most efficient use possible of our national resources, and the changing political and social concepts of American society towards the Negro. These factors have necessitated a careful study of past army policy and have led to a questioning of many views which have been widely accepted in the past. These policies have undergone recent tests in Korea which may offer the Army new evidence for a study of existing practices.

The traditional policy of the Army in regard to Negro soldiers underwent few changes in the period between 1775-1941 and, indeed, changed but slightly in the basic assumptions in the period between 1941-1950. Influenced initially by local beliefs and prejudices regarding the intelligence, dependability, and qualities of leadership of the Negro, the Army prior to World War I was inclined to handle Negro troops in an entirely different way from that in which they dealt with white soldiers. As a result of experiences with Negro units in World War I, the Army concluded that they would fight well only under white officers, that they were not dependable in close combat, that they must be segregated from white troops, and that they must be used in services which did not require great skill or intelligence. Because of the low estimate of the intelligence of the Negro and the difficulty of handling large numbers of men on a segregated basis, the Army developed the view that a careful ratio must be maintained between whites and Negroes in the Army at the same ratio which existed between the white and Negro populations of the United States--approximately 90% white and 10% Negro.

II. Use of Negro Troops 1775-1941

Although Negroes were used on an integrated basis in the Revolutionary Army,^{2/} the first widespread use of colored soldiers was by the Union Army in the Civil War. Nearly 200,000 Negroes were used in the last two years of that conflict after a decision had finally been made to employ them. Contrary to Revolutionary War practice, the Army decided to use

^{1/} In tracing the evolution of Army policy it is recognized that policy changes interact with experience acquired in use of Negro troops. Thus military operational history in many instances is repeated in this section to stress its relation to Army policy.

^{2/} A strength report of August 24, 1778 showed that in the forces under Washington's immediate control, there were 755 Negroes on the rolls of fourteen different companies. The state of Rhode Island had a separate Negro battalion. These details are from Elon A. Woodward, The Negro in the Military Service of the United States, Ms. in War Records Branch, National Archives. Mr. Woodward was Chief, Colored Troops Division, A.G.O., 1888. (Mr. Mandelbaum quotes Reddick, pp. 12-15, as saying that there were several thousand Negro troops).

Negro troops in separate units, thus establishing the custom of segregation in the Army. After the end of the war, Congress, with the idea of complimenting Negro troops for their work in the war, provided for the establishment of six permanent Negro regiments. This number was later reduced to four.^{1/}

World War I saw the induction of some 300,000 Negro soldiers. The principle of segregation was continued in force, and two Negro divisions were activated in the course of the war. Despite the existence of four Negro regiments since the Civil War, no particular effort had been made to train Negro officers who could be used to staff the divisions. Actually only three Negroes had been graduated from West Point in the period 1865-1917 and of these only one was on active duty when the war began. Even this officer, a colonel, was not given a command. The Army firmly held to the view that Negro troops fought best under white officers; there was also opposition to commissioning of a great number of Negro officers on the ground that they would be used over white troops and thus create problems of discipline or morale.^{2/}

The principle of segregation and the view that Negro troops were ineffective in close combat gained strength in the ruling circles of the Army as the result of testimony by Major General Robert Lee Bullard and others to the effect that the Negro was of little use as a combat soldier, and that he should be used primarily in service units. Public statements to this effect occasioned strong criticism by the Negro press and by some white publications. Negro leaders concluded that the Negro soldier and, particularly the Negro officer, were not being given a fair chance by the Army. During the post-war years, they became more convinced of this as the Army sharply curtailed the number of Negro enlistments. The sharp decrease in the Army's strength in the 1920s brought a cut in the size of the Negro regiments, which the Army was required by law to maintain. As in the case of white units, the Army retained the regiments on paper, but reduced some of them to skeletons.^{3/}

On April 26, 1937 the Army outlined a number of policies regarding Negro troops which indicated a shift towards greater opportunities for the Negro officer and soldier, but made no basic change in the traditional policy of the United States. Thus, Negro reserve officers eligible for assignment were to be assigned Organized Reserve Negro units. Regulations relative to officer procurement and officer candidate training were to govern all officers regardless of rank, subject, however, to the openings available to Negro officers in Negro units. It was still clear that the policy of segregation was to be maintained. This was evident from the statement made in the directive of April 1937 that Negro manpower, so far as practicable, was to be kept at approximately 9 percent of the total mobilized strength of the Army at all times.^{4/}

1/ Major Ulysses G. Lee, "The Employment of Negro Troops," draft history in Office, Military History, Dept. of the Army, Ch I, pp. 19 and 49. (Hereafter referred to as Lee Draft History).

2/ Lee, Draft History, Ch I, p. 32.

3/ Ibid.

4/ War Department directives, April 26, 1937, and February 8, 1938.

III. Use of Negro Troops in World War II

At the outbreak of World War II in Europe, therefore, the Army was committed to a policy of segregation, to a quota system of 9 percent of the total forces in the Army, and to the belief that most of the officers should be white. The strength of the latter view was reflected in the fact that only five Negro Regular Army officers were on duty at the beginning of national mobilization just prior to our entry into World War II. Of these, three were chaplains.

After the passage of the Selective Service Act and the drafting of large numbers of Negroes--ultimately more than 900,000 Negroes were used in World War II--Negro organizations called on the President and the Army to change existing policies relating to colored troops in order that they might feel they had something worth fighting for. Manifestations of Negro discontent prior to the Pearl Harbor attack made obvious the need for a re-examination of the Army's policy. President Roosevelt expressed his personal interest in the matter, and the Secretary of War decided to meet some of the objections by appointing a Negro lawyer, Dean William Hastie of Howard University's Law School, as civilian aide in charge of Negro problems. This action was followed by specific actions to meet many of the main objections to existing policy. As a result of these efforts opportunities were given Negro soldiers to enter certain military specialties from which they had formerly been excluded, and additional openings were made available to Negro officers. An all-Negro air squadron was activated and the first Negro general was appointed. One step, which may have been regarded as a concession to Negroes--the re-activation of two Negro regiments--was not well received by Negro leaders who felt that it strengthened the principle of segregation in the Army. Studies of the Negro manpower problem were made from the end of August 1942 to the end of the war by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy's Advisory Committee on Troop Policies. ^{1/}

In retaining its past policies regarding the use of Negro troops, the Army frankly sought to avoid changes which might lead to friction. This attitude was expressed more than once in the statement that the Army was not a laboratory for social experimentation. It was argued that any attempt to integrate whites and Negroes would lead to the lessened efficiency of the unit in which the experiment was tried. As a result, the Army throughout World War II held to the principle of segregation. It also tended to assign most of its Negroes to service units, which were to have on their rolls some 78.1 percent of the Negroes in the Army.

Two important exceptions were made to the policy of segregation during the war. Negro officer candidates were admitted to certain classes with white officer candidates, and in the course of the Ardennes battle some 2500 Negro volunteers were accepted into white regiments. The units were set up initially as all-Negro platoons and then integrated into white

^{1/} Lee, Draft History, Ch IV, pp. 11, 15, and 21. (The Committee was also known as the Negro Troop Committee, The Special Troop Policies Committee, and the McCloy Committee).

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companies. When replacements were needed, white soldiers were integrated with the Negro troops. Despite the excellent combat record of these volunteers, there was a feeling that the experience offered no true basis for evaluating the worth of Negroes as combat troops, inasmuch as the number was small and the men were volunteers of better than average intelligence.

At the close of the war, the Army found it necessary to re-examine a number of its policies in regard to Negro troops. This came in part because a number of Negroes desired to remain in the Army at a time when many whites were clamoring to be released. Although many of these troops believed that the Army was unfair, they still preferred its opportunities to those of civilian life. The question therefore arose as to whether or not the quota could be changed so that more than 10 percent of the soldiers in the Army ~~could be Negroes~~. No information was available on the wisdom of such a practice, inasmuch as the percentage of Negroes in the Army had never gone above 9 percent.^{1/}

IV. Policy on Negroes Since World War II

Pressure from Negro organizations on the National Administration and the Army for a liberalization of Army policy regarding Negroes became increasingly strong in the middle and late 1950s. In the spring of 1945, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy urged that a thorough field study be made of the Army's racial policy and that the policy be revised on the basis of experience. In October 1945, therefore, an all-army board, headed by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., was set up to investigate means of developing the efficiency of the manpower of the nation by preparing a policy for the better utilization of Negro soldiers. Thus, for the first time, the Army approached the Negro question as a part of the entire manpower problem.^{2/}

The Gillem Board, despite its intentions of treating the Negro soldier as part of an overall manpower question, ~~soon found itself back at the old practice of discussing the Negro soldier in terms of the social problems involved. Instead, therefore, of stressing the means by which the Negro might be used in a different system more efficiently, the Board discussed how the Negro could be used in the traditional framework of segregation, more efficiently.~~ ^{became involved in considering} On the basis of World War II experience, as applied to segregated units, the Gillem Board concluded that the Negro was least effective in close combat, that small Negro units which were teamed up with larger white units worked better than large independent Negro units.^{3/}

Proceeding from the premise that the Negro soldier suffered from certain defects not of his own making, the Gillem Board concluded that the Army must deal with the problem by limiting Negro enlistments to 10 percent of the total number of troops and by continuing the policy of segregation.

^{1/} L. V. Naisawald of ORO in an analysis of quarterly strength figures based on Strength of the Army, STM-30, 1 October 1945 shows that Negro percentages in the Army ranged from 5.9% in December 1941 to a wartime high of 8.7 percent in the summer and early fall of 1944.

^{2/} Freedom to Serve, A Report by the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services (Washington, 1950), pp. 49-50.

^{3/} Gillem Board Report, 17 Nov 45.

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The Board added that ultimately the Army should consider the use of all the nation's manpower without regard to race or color. It was willing to approach such an end by recommending that new Negro units be established to give Negroes broader opportunities to use their skills in fields hitherto closed to them in the Army. Basically, however, the Gillem Board, while showing sympathy for the Negro, had recommended no fundamental change in the Army's racial policy. Segregation was maintained and the quota system was retained.

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The Negro press promptly assailed the Gillem Board's report and demanded a more thorough examination of the subject. The President in 1948 established the Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces under Mr. Charles Fahy to study the question of the Negro soldiers. The Committee, entirely civilian in its makeup, was instructed to start its investigations from the standpoint of giving the Negro greater opportunities and of making better use of the potential Negro reserves in the United States. While this Committee was still considering these questions, the Army established another all-Army board headed by Lieutenant General S.J. Chamberlain to study the Negro manpower problem.

The Fahy Committee insisted that the environmental background of Negroes which created special problems in their use imposed a feeling of insecurity on Negroes which was increased by the Army's system of segregation. The Committee believed, therefore, that the more efficient use of Negroes could be achieved only by complete integration. They also attacked the segregation system because of its failure to make the best possible use of the skill and specialties of Negroes. The multiplication of units merely to give a few Negroes a chance to use rare specialties or skills was not regarded as an efficient solution of the problem. The Committee also attacked the quota system, urging that the ratio of 9 to 1 between whites and blacks be changed.

Negroes

Before making its final report to the President, the Fahy Committee in May 1949 recommended that the Army (1) open all Army jobs to qualified personnel regardless of race or color, (2) open all Army schools on the same basis, (3) assign all Army personnel according to ability and need, and (4) abolish the racial quota. The Army on October 1, 1949 took steps in the direction recommended by opening all jobs and schools in the Army to qualified soldiers regardless of race or color and by abolishing racial quotas for attendance at schools.

Other measures intended to give "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Army without regard to race, color,

1/ Fahy Committee Report, 1950
2/ Freedom to Serve, p. 61; cable, WCL 45586, 1 Oct 49.

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religion or national origin" were set forth as basic Army policy in special regulations of January 16, 1950.^{1/} Two months later the Army abolished the recruiting quota system for enlistments in the Army.^{2/}

The Chamberlain Board made its recommendations on February 9, 1950 while the Army was changing its policy to meet some of the proposals of the Fahy Committee. The Board decided to stick close to the Army's traditional policy of segregation and racial quotas. It pointed out that the Army represented a cross-section of the nation in customs, attitudes, and standards, and added that "No revolutionary changes will occur during the period of military service."^{3/} It was clear that the Chamberlain Board was not using the Fahy Committee's approach of finding how wider opportunities for Negroes would increase their efficiency and make available a larger reserve of manpower for the Army. Rather it was worried about the way in which increased opportunities for Negroes might affect the fighting spirit and morale of the Army as a whole.

The Chamberlain Board accepted the fact that more opportunities should be offered to Negroes and it listed the ways in which the Army since 1945 had activated new units in order that Negroes might be given greater opportunities. It strongly opposed any widespread adoption of integration and held that if the efficiency of the Army as a whole was to be considered, the abolition of segregation, however desirable as a social measure, was an unsound policy for the Army to adopt. The Board also favored the retention of the 10 percent quota system.^{4/}

Thus three months before the Fahy Committee's final report of May 22, 1950, the Chamberlain Board ~~reiterated~~ ^{recommended} the Army's traditional policies of segregation and racial quotas. Presidential support of the almost diametrically opposed views of the Fahy Committee made necessary a further re-examination of the Army's position. The outbreak of war in Korea and the commitment of American forces there also required a study of Army policy as the result of new Army manpower requirements. The Chamberlain Board was asked in February 1951 for a new report based on the performance of integrated units under combat conditions. After studying statements from units which had been committed to battle in Korea, the Chamberlain Board concluded that units in combat did better if they were integrated. There was also evidence that white-black ^{Negro} friction was decreased as a result of the fighting man's reaction that any replacement who would fight was acceptable, regardless of race or color.^{5/} *within the Army*

While making this concession concerning Korea, the Chamberlain Board was dissatisfied about other parts of the new policy. Its members were concerned over the abolition of the 10 percent quota, and the consequent increase of Negroes in the Army. The Board expressed ~~anxiety~~ ^{concern} lest (1) Negro troops be brought into the Army in such quantities that they could not be

^{1/} Special Regulations 600-629-1, January 16, 1950.

^{2/} Cable, Dept. of the Army to all commands, WCL 44600, March 27, 1950.

^{3/} Report of Chamberlain Board, Feb. 9, 1950.

^{4/} Chamberlain Board Report, Feb. 9, 1950.

^{5/} Second Chamberlain Report (unapproved version).

assimilated, and (2) the growing number of Negroes with low intelligence scores would seriously reduce the efficiency of the units to which they were assigned. The Chamberlain Board in its second report concluded that it was necessary to re-impose the 10 percent quota system and to retain separate Negro units for the Army. This report was not approved inasmuch as the Army G-3 held that no new units should be activated and that Negroes should be assigned to existing units, while the Army G-1 insisted that since many units, particularly the southern ones, had already taken more Negroes than they wanted, it would not be possible to assimilate the new Negro soldiers.^{1/}

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Current Army

V. Existing Policies on Use of Negro Troops

At the present time the Army's official policy is ~~still~~ that outlined in the special regulations of January 16, 1950. They state that "there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Army without regard to race, color, religion or national origin," and that all manpower "will be utilized to obtain maximum efficiency in the Army." The first part of the statement commits the Army to a policy similar to that of the Fahy Committee. The second statement, while in keeping with the views of the Fahy Committee, can be used to justify the Gillem and Chamberlain Boards' theses. If it can be established that non-segregation and non-quota arrangements reduce the efficiency of the Army as a whole, while raising that of the Negro soldiers, it is possible for the Army to call for a return to the older policy on that ground. The matter of efficiency can be made to work both ways, however, and if the recent experiences show that the policy outlined in January 1950 has increased not only Negro efficiency, but has ~~actually~~ aided the effectiveness of units where the integrated system has been tried, the Army will have good grounds for continuing its new policy of non-segregation.

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The study of the Korean experience is not complete. It affords a means, however, for testing the policies put into effect in 1950. Such studies require an amassing of information beyond that gained from recording individual reactions of a few commanders or men. It is essential in evaluating the new policy of the Army to drop the habit of regarding the use of Negro troops as a social problem and instead to study means of getting better returns from American manpower reserves.

VI. Negro Personnel in the Air Force and Navy

The Air Force and Navy instituted changes in their policy relative to segregation of Negro and white forces either prior to or at the same time as the Army, but have succeeded in speeding up the degree of integration

^{1/} 2d Chamberlain Report, 1951.

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practices
to a point not yet achieved by the Army. ~~While~~ This has been made possible in part because of the tendency of these two services to depend on volunteer recruiting and because of their ability to get men with higher intelligence scores among their enlistees. ~~The experiences of the Air Force and Navy may offer some experience of value to the Army in its study of plans for granting equality of treatment and opportunity to Negroes.~~

The Air Force

not a lot of limited application to the mass

~~A. Prior to 1945~~

During World War II, the Army Air Force followed the Army's policy of segregation, a rigid application of the 10 percent racial quota, and a limitation of job opportunities for Negroes. In the course of the war some 140,000 Negroes were in the Air Force, making up approximately 8 percent of the total. Three Negro fighting units were organized in the course of the war. Of these the 99th Fighter Squadron and the 352d Fighter Group were committed in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations; the 477th Bombardment Squadron was just completing its training at the war's end. For the most part, Negro troops in the Air Force were assigned to service units.^{1/}

The Air Force reported its experience with Negro fighting units to be something ~~similar~~ ^{what} similar to that of the Army ~~white or Negro combat units~~. It was found that the Negro units were less efficient than neighboring white units. Lack of aggressiveness, poor maintenance, and technical deficiencies were noted. High praise was expressed of the commanding officer of the 332d Fighter Squadron, Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., who was given credit for the degree of success achieved by the Squadron.^{2/}

~~B. Negroes in the Air Force, 1945-50~~

In 1948, in response to the President's directive for a study of means of equalizing treatment and opportunity of Negroes in the Armed Forces, the Air Force outlined a new policy providing for the abandonment of racial quotas for enlistments and attendance at schools, the opening of occupational specialties to qualified personnel without reference to race or color, and the placing of enlistment, school attendance, assignment, and promotion on a basis of personal merit and ability.

reported
By mid-January 1950, seven air bases inspected by the President's Committee were ~~found~~ ^{reported} to have made significant progress in giving greater equality of treatment to Negroes. Only one of the seven was still being run on a segregated basis. At six of the bases the Negro Air Base Service Squadrons had been broken up and members of the units sent to school if they were qualified or were sent to white units. Whites and Negroes were integrated as to work, classes, living quarters, and messes.^{3/}

^{1/} Gillem Board Report, II, A.

^{2/} Ibid.

^{3/} President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, Freedom to Serve, pp. 33-44.

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The Department of the Air Force reported in mid-year 1950 that of approximately 26,000 Negro officers and airmen, some 19,000 had been assigned to units previously made up of whites alone. The Department declared that this program was resulting in increased efficiency and improved use of manpower.^{1/}

The Navy and the Marine Corps

A. Prior to 1948

The Navy

Negroes were enlisted in the Navy for general service for many years prior to World War I, and were used throughout the fleet. Enlistment of Negro seamen was stopped at the end of World War I, however, and not re-opened until 1932. Even then service was restricted to the messman's branch of the service. The provision in the Selective Service Act of 1940 barring discrimination in the armed forces on account of race or color made no immediate change in the Navy's policy, inasmuch as the Navy depended on volunteers until February 1943.^{2/}

A change in policy towards Negroes had been announced by the Navy as early as the spring of 1942 when it was agreed that volunteers would be accepted for general service with the understanding that segregation would prevail and assignments would be limited to shore installations and harbor craft. When, in February 1943, the Selective Service organization began to allot Negro personnel to the Navy, a decision was made to assign Negroes to the fleet. After an initial attempt to man a destroyer escort and a patrol craft with predominantly Negro crews under white officers, the Navy turned to a policy of assigning Negroes with whites to auxiliary fleet vessels. A 10 percent quota was established, however, for each ship.

Segregated advanced training schools for Negroes were abolished in July 1944, and separate training camps were given up in the summer of the following year. In February 1946, the Navy took the further step of making Negroes eligible for assignments in all ratings in all activities and in all ships of the naval service.^{3/}

In the course of the war, a total of 150,000 Negroes served in the Naval Establishment. Approximately 46 Negro reserve officers were on duty during the war. The first Negro regular Navy officer was commissioned after the close of the war.^{4/}

^{1/} Department of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense and Semiannual reports of Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, Jan 1 to June 30, 1950, p. 175.

^{2/} President's Committee, Freedom to Serve, p. 17.

^{3/} President's Committee, Freedom to Serve, p. 20.

^{4/} Gillem Board Report, II, A.

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The results of the study are presented below under the following headings:

(1) Performance of Negro troops, (2) attitudes toward Negro integration, (3) Negro utilization in the Zone of the Interior, and (4) the role of leadership.

Reports on Negro Troop Performance:

One of the sharpest distinctions encountered in the attitudes toward Negro troops, whether of whites or Negroes, is that between those in segregated and those in nonsegregated units. Previous reports by Army officers have agreed that Negro troops perform more adequately in combat when mixed into white units than when segregated. This view is confirmed by the interviews conducted in Korea with white officers of both senior and junior grade. The rare exceptions to those favoring integration are almost all found in non-integrated units. While skepticism is often expressed as to the feasibility of all-out Army-wide integration, there is marked agreement on its desirability in the Far East.

Although this view that integration aids Negro efficiency is virtually unanimous, the officers interviewed by no means gave the same reasons. The principal argument in favor of integration is expressed by those officers who argue that every sort of manpower should be used in combat units. "We need bodies" is a favorite phrase of this group, and it has its counterpart in the spontaneous expression of white enlisted men, "I don't care what color he is so long as he isn't yellow and wearing a Chinese uniform. If he's in the same fox-hole with me, he's OK."

It is further argued that integration improves the reliability and the comparability of combat units in such a way that they all can be used without special consideration in the planning of tactical missions; that the morale of Negro troops is raised when they are placed in a position where their full equality with white soldiers cannot be questioned; and that a competitive spirit is aroused when Negro troops are in intimate contact with whites.

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In addition, there are proponents of integration who are moved mainly by negative considerations - that is, those whose experience with all-Negro units has been especially disappointing and who have low regard for the combat effectiveness of Negro troops. This leads them to feel that these troops should be distributed in such a way as to minimize their conspicuousness and the special problems which they pose for the Army.

Senior officers, especially, cite the excessive demands on leadership in all-Negro units and the high officer losses incurred as a result. It is sometimes argued that since all-Negro combat units do not perform effectively, Negroes tend to be placed in service-type units, where they suffer no combat casualties. There is thus an inequality of sacrifice as between the whites and Negroes.

Of course, the integration of Negro troops in Korea takes place within the context of previous integration of Korean soldiers at the man-level in a number of American divisions and the presence of small units of other United Nations troops attached to our divisions. In contrast to those contacts with foreign soldiers, with their language and cultural barriers, the integration of Negro troops is reported by troop commanders to present relatively few problems.

In so far as the attitudes of Negro troops and officers are concerned, the evidence is overwhelming. Whether in service or combat organizations, whether in integrated or segregated units, and whatever their background and experience, the Negroes uniformly prefer service in integrated units. The reason, in general, is that the Negro in a segregated unit feels set apart and discriminated against. At worst he has the bitter feeling that the Army is violating a basic tenet of the democratic tradition for which he fights. At best he tends to translate all the familiar GI gripes into racial terms. Every soldier has his complaints about

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his food, his pack, rotation, equipment, officers, and his unit's mission. The Negro soldier in an all-Negro unit tends to regard his grievances as evidence that his unit has been singled out for unfavorable treatment. When he is integrated into a white unit, these complaints are no longer given a racial slant; instead they become indistinguishable from the complaints of the white soldier.

Evidence that even the white soldier realizes the basis for this reaction is shown by the following quotation:

"One thing, I think when they're all together like that, they probably think they're getting rocked all the time. I know that's the way I'd feel if I were colored. If you've got a colored outfit on part of the line, and the white outfits near them are ordered to a different position, if I were in an outfit like that I'd figure, 'Oh, oh---suicide patrol'. You know how guys are. When they're all together with the other men there's no special reason for them to feel that they're getting some sort of a special lousy deal."

There is little evidence of apprehension on the part of Negro troops that all-out integration might mean fewer ratings and commissions for them as a consequence of the competitive background. When the possibility of such a state of affairs is raised in interviews with Negro soldiers, the usual response is i.e., if he were fair and based promotions on merit, the Negroes would be content to take their individual chances with other soldiers. Negro combat soldiers, in particular, feel it essential to have the best qualified officers and non-coms possible, and that the best man should get the job, regardless of race.

Occasionally, Negroes in integrated units speak wistfully of the more relaxed atmosphere of conversation which they found in all-Negro units. As one man said:

"I know one guy, he's the only colored in the platoon. I talked to him once, he said they treated him O.K. - he just wanted a few more Negroes around to talk to once in a while."

These expressions are the exception, however, and are often followed by the observation that some difficulties must be expected by the "pioneers" in inte-

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gration; things would be better for those who come after them.

Attitudes of Whites on Negro Integration:

The interview findings show a considerable incongruity between the fears and anxious anticipations of many white officers and men in units that have had no Negro replacements, and the more favorable attitudes of those in integrated units. In the all-white units, officers and men alike often express the fear that there will be conflict between the white and Negro troops,--that the white Southerners, particularly, will refuse to serve with them, that there will be a wide social gap between the two elements which cannot be bridged. Frequently, of course, personnel in such units bring forth traditional stereotypes that Negroes are dirty, smelly, uncouth, intemperate, lazy, etc. To this is added the allegation that Negro troops are not good as soldiers and that the performance level of the unit will be lowered by their presence.

"I would banzai any day with this company. I've done it twice in the last two weeks...But I've seen the 9th Regiment and I've seen the colored boys bug. We took their objective a couple of times when they wouldn't move."

"It is like adding ink to milk. The whole thing would taste better than plain ink, but not anywhere near as good as plain milk."

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SUMMARY

In summary, the research personnel responsible for this survey, make the following observations:

1. Field work on this report took place during May and early June, 1951, and included a study of relevant documentary evidence, administration of questionnaires to over 3,000 troops in the field, and intensive interviews with 150 officers and 450 enlisted men of all ranks in every division in the Far East command, and in rear echelon units.
2. Most Negroes in Korea are in all-Negro units, many of the service type. In the last half year a sizable proportion have been integrated at the man level into formerly white units.
3. It is the concensus of officer opinion, and of previous official reports, that Negroes perform more effectively in integrated units than in class II units.
4. Negroes both in integrated and in segregated units overwhelmingly prefer integration.
5. Integration has occurred without incident or friction both in combat and rear echelon units; in units which are predominantly white as well as in those which are predominantly Negro.
6. Introduction of Negroes into white units does not lower the performance or morale of white troops in those units. On the other hand it does appear to raise the performance and morale of the Negroes.
7. There is evidence that contact with Negro troops results in attitude changes on the part of whites, making them more favorable to integration, and in general more favorably disposed toward Negroes.
8. There is agreement among most whites and Negroes that Negroes should hold both combat and service jobs, and should be assigned to these on the same basis as whites.

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9. Instances in which white troops have Negro leaders do not constitute problem situations.
10. Although conditions in Korea are more favorable to integration than conditions in the United States, the survey findings do not indicate that integration in garrison would arouse strong objection from most white troops (especially those who have already had experience with integration).
11. Existing Army policy statements with respect to the use of Negro manpower are diversely interpreted by both officers and troops and in fact lend themselves to such diverse interpretations because of their failure to clarify the disposition of class II units.
12. It is recommended that full integration be carrier out Army-wide, with assignment of personnel made only on the basis of individual qualifications, without regard to race. This would mean a restatement of Army policy, with a clarification of the status of Negro units, to permit the assignment of white personnel to those units in the normal replacement process. The Army's objective should be to eliminate the concentration of Negroes in certain types of service units. Army policy should be unambiguously stated and should be brought to the attention of officers at all levels of command. To smooth the transition in practice, efforts should be made to contact leaders of the Negro community. This might insure a receptive and sympathetic understanding of the Army's problems on the part of Negro civilians generally.
13. It is urged that the Army establish social science advisory units to provide continuous counsel on human relations problems. The data collected in the present study should be put to further analysis, and additional research in the ZI and Germany is proposed.

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WHITE HOUSE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIONS

The President's Policy of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment

by President Truman

Executive Order 9981, issued 26 July, 1948, is one of the principal factors influencing the Army's racial policy since World War II. The Order expressed the Presidents belief in the premise that it is essential to maintain, within the armed services, the highest standards of democracy. The President specifically declared it as his policy that there be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. By the same order, a committee of seven civilians under the chairmanship of Justice Charles Fahy of the U. S. Court of Appeals, was appointed. The Committee was authorized to consult with the Secretary of Defense and with the Secretaries of the three services to ascertain what changes in procedures and practices were necessary in order to meet the objective stated by the President. Although primarily motivated toward the achievement of democratic ideals in the Armed Forces, the Fahy Committee also gave full weight to the concerns of those within the services for military efficiency. The recommendations resulting from the Committee's investigation formed the basis for a new Army racial policy which is in effect at this issue.

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on Qualitative Distribution of Personnel

Directive of the Secretary of Defense of April 2, 1951

Throughout the early part of World War II, the Army found itself at a disadvantage in the procurement of manpower because the volunteer enlistment programs of the Navy and Air Force, with pay differentials or better opportunities for advancement, attracted a great number of men with *Group* Class I and *Group* Class II intelligence scores. The two services were able to make a selection of the men thus volunteering, and thus tended to leave for draft purposes most of the men with lower mental qualifications. Until February 1943, when all branches of the armed forces were

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assigned men brought in under Selective Service, the Army found itself with a growing group of soldiers less well qualified than those taken in the Navy and Air Force. In the years between the wars and, indeed, until after the beginning of war in Korea, this same experience was repeated. It became particularly alarming to the Army when near the end of 1950 college men facing the draft began to flock in large numbers to the Air Force and the Navy, leaving the Army again with the prospect of having to choose its officers and noncommissioned officers from poorly qualified men. This became all the more serious in the face of the removal of the racial quota which meant that the Army would receive an increasingly large number of personnel in the lower classifications. In an effort to provide for a more equitable distribution of high-quality personnel among the services, the Secretary of Defense ^{Qualitative Distribution} issued his directive of April 2, 1951.

The various services were permitted to continue their voluntary enlistment programs, but these were made subject to limitations of special quotas. While apparently applying to services alike, the directive would be expected to have the effect of aiding the Army in getting a larger percentage of ^{Group} ~~Class~~ I and ^{Group} ~~Class~~ II men, the group from which leadership may be drawn.

The directive established the following quotas for the percentage of the various intelligence ^{aptitude levels} ~~classifications~~ which could be accepted by any of the services:

| <u>Mental Groups</u> | <u>Percentage Quota</u> |
|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| ^{Group} Class I | 8.0 |
| ^{Group} Class II | 32.0 |
| ^{Group} Class III | 39.0 |
| ^{Group} Class IV | 21.0 |

Beginning on May 1, 1951, the services were required to accept enlistments in order of application so far as vacancies in any of the mental groups existed without any attempt to select an arbitrary score within the various classes. If a shortage still remained in any one group, it was possible to accept enlist-

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ments from men in the next lower group. In no case, however, were the services permitted to acquire additional personnel from a higher category. There was thus barred any attempt on the part of ^{any service} ~~the Air Force or the Navy~~ to hoard ^{Group} ~~Class~~ I or ^{Group} ~~Class~~ II personnel. There appeared to be little danger that the Army would have such an overage in those categories.

If one of the categories should not be filled at the end of any two months period, the Secretary of Defense directed that a sufficient number of Selective Service registrants be forwarded for induction in that category. This would ^{was intended to group group} prevent ~~Class~~ I or ~~Class~~ II men from being held up by their draft boards if one of the services needed men in that category. This closed a loophole to the possibility that men in these categories would be allowed temporary deferments by their draft boards to ^{await vacancies} ~~accommodate the preferences for service in the Air Force or Navy.~~ ^{in the quota for a preferred service}

A third loophole was closed with the statement that enlistments in excess of the percentages established for each class of inductees would not be accepted for the purpose of being applied against the quota of the following month. Enlistees had to enter the service within the month for which they were accepted, except in certain authorized cases.

The Secretary of Defense's directive, if applied vigorously, ^{should} ~~will~~ reduce the widespread differences in the ^{mental} intelligence ratings of men in the three services, such as existed during much of World War II and in the early phases of the selective service program in the present emergency. The Army would ^{have an opportunity to obtain} be assured of a larger share of the mental groups needed for leadership. It would also help to decrease the problem which has arisen because of the concentration in the Army of whites and Negroes of lower mental qualification beyond the capacity of the Army to utilize them efficiently.

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CIVILIAN CONSIDERATION

In the years since World War II, the civilian population has shown increased interest in the status and rights of negroes as citizens. This interest is flourishing in a more liberal and idealistic atmosphere than that which previously prevailed. The President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity within the Armed Services, all civilians, viewed the racial policies of the three services in the light of social and moral objectives of maintaining democratic standards. The Supreme Court has, within recent years, handed down several decisions which guarantee to the Negro rights enjoyed by white citizens. While such decisions had no direct application to the Army's program for utilization of Negro manpower, they establish a background against which interested civilians will evaluate the Army's racial policy and practices. Newspapers and magazines have been active in reporting both the Supreme Court cases involving Negro rights and the changes, since World War II, in the Army's policy respecting Negroes. Of equal interest to the press have been the conditions currently existing in Army camps in the United States where Negroes are stationed, and the performance of Negro troops in Korea. The succeeding pages will discuss the viewpoint of the civilian population concerning the Negro's status particularly as it applies to the Army.

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EXECUTIVE CONCERN: THE FAHY COMMITTEE*

On 22 May 1950, the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services (the Fahy Committee) submitted its report under the title Freedom to Serve. This report completed the work which had been started as a result of Executive Order 9981, of 26 July 1948, in which President Truman stated it to be his policy to have "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin."

MISSION AND METHODS

In undertaking its mission, the Committee agreed that it must consider not only equality of treatment and opportunity, but also the factor of military efficiency. To this end it studied the personnel policies and administration of the three services, historical experience with racial groups, and each service's implementation of its policies. Inasmuch as a preliminary survey showed that policies discriminated against Negroes only, the Committee concentrated its attention on the status of Negroes, hoping that a formula applicable to all minority groups would emerge from this approach.

In preparing its report, the Committee heard the testimony of 67 witnesses representing the three services and interested civilian groups, studied documents of an historical and technical nature, and visited representative installations of the three services.

NAVY AND AIR FORCE POLICIES

Inasmuch as the Navy had abandoned segregation in February 1946, the Committee had little to report other than the observation that integration had produced no racial friction and that individuals were evaluated by their

* A more complete abstract of the Fahy Committee report is given in the Appendix.

mates on the basis of their work rather than of their color.

In response to the Executive Order, the Air Force had moved toward integration of Negroes up to 10 per cent of the strength of units but had retained some segregated units, membership in which could be retained by the airman if he so desired or if he held a key position or if his commanding officer considered him best suited for such assignment. Subsequently the quota restriction and the commanding officer's discretion in retaining a man in a segregated unit were eliminated. Observations after eight months of operation of the new policy showed that apprehensions about the new policies had been groundless and that, even though recreational facilities had not been mentioned in the directive, there was a tendency for the men to initiate a move toward shared facilities. Racial incidents had not increased, but had actually diminished.

ARMY POLICIES

Because of its varied and (usually) admittedly unsuccessful experience with segregation, the Army in 1945 convened a board of general officers under the Chairmanship of General Gillem to study the problem of the utilization of Negro manpower. The Board noted that Negroes had made advances in civilian life since World War I and recommended that Negro units conform to white units, that Negro personnel be assigned as individuals to overhead units, and that the grouping of white and Negro units in composite organizations be continued. The traditional policy of segregation and the use of the (10 per cent) quota system were reaffirmed.

The President's Committee expressed doubt about the efficacy of these recommendations in providing for more efficient utilization of Negro manpower. This view was reinforced by the observation that, although the

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number of Negro units and the number of available jobs had increased as a result of the New policy, there had been little expansion in the type of job available to Negroes. One effect was to deny Negroes the opportunity for further training in Army schools. Another objection was the denial of enlistment to otherwise qualified Negroes because the quota was full.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Because the Navy and Air Force had already implemented the policy of integration, the Committee's recommendations to them were more or less routine. Four recommendations were made to the Army:

1. That all Army jobs be opened to qualified personnel regardless of race or color.
2. That all Army schools be similarly opened.
3. That the policy of restricting Negroes to racial units and overhead installations be rescinded so that all Army personnel might be assigned according to individual qualifications and the Army's requirements.
4. That the racial quota be abolished.

All of these recommendations were implemented by appropriate directives, but insufficient time remained for the Committee to evaluate the success of the new policies.

CONCLUSIONS

In general, the Committee concluded that many Negroes have special skills and qualifications and should be treated as individuals rather than as members of a race and that all three services had underestimated the range of Negro skills with a consequent waste of some of these skills.

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In evaluating its work, the Committee made no reference to the civilian attitude toward integration but expressed itself as being satisfied that integration was working in the Navy and Air Force and had created much less of a problem than had been anticipated. In line with its feeling that the only men who should be permitted to enlist were those who would make good soldiers, the Committee objected to the quota system on both moral and practical grounds.

In brief, the Committee felt that the democratic ideals expressed in the words "equality of opportunity and treatment" were not antagonistic to conditions making for military efficiency. On the contrary, it believed that inequality had contributed to inefficiency and that, where steps had been taken toward equalizing opportunity, improvement had followed.

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V1. Supreme Court Decisions

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~~LEGAL CONCERN: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS~~

The Supreme Court has handed down, in recent years, decisions in which certain "Jim Crow" practices are cited as violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ¹ While none of these decisions applies to the armed services, a few interpret broad problems in which the Army has an interest.

The Court has ruled, for example, on equality of opportunity and treatment for Negro graduate students at state universities. Once a Negro is admitted to graduate instruction at a state university, special treatment because of his race, e.g. assignment to a specified seat in the classroom, library or cafeteria, constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. ² A state must, furthermore, provide legal education for Negro students as soon as it does for applicants of any other group. ³ Furthermore, if separate law schools for Negroes and whites are maintained by a state, a Negro applicant must be admitted to the white school if it is superior. Superiority, as defined by the Court, depends not only upon members of faculty, variety of courses, scope of the library, etc., but also upon such unmeasurable qualifications as professional reputation of the faculty members, traditions and prestige. One mark of the inferiority of a Negro school would be the enforced absence of those white students with whom the prospective Negro lawyer would be expected, eventually, to have most of his professional associations. ⁴ Since any state-provided Negro law school would probably prove inferior in these respects, the ruling makes the duplication of law school facilities for the two races a useless method for maintaining segregation.

x See Thurgood Marshall, "The Supreme Court as Protection of Civil Rights," in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 275, May 1951, pp. 101-110.

- 2/33 339 US 637
- 3/33 332 US 631
- 4/33 339 US 629

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Of what significance are such rulings insofar as the Army is concerned? If it is assumed that advanced training in service schools or in officer candidate schools is analogous, within the military establishment, to graduate training in the state university, it would follow that the Army, in order to adhere to the spirit of the Supreme Court decisions, should:

1. Make no distinctions based upon race in its treatment of white and Negro servicemen training in the same schools.
2. Provide the identical range of training for Negroes as for whites if separate schools are maintained.
3. Permit Negro applicants to attend any white school which is superior to its Negro counterpart.

Actually, the Army's present policy more than fulfills these conditions. Negroes and whites are, according to this policy, admitted to the same service schools and officer candidate schools; no special facilities are provided for the two races. ~~Policy, alone, however, cannot go so far~~ to insure equity in the military establishment as can a Supreme Court ruling in a state university. In any of the armed services, ^{regardless of} an individual's ^{no one} qualifications for attendance at any school are ~~less definitely established~~ than are those of a civilian applicant for graduate study. Furthermore, even though the military applicant be obviously qualified for certain advanced training, assignment to a school cannot be assured. The conflicting requirements of Military expediency might make it necessary for him to remain at his present assignment, to receive training in a less-crowded specialty, or to proceed to combat without further training. ~~The Negro~~

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who is denied a particular type of military training, therefore, is in a position distinctly different from that of the Negro civilian barred from a state law school. He is less able to prove that he is a suitable applicant or that his race, rather than other circumstances, has barred him from the training he desires. ~~He enlisted men, white or Negro, has, under existing policy, the established right to any advanced training.~~

← (104) Which men receive such training, therefore, remains, in large measure, within the discretion of local commanders. In order to comply with the spirit of the Supreme Court decisions and, more specifically, with the Army's stated policy, these commanders ^{are obligated to} ~~should~~ select men for special training according to the criteria of individual qualifications and military necessity, ~~without restrictions based on race, ignoring the racial factor.~~

^{until recently} ~~One of the traditional aspects of the Army's racial policy has been~~ ^{included a quota based on} the concept that the percentage of Negroes within the military establishment ^{not exceed} ~~should correspond to~~ their percentage in the total population. The Army has recently abolished this quota both for enlistment and for the composition of any unit. Some military authorities, however, still consider the limitation of Negro troops as essential to the Army's efficiency.

Recent rulings by the Supreme Court concerning Negro representation on grand and petit juries have an indirect bearing upon the Army's problem. Insofar as the male population is concerned, service on a jury and involuntary service in the armed forces are, in some respects, similar: both are duties of the citizen who meets certain requirements of health and intelligence; furthermore, a selecting authority requests the performance of duty in both cases.

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The Federal Constitution prohibits racial discrimination in the selection of jurors. Racial discrimination, as defined by the Court, means "purposeful, systematic, non-inclusion because of color. It does not mean an absence of proportional representation . . .¹ Though the group from which jurors are selected must include qualified members of the Negro population, it is not required that any particular jury include Negroes.² On the other hand, the imposition of a limiting quota on the pool from which jurors are selected or on the composition of a particular jury is prohibited by the Constitution and by Act of Congress.³

The Army's current policies correspond, insofar as the quota is concerned, with the decisions governing juries handed down by the Supreme Court. Exclusion, on the basis of race, from service or from assignment to any unit or training school is now prohibited. Furthermore, Army policy prohibits the use of a percentage, either as a limitation or a requirement, in the enlisting, assigning or training of Negroes. Qualities other than race are the only sanctioned criteria.

The rulings of the Supreme Court in respect to juries have established a principle which the Army should take into account if it ever considers the re-establishment of a racial quota. The re-adoption of proportional representation within the military establishment ^{might} would make Army policy inconsistent with this principle. To avoid such inconsistency while at the same time preventing the large-scale induction of Negroes of low mental qualification into the Army, requires a tightening of selection standards. A recent directive from the Secretary of Defense has already raised the minimum mental qualification level required for induction into

1/ 339 US 282
 2/ Ibid.
 3/ Ibid.

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any of the armed services. At the moment, the Army is suffering no disadvantage in the quality of its inductees because the racial quota has been abandoned.

In the event of total mobilization, however, the Army is likely to face a manpower shortage. If enlistment standards are lowered to provide greater quantities of manpower, the Army will probably find itself ^{confronted} ~~burdened~~ with large numbers of personnel of low mental qualification, a large percentage of which ^{will be} ~~are~~ Negroes. Under such circumstances, the ^{the "obvious" expedient} ~~Army~~ might ^{be urged} ~~feel justified in re-establishing~~ ^{most of} a racial quota. If, however, it is low mental qualification rather than race which threatens military efficiency, ~~it is difficult to understand how recourse to the quota would~~ ^{be treating a symptom rather than a cause,} ~~solve the problem more effectively than careful control~~ ^{and} ~~the~~ relaxation of standards for induction. ^{and} ~~recourse~~ ^{would} ~~not~~

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CITIZENS' CONCERN: THE PRESS

On the New Racial Policy of the Army.

In January, 1950, Army policy made news headlines. A few days prior to any announcement from the Pentagon, newspapers began to report that Negro soldiers would soon be assigned to white units to fill military occupational specialties for which they were qualified.¹ On 16 January, the report was confirmed by an official statement from Gordon Gray, Secretary of the Army. This statement too was noted by the daily press.²

Most of the articles published cited the role of the President's Committee on Equality of Opportunity and Treatment in bringing about this move toward integration of white and Negro troops. Mention was made of the Army's previous steps toward increased equality, namely the opening of all occupational specialties and all special schools to Negroes without regard to race. The new directive, allowing Negroes to find suitable assignments outside the narrow limits of the Army's all-Negro units, was described as a significant departure from the Army's former policy of virtual segregation. Several columnists noted that abolition of the racial quota governing Negro enlistments had still to be achieved.

I In the Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor and Chicago Defender,³ the Navy and Air Force were cited as having been more prompt in bringing their racial policies into line with the recommendations of the President's Committee. The tone of these articles implied a reluctance on the part of the Army to follow the example set by the other two services.

1. "Army to Integrate Negro Personnel", The Atlanta Journal, 12 Jan. 1950. "Gray to Demand Army Commanders Assign Qualified Negroes to Any Unit", Miami Daily News, 12 Jan. 1950. "Army to Curb Segregation in New Policy", The Washington Post, 12 Jan. 1950.

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1. continued: "Opening Army Doors for Negroes" and "Army to End Practice of Segregation", Christian Science Monitor, 16 January, 1950. "Expect New Race Policy for Army," Chicago Defender, 14 January 1950. "Periscope: Break for Negro Troops," Newsweek, 16 January, 1950.
2. "Army Acts to Assure Troops Racial Equality," Baltimore Sun, 17 January, 1950. "Army Tightens Anti-Bias Policy", Philadelphia Inquirer, 17 January 1950.
3. Op. cit.

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On the Negro's Status at Military Installations in the United States

The Negro Press, consisting of 150 newspapers and several major magazines*, is always alert for news of tolerance or discrimination. The racial policies of the armed services and their implementation are, naturally, of special interest to these news organs and their combined total of three million readers. For the past fifteen months all three armed services have been operating on the policy lines recommended by the President's Committee on Equality of Opportunity and Treatment. The Negro serviceman's present status should, therefore, show a distinct improvement.

Collins C. George, in a series of articles currently running in the Pittsburg Courier, describes conditions as he has observed them at Army, Navy and Air Force installations in the United States. Mr. George's language clearly conveys the subjective reactions of a Negro writer reporting on a situation in which he and his readers have an emotional interest. The wide range of his evaluations, however, is an indication that he has made some keen comparative observations.

At each of his visits to service installations, Mr. George sought the answer to one major question; "How far has racial integration actually superseded the old pattern of strict segregation?" In each case, as he discovered, a combination of several factors influenced the end results. These factors were (1) decisions at high levels, (2) the attitude of local commanders, (3) the attitude of local civilians, and (4) the attitude of the men themselves.

*George S. Schuyler, "The Phantom American Negro," condensed from The Freeman for The Reader's Digest, July, 1951, p.62.

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Decisions at High Levels: Mr. George found, particularly at Army posts, an overall inconsistency in respect to integration. Integrated and segregated units were stationed side by side at the same camp. In most cases, the base complement, reception and training facilities were operating on an integrated pattern. Yet a few Negro units, cut off from the more fluid situation which characterized the rest of the camp, were found to be working and living separately.¹ In some cases, an all-Negro unit was duplicating the work of a white unit.² All-white organizations, usually of National Guard origin, complicated the picture at other camps. The "Dixie" Division, a National Guard outfit from Alabama and Mississippi remained aloof from the mixed "Golden Arrow" Division with which it was sharing Fort Jackson.³ At Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, where there were several National Guards units, each reflecting its state's racial pattern, the over-all policy of the camp was found to be confused.⁴ It was "old-time Army thinking", in Mr. George's opinion, which still permitted these vestiges of segregation within the framework of a liberal military policy. The assignment of mixed and separate units to the same camps accentuated the inconsistency.

After visits to Norfolk Naval Base and New London Submarine Base, Mr. George concluded that there were two blots upon the Navy's generally excellent record of integration. The steward's branch remained an exclusively Negro-Asiatic branch: on each base he found a steward's company living and working apart from the other personnel.⁵ Furthermore, the number of Negro Naval officers, less than twenty in the entire service, seemed unreasonably low.⁶ Mr. George praised, however,

1. "Camp Rucker Fine, Surroundings Bad", The Pittsburg Courier, Washington Edition 7 April 1951. "Segregated Unit Sore Spot at Maxwell Field Air Base", Ibid., 14 April, 1951. "Camp Gordon Takes Beating from Augusta", Ibid., 28 April 1951. "Fort Devens Represents Dual Policy", Ibid., 16 June 1951.

2. "Camp Gordon", Ibid., 14 April 1951, and "Fort Devens", Ibid., 16 June 1951.

3. "Fort Jackson Works Hard at Integration", Ibid., 21 April 1951.

4. "Camp Edwards Jekyll-Hyde of U.S. Army", Ibid., 23 June 1951.

5. "Naval Base Has Villain: Norfolk City", Ibid., 19 May 1951; and "Navy Policy Shunts Aside Race Officers", Ibid., 2 June, 1951.

6. "Race Officers", Ibid., 2 June 1951.

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the Navy directive on equality of treatment and opportunity, designating it as the most direct, specific and unequivocal of the three services.^{1.}

Attitude of Local Commanders: Differences in the attitudes of local commanders and their subordinate officers produced, Mr. George noted, a variety of conditions at the several installations. At Camp Rucker, surrounded by an unsympathetic Alabama community, the tactful and fair practices of the officers had produced a harmonious camp where the majority of personnel were integrated in their work, living accommodations and recreational facilities.^{2.} Negro sailors at New London Submarine Base spoke with unanimous enthusiasm of their skipper, Captain Charles Triebel: his fairness had, they felt, substantially contributed to the harmony existing among Negroes and whites.^{3.}

In talks with a few commanders, Mr. George reports he was informed that a particular Negro unit remained segregated by its own request. This preference was claimed for a base service squadron at Maxwell Field Air Base, Alabama. Most members of the squadron, however, denied that their segregation was voluntary and deeply resented the fact that their portion of the camp was remote and ill-kept. This unit was, Mr. George felt, being used as a catch-all for a large percentage of the Negro personnel arriving at the base.^{4.}

Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, provided Mr. George with his worst example of command attitude. In disregard of the President's Executive Order, racial integration was virtually non-existent. Negro units had been removed from their natural locations in groups doing similar work and had been assembled in one area of the camp. They were deprived of equal recreational facilities. A Negro soldier, arriving at the camp with his National Guard outfit, was transferred to a Negro unit, in violation of Army policy. Another Negro, a combat veteran of World War II, had objected to a segregated billet; he was subjected to two courts martial and strip-

1. "Naval Base Has Villain", Ibid., 19 May 1951.
2. "Camp Rucker", Ibid., 7 April 1951.
3. "Race Officers", Ibid., 2 June 1951.
4. "Maxwell Air Base", Ibid., 14 April 1951.

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ped of his decorations. It was reported that the men, when questioned, all indicated that Col. Bullard, the Camp commander, recently transferred, was primarily responsible for the maintenance of segregation and the resulting low morale.¹ The Deputy Post Commander was thought to be responsible for a similar situation at Fort Bragg.²

The Attitude of Local Civilians: At bi-racial installations located in the South, Mr. George heard numerous complaints from Negro servicemen about the hostility of neighboring civilians. Jim Crow bus and taxi services connected the camps with nearby towns where there were but a few run-down entertainment facilities open to Negroes.³ Local white girls were reluctant to attend dances on the post if Negroes were to be present.⁴ Those civilians employed in the post exchanges treated Negroes with discourtesy.⁵ Negro servicemen at Fort Jackson complained that even the Negro civilians in the area seemed unsympathetic.⁶ Mr. George found that, in many cases, Negro personnel were reluctant to leave the post.

In the North, civilian attitudes were more sympathetic. Mr. George reported mixed post dances and mixed dancing at Fort Devens, Massachusetts,⁷ and Fort Dix, New Jersey.⁸ When one officer at the latter installation sought to prevent such dances, he was overridden by a predominantly white citizen's committee from Philadelphia.⁹ The North, however, had, as Mr. George reported, some remaining prejudices. In one of the two housing projects for Naval personnel near New London, Negro families were grouped together in the most remote, least attractive area.¹⁰

1. "Camp McCoy Race Policy Vilest in U.S.", Ibid., 9 June 1951.
2. "Jim Crow Still King at Fort Bragg", Ibid., 12 May 1951.
3. "Camp Rucker", Ibid., 7 April 1951 and "Camp Gordon", Ibid., 28 April 1951
4. "Camp Gordon", Ibid., 28 April 1951.
5. "Maxwell Air Base", Ibid., 14 April 1951.
6. "Fort Jackson", Ibid., 21 April 1951.
7. "Fort Devens", 16 June 1951, Ibid.
8. "Jim Crow is Kicked Out at Fort Dix", Ibid., 5 May 1951.
9. "Fort Dix" Ibid., 5 May 1951.
10. "Race Officers", Ibid., 2 June 1951.

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Civilian attitude, it was found, could neither make nor break the harmonious integration of whites and Negroes on military posts. Negroes were pleased with the way they were treated at Camp Rucker, Alabama, and Norfolk Naval Base and confined their complaints to conditions outside the installations. Conversely, although the all-white community surrounding Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, had welcomed Negro servicemen and made provisions for their entertainment,¹ discriminatory practises on the post had sustained segregation and lowered morale.

Attitude of the Men Themselves: In general, Mr. George reported, Negro servicemen were well treated by their white colleagues both at work and in the shared living and recreational facilities. There were complaints that white Military Police from Camp Rucker adopted, when off the post, the attitude toward Negroes of the local civilian police.² Eighteen white soldiers from the same camp, however, had accompanied a Negro buddy when he was forced into a Jim Crow railway coach at Birmingham.³ It was reported at Fort Jackson that, once the initial shock of integration had been absorbed, it was the Southern rather than the Northern whites who tended to form close friendships with Negro soldiers.⁴ A Negro sergeant at Fort Devens observed, "Out only trouble is that too many of us just segregate ourselves."⁵ In all, there appeared to be less racial friction and less griping from Negro soldiers at those installations where integration was most widely practised.

Mr. George's articles convey the impression that integration has been most extensively and successfully achieved in the reception and training processes at armed services installations. In the assignment of personnel to mixed units according to individual qualifications, the Army is reputed to have shown less progress than either the Navy or Air Force. Although, in all three services,

1. "Camp McCoy", Ibid., 9 June 1951.
2. "Camp Rucker", Ibid., 7 April 1951.
3. "Camp Rucker", Ibid., 7 April 1951.
4. "Fort Jackson", Ibid., 21 April 1951.
5. "Fort Devens", Ibid., 16 June 1951.

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the sharing of recreational facilities has lagged somewhat behind integration at work or in living quarters, this lag is most pronounced at some of the Army camps. No instances were observed in which Negro officers had been assigned to positions of command over mixed units, a situation which Mr. George felt was the most evident vestige of former discrimination. The Navy, in respect to the number of its Negro officers, appeared to have made less progress than either the Army or the Air Force. On the basis of observations made to date, Mr. George concluded that every installation, except Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was attempting to approach the President's policy of equality of opportunity and treatment.

On the Present Combat Performance of Negro Troops: American troops now fighting in Korea include several integrated units and the all-Negro 24th Infantry Regiment. For the first time, therefore, it is possible to compare Negro combat performance in the two types of organization. Recently, a magazine with nation-wide circulation has undertaken such a comparison as reported by Harold E. Martin.¹

There is general agreement in the Korean command, Martin states, that the 24th Infantry Regiment, despite the gallantry of some of its men, has been a poor combat risk. Although the Regiment could usually be counted upon to perform well in daylight, there has been a consistent and alarming tendency for the troops to "melt" or "bugout" in night engagements, either offensive or defensive. The problem of keeping Negro sentries awake against surprise sallies has never been solved. Whenever troops from the 24th scattered before the enemy, it was reported, they abandoned their rifles and other equipment, thereby causing a drain upon the available supplies. The regiment came, eventually, to adopt a defeatist attitude toward its own effectiveness, going so far as to celebrate its inefficiency in a special regimental song. The combination of poor performance and low morale

1. "How Do Our Negro Troops Measure Up?"; The Saturday Evening Post, 16 June 1951.

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produced an unusual number of disciplinary incidents, including the court martial of Lt. Gilbert who flatly refused to lead his men against the enemy. Gilbert was given the death sentence, later reduced to twenty years. Official testimony revealed that Lt. Gilbert withdrew with his command from an outpost line, without orders. This unauthorized withdrawal was exploited by the enemy causing the main line of resistance to yield.¹

The approach used in depicting the performance of the 24th by Mr. H. L. Martin was criticized by former commander of the 24th, Col. John T. Corley, who when interviewed by the Courier's correspondent² stated that Mr. Martin "had selected the bad points of the regiment to play up, forgetting almost entirely the good points". The correspondent writes that "although he (Col. Corley) defended the regiment against some of the untruths and half truths of the article, Colonel Corley was careful not to say the regiment had a fine record. He said the regiment's record was spotty". Col. Corley also refused to compare the regiment with any other regiment of the Korean war; he commented that the timeliness of the article was very bad. "If it had been accurate, but today, when the regiment is doing some of its best fighting, the article is in no way characteristic."

Under the new leadership of Colonel Arthur S. Champeny, the 24th Infantry Regiment has made marked improvements. Recognizing that Negroes had an initial sense of inferiority because of discriminations at home and that many members of the 24th had been taken from uneventful garrison duty in Japan and plunged into strange terrain where they were constantly under attack, Colonel Champeny set out to give self-esteem to this unit. He praised good performance whenever

1. Report of Investigation concerning 24th Infantry Regiment and Negro Soldiers in Combat. - Wm.O. Perry, Col.,IGD, Inspector General, 8th U.S.Army ,Korea(EUSAK) Tab B-1, Testimony of Paul F. Roberts, Lt.Col. Inf.O-33825, 24th Inf.Reg.,Executive Officer, 13 Sept.1950.

2. Pittsburg Courier, Washington Edition, Article by Frank Whisonant "True Story of the 24th: Colonel Corley Gives Facts to Courier War Reporter".June 23,1951 pp.1.4

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possible, referred to the Regiment as "The Fighting 24th", reasoned gently but firmly with individual delinquents and asked the chaplains to assist in instilling confidence in the men. By these measures, he has been able partially to overcome the exaggerated fear of the enemy which originally characterized members of the regiment. Performance has, accordingly, improved.

Many commanders have asked, however, whether this long effort has been worth the time, loss of equipment and the loss of life it has entailed. No such problems have arisen in those combat units to which individual Negroes have been assigned as replacements. In these integrated units, it was reported, the Negro soldiers have fought as well as their white colleagues and many Negroes have demonstrated excellent capacities for combat initiative and leadership. Furthermore, there has been no friction between the white and Negro members of mixed units; admiration for good performance has precluded the development of any latent racial antagonisms. Martin concluded that the sense of being treated as an American soldier rather than as a Negro, the confidence gained through constant association with white soldiers and the knowledge that he can advance according to his individual talents have made the Negro in integrated units a dependable and efficient combat soldier.

Conclusion:

Steps toward racial integration within the armed services have received much publicity in the American press. Evidence that American Negroes are enjoying equality of opportunity and treatment is of special importance because it contradicts one of the dominant themes of Communist propaganda. In this connection, George S. Schuyler's article in the current issue of The Reader's Digest* merits attention.

* The Phantom American Negro", condensed from The Freeman, July 1951.

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Writing as a Negro and as associate editor of the most prominent Negro newspaper in the country, he cites the new policies of the armed services among the many recent improvements in the status of his race. Opportunity to serve with dignity in the armed forces is listed together with lengthened average education for Negroes, advancement of Negroes in business and the professions and the increase in Negro-owned property as an indication that the American Negro group can no longer be considered an oppressed minority. Satisfaction on this score within the Negro population cannot fail to deprive anti-American propagandists of one further weapon.

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SCIENTIFIC CONCERN

So far in this report we have weighed historical data, the considered judgments of qualified military personnel, and the opinions of informed civilians and responsible officials who have interested themselves in the problems of the Negro. Subjectivity enters into all information of these types. However, when such information is supported by the findings of scientists, it takes on more validity; and demographers, anthropologists, and sociologists have accumulated vast amounts of information on the Negro. In this section the findings of these scientists are considered insofar as they bear on the problem at hand. It must be recognized that only a limited analysis and evaluation of these findings has been possible for this preliminary report.

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DEMOGRAPHIC STUDIES

Part I. Economic and Demographic Trends in White and Negro Population of the United States*
Population Ratio:

Since 1900, Negroes have accounted for approximately 10 per cent of the population of the United States. Census data and other statistics indicate that this percentage will remain relatively constant during the next few decades. The Negro birth rate is higher than the white, but its effect on the Negro-white ratio is minimized by a difference in death rates and by a small but predominantly white immigration into the United States.

Geographic Distribution:

Of much more importance to the Army than the 1-9 ratio of Negroes to whites is the geographic distribution of the Negro population. There is evidence to show that the relative concentration of Negroes in the South is being reduced (by migration to other parts of the country), but in 1950, two-thirds of all Negroes in the United States were living in the South. There they make up one-fifth of the population, compared with one-twentieth in the Northeastern and North Central parts of the country and less than one-thirtieth in the West.

Urban-Rural Distribution:

Within the several major regions of the country, there is considerable difference in the distribution of the white and Negro populations as between rural and urban. The census of 1950 shows that approximately three-fifths of each group is urbanized, but a breakdown by regions gives the following figures:

| | <u>Per Cent Urban</u> | | |
|---------------|-----------------------|--------------|--------------|
| | <u>Total</u> | <u>White</u> | <u>Negro</u> |
| North East | 78.2% | 77.6% | 91.7% |
| North Central | 63.1% | 61.6% | 91.5% |
| West | 67.9% | 67.5% | 91.5% |
| South | 46.3% | 46.6% | 45.4% |

* Analysis of study prepared by the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University.

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


Figure 7. Percentage of Whites and Negroes Living in Urban Areas, for the US and the South: 1950

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


Figure 2.⁸ Crude Rate of Natural Increase by Color, for the United States: 1917-1948

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



Figure #. ⁹ Number of Males Aged 18-37, by Color, for the United States 1940 and 1950, and Estimated Number 1955

These figures indicate that practically all Negroes leaving the South settle in Northern cities while the majority of Negroes remaining in the South live in rural areas. In terms of military deferment policies, this regional difference is of great importance, especially when one bears in mind that many of the Negroes moving into urban areas find employment in semi-skilled and unskilled occupations that do not merit draft deferment.

Age Distribution:

Another factor of importance to the Army is the relative size of the white and Negro populations of military age. Currently, the Army is dependent upon the "lean crop" of children born during the period of declining birthrate that set in shortly after World War I and lasted through the Depression. This decline in birth rate was less pronounced among the Negroes than among the whites, with the result that there are relatively more Negroes than whites of military age at present. The great increase in both white and Negro birth rates since the Depression will redress this situation in another five to ten years, but right now the Army's problem is exemplified by the fact that there were actually fewer men in the 18-29 age group in 1950 than there were in 1940, despite the great over all gain in population in that ten-year period.

Educational Differences:

Apart from numbers, there are qualitative factors that affect Army policies with reference to whites and Negroes. One of the most important of these is education. In 1940, about one in seven white males over 20 years of age had had less than six years of formal schooling. More than half of the male Negro population fell below this standard. At the other end of the scale, one in eight whites had had some college training, but only one in thirty Negroes had had this advantage.

Census data show that this wide discrepancy in educational opportunity may

be diminishing, at least on the elementary level, but the 1950 figures for the 14-24 age group still reflect wide discrepancies, somewhat more pronounced in the South than in other regions. Here again is a situation that is in process of improvement, but the Army will have to wait another five to ten years to reap the benefits.

Dependency Status:


Dependency appears to have little bearing on military availability as between white and Negro. The only (minor) differences that appear are that the Negro father will tend to have more dependent children and will have married somewhat earlier than a white father.

Types of Employment:

As has already been indicated, the bulk of Negroes migrating into Northern urban areas seeking employment find that employment in positions involving little or no skill. Percentage-wise, the white and Negro male populations fall into the following employment categories:

| | <u>White</u> | <u>Negro</u> |
|--------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Professional, managerial, etc. | 23.0% | 5.6% |
| "White collar" jobs | 38.5% | 16.6% |
| Service and laboring jobs | 38.5% | 77.8% |



The importance of this difference in types of employment as between Negroes and whites is emphasized by the relative earning power of each group. Thus, in 1949, the average income of white families was nearly \$3,000 per year, while that of Negro families was about \$1,400 a year - less than half as great. As a result, Negroes eligible for military service are less apt to have jobs that carry with them draft deferments and are much less apt to have had the opportunity for extended or special schooling than their white counterparts. Accordingly, from



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Figure 7. Distribution of White and Non-White Employed Males by Major Type of Occupation, for the United States: 1950

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Figure 8. Median Income of Non-Farm Families by Color,
for the United States and the South: 1949

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the Northern industrial areas, the Army is confronted with the problem of having more draft-eligible Negroes than the traditional 10 per cent and these Negroes are less apt to have skills of immediate use to the Army than a comparable cross section of white men from the same areas.

In this respect, the situation in the South is different. There, where 34.5% of all Negro men are engaged in agriculture, deferments are a major factor in manpower planning. However, the 53.1% of Southern Negroes engaged in service and labor occupations are in essentially the same position as their fellow men in urban areas elsewhere in the country.

Part II. Fitness of the Negro Population Available for Military Service in World War II*

Rates of Rejection:

During World War II, the Armed Forces were able to draw upon approximately 2,179,000 Negroes males in the age group 18-37. This number represented a slightly higher percentage (10.11) than the percentage of Negroes in the total population (9.8). This disproportion was offset to some extent by the higher rejection rate for Negroes (two out of five, compared with slightly more than one out of four whites), but the higher rate of white deferment because of occupation still left a higher proportion of Negroes available for military service than their proportion in the population at large.

By regions, rejection ran higher in the South than in the North for Negroes (about 44 per cent as against about 32 per cent). Possibly as a result of the improving educational standards in the South, the rejection rate there was not as high in the younger groups as in the older groups eligible for military service.

Reasons for Rejection:

Percentage-wise, fewer Negroes than whites were rejected on physical grounds. Thus, just over half of Negro rejections were physical, while nearly three-quarters

*Analysis of study prepared by the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University

ters of white rejections were physical. By contrast, fewer than one in ten whites were rejected on mental grounds related to education, whereas one out of three Negroes was so disqualified.

Among the physical reasons for rejection, syphilis ranked first for Negroes, accounting for one-sixth of the rejections. Fewer than two per cent of the whites were rejected for syphilis.

When reasons for rejection are analyzed regionally, both educational deficiency and syphilis occurred with greater frequency in the South. Education tended to be less important as a basis for rejection of Northern Negroes; in the Midwest, for example, Negro rejection on educational grounds was lower than white rejection on that ground in the South. But syphilis rejections ran significantly higher in all regions of the country for Negroes than for whites.

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RESEARCH FINDINGS

ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Negro Abilities

Effects of racial characteristics: The physical differences which distinguish one large grouping of mankind from another have long been studied by anthropologists. Three racial stocks may be classified on the basis of physical characteristics. They are the Caucasoid (white), Mongoloid (yellow), Negroid (black) races. There is so much overlapping among the three racial stocks in the American population that no one nor any set of them is typical only of Negroes.

The scientists who have studied human races emphasize the fact that the term "race" refers only to biological characteristics such as skin color and hair form, and that no correlation has been established between such physical characteristics, and any particular type of mental or temperamental traits have been proved to be characteristic of Negroes or of any other race. Indeed, to a biologist or to a physical anthropologist, the very physical differences which loom so large in the eyes of laymen appear as very minor modifications within the human species. A leading physical anthropologist, Professor Wilton Marion Krogman, puts it in this way, "There are observable and measurable physical differences in mankind that

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do permit of stock and racial categorization. But these differences are biologically unimportant and may even be genetically evanescent."

(Krogman 1945, 61) The last phrase concerning racial genetics refers to scientific evidence which indicates that the racial divisions, as we now know them, are not fixed and unchangeable classes, but have changed in the past and may well do so in the future.

Negroes, then, are neither inferior nor superior because of their physical, "racial" characteristics. These characteristics, skin color, hair form, and facial cast, are inherited, but there is no evidence to indicate that particular mental or personality traits are inherited along with them. There is no need to pile up either evidence or statements from authorities on this score. Anthropologists do have widely differing views on some subjects, but on this matter they are unanimously in accord. And it is even difficult for an anthropologist to believe that anyone who has studied the subject seriously can entertain other views. Thus Earnest A. Hooton writes, "In common with all reputable anthropologists, I abhor the vicious nonsense about racial inequality and particularly 'Nordic' or 'Aryan' superiority, put out by German propagandists and by others under the guise of anthropology. No intelligent person with a scientific training in anthropology has anything but scorn for these unfounded claims, fanatical ravings, and faked facts." Hooton 1946, 660)

Yet these statements by scientists may well appear to non-scientists to contradict the evidence of everyday experience with Negroes. And in the Army Negroes generally make lower scores on tests of various kinds than do whites. Thus a two per cent sample of the Army in March 1945 showed that a much higher percentage of Negroes than of whites were within the lowest

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group, Class V, on the Army General Classification Test. In this test 28% of the Negro enlisted men, compared with only 3% of the white enlisted men, were in the lowest class. (Stauffer 1949, I 492)

But what these tests measure and what everyday experience reflects are not necessarily innate racial characteristics but simply the outcome of a certain kind of social environment and educational opportunities. In World War I as in World War II Negroes scored lower than did whites on the tests which were then in use, the Army Alpha and the Army Beta Tests. But Negroes from Ohio and Indiana, for example, scored higher in both tests than did whites from Kentucky and Mississippi. While the test data from World War II have not yet been as extensively published and analyzed, such analyses may well reveal that northern Negroes frequently and perhaps consistently scored higher on the Army General Classification Test than did southern whites.

In commenting on the World War I example, Otto Klineberg notes that the most probable interpretation of this finding is that when American Negroes live under relatively favorable environmental conditions their test scores are correspondingly high, and when whites live under relatively poor conditions their test scores are correspondingly low. "It is apparently not 'race' but environment which is the crucial variable."

But these negative conclusions from many decades of the most painstaking scientific labor, Myrdal adds, stand in glaring contrast to the firm conviction held by many white Americans that there are fundamental psychic differences between Negroes and whites. The reason for this contrast is not so much that the ordinary white American has made an error in observation, for the average Negro does rank lower on intelligence and other

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tests, but that he has made an error in inferring that observed differences were innate and a part of nature. He has not been able to discern the influence of differences between Negroes and whites in nutrition, in schooling, as well as in many more subtle life experiences. Moreover, the ordinary white American tends to make many observational errors on this subject, because his observations are necessarily limited and frequently biased.

Negro achievements and capacities: True though all this may be from the point of view of science, Army policy is concerned with the best practical utilization of Negro manpower now, rather than with the potentialities of Negroes given better social opportunities at some future date. Two questions must be answered from the standpoint of the practicalities of Army policy. One is, has the degree of integration effected in the Army been far in advance of Negro social participation in civilian life generally, such as in industry and education? The Army is neither an instrument for social reform nor for social regression and must not, if it is to fulfill its mission effectively, digress greatly from the norms and standards of American life.

The answer cannot be given in terms of any exact measurements, but it appears that Army policy has followed rather than anticipated the general social trend. In recent decades there has been a great change in the status and function of the Negro, even in the southern states. Some phases of this change have been summarized by the Negro sociologist, E. Franklin Frazier, whose conclusions may be cited here.

Frazier points out that as American society has become more mobile and secular in its outlook, people are no longer bound by former traditions and fixed local sentiments. For example, with the appearance of the filling station, there was not the same insistence upon separate toilet facilities as in the case of the railway station. Likewise separation in traveling by

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air has not been enforced as in the case of railroads. The effect of the increased physical mobility of the population on customary and even legal practices regarding race relations was accentuated during World War II. In the upper tier of the southern states, the constant movement of large numbers of people tended to wipe out segregation on trains. Even under normal circumstances in the larger cities of the South there has been much relaxation of the caste-like controls in race relations which have characterized the rural South. In the metropolitan areas of the North, where there is greater anonymity and contacts are more casual and impersonal, the Negro escapes from most of the caste restrictions of the South.

Not only have there been changes in the conditions of Negro life, but there have been marked shifts in the white attitude toward and stereotype of the Negro. There has been a wider dissemination of knowledge through the extension of the public school system to the remotest rural areas. The increase in high school and more especially college attendance has brought an increasing number of persons in contact with scientific knowledge concerning races and race relations. Even more important has been the role of the radio and the movie in spreading information and in producing greater uniformity of ideas and attitudes.

All this indicates that the country as a whole is moving in the direction of integration, but it must not be overlooked that in the South formal segregation still exists and that widely in the country there is some degree both of informal segregation and of self-segregation by Negroes. The only real test of whether Army integration is too far in advance of the nation's trend in that direction is whether serious conflict or antagonism has arisen as a result of integration in the Army or in the other military services. No such friction or overwhelming opposition has been manifest.

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The second practical question concerning Negro achievements is whether Negroes now have the capacity to be employed throughout the Army structure, especially in positions of leadership. It is clear that among Negroes there are some individuals who can perform the most exacting technical tasks in the Army's list. For example, there are Negroes who are skilled electronics technicians. There are proportionately fewer Negroes than whites in such work because these jobs require a certain educational base which fewer Negroes than whites now have. But it must be noted that in the matter of educational base a large proportion of Negroes are now more advanced than a considerable segment of the white population. A special tabulation which was made for the Research Branch of the Army by the United States Bureau of the Census shows that, at the younger age groups, the proportion of northern Negro males in the American population in 1940 who had gone beyond the eighth grade in school was as high as or higher than that of southern whites. (Stauffer 1949, I 490)

The crucial question then, in regard to such skilled jobs, is not whether a man is Negro or white, but whether he has had the educational background required for the task. And on this matter, insofar as primary schooling is concerned, northern Negroes are becoming as well or better endowed as are southern whites.

For many important responsibilities, such as those of noncommissioned officers in a line company, no advanced educational background is necessary. The record of Negro noncoms in the integrated outfits now activated and in combat action indicates that there will probably be no disproportionate lack of noncommissioned leadership from Negroes under a policy of more complete integration.

The matter of officer leadership is similar to that of skilled tech-

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nical ratings. The record, especially the recent Korean record, shows that Negro company officers can effectively lead integrated companies. But there will continue to be a smaller proportion of Negro officers in relation to total Negro strength in the Army because there are proportionately fewer Negroes than whites who now have the educational qualifications necessary for entering Officer Candidate Schools. This is also true for southern whites when compared to northern whites, but the disproportion is offset in the case of southern whites by the higher proportion of qualified southern whites than of qualified northern whites who seek officer's careers in the Army. The same process may turn out to be true for Negroes. That is, the lower proportion of men educationally qualified to be officers among Negroes may be offset by the higher proportion who make the Army their professional career.

Myrdal devotes ten chapters to the matter of Negro leadership and concerted action in civilian life. (Myrdal 1944, 667-926) His evidence, as it relates to our present discussion, indicates that there has been no dearth of leadership among Negroes but that there have been very few and drastically straitened opportunities for that leadership to be effective. Under a policy of integration in the Army, it may be expected that an adequate proportion of leadership will be available from Negroes on the noncommissioned level. There will be proportionately fewer Negro officers for some time to come, until the steadily rising educational qualifications among Negroes reaches a position which approximates that of whites.

Given equal training opportunities then, Negroes in the Army now can probably provide a proportion of leaders in the noncommissioned grades not greatly less than that provided by whites, and a similar proportion will be increasingly available in the officer grades as more Negroes acquire the necessary educational base. However, there still remains the problem of whether

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Negro soldiers with the potential ability to be leaders will be allowed to realize that potential.

The principal bar to the realization of Negro leadership talents seems to be found not among white enlisted men or line officers, but rather among staff officers. The evidence indicates that -- under certain conditions at least, as in combat or in a school complement -- both enlisted men and line officers will serve congenially under and with Negro officers. But staff officers, over a long period of U. S. history, have taken a dim view of the abilities of Negro soldiers, and a number of staff officers are currently loath to increase the opportunities for Negro leadership and participation in the Army. (Mandelbaum 1951, 2, 32, 35, 37)

Two factors may enter into this reluctance. One is that planning officers who deal with Negro matters tend to be considerably influenced by non-military considerations, such as the presumed reaction from civilian sources and the popular civilian belief of innate Negro inferiority. Perhaps more important at the present time, is the fact that experiments with integration in the Army are very recent. Officers who have witnessed the manner in which integration operates in combat and in garrison tend to be highly in favor both of integration and of giving greater opportunities for Negro leadership in the Army. Staff officers whose desk duties have necessarily estranged them from close contact with combat troops and line outfits are still highly influenced by beliefs about Negroes which seem to have little basis either in scientific principles, recent garrison experience, or Korean combat duty.

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SOCIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In determining its policy for race relationships within the military establishment, the Army ^{can} ~~should~~ make full use of the surveys which have been conducted on various phases of the racial problem within the civilian population. Civilian attitudes on interracial associations will have particular application to the military situation in ~~the event of national emergency when a majority of soldiers~~ ^{facilities on military posts, and in problems} ~~would be non-professionals~~ ^{involving contact with civilian communities and residents thereof.}

~~These military boards which have made recommendations concerning the Army's racial policy have already noted the various~~ ^{Significant} changes which have been taking place within the Negro population since World War I. The educational level has been rising, ~~and~~ an increasing proportion of Negroes are holding skilled, clerical or professional jobs, ~~greater~~ percentages of the Negro population have become residents of Northern states and of urban rather than rural communities, ~~Furthermore,~~ the Negro population has become increasingly conscious of itself as a minority group, ~~Such group consciousness has been attended by a new awareness among Negroes of their legal position as citizens, and by the marked development of various Negro organizations and of a Negro press. All these trends have been obvious since World War I and are continuing.~~ ^{has developed} ^{there has been} ^{showing}

~~Of more recent prominence are concerted expressions of the Negro wish to seek new principles governing the inter-relationship of Negroes and whites. Bi-racial organizations which are active, on a national scale, in the field of Negro-white relations have become much more numerous. Furthermore,~~ Although the more than 200 state laws and constitutional provisions prohibiting "discrimination" on the basis of race, religion, color or national origin had not been widely enforced in the past, the measure of the enforcement has increased since 1942.^{1.}

1. Johnson, Charles S., Patterns of Negro Segregation (Harper and Brothers, N.Y., 1943). Myrdal, Gunnar, et al., An American Dilemma (2 vols., Harper and Brothers, N.Y., 1944).

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Civilian Experience with Integration in Northern Communities

Within the last decade, some Northern communities have provided situations in which it has been possible to study the racial relationships of Negroes and whites who were living and working together. In one such study, the attitudes of residents in integrated interracial housing projects and in segregated bi-racial housing projects were compared. The results disclosed that, in the integrated projects, there was more opportunity for social contact between the two races and a larger proportion of friendly interracial association than in the segregated projects. Although residents on the integrated projects reported some instances of personal friction, such friction did not follow racial lines. Among the white residents^{of} integrated projects a much larger percentage had favorable attitudes toward Negroes. The majority of the housewives in these white families stated that their attitudes had become more favorable since living under integrated conditions. The housewives in segregated projects, however, claimed that their attitudes had remained static. It was reported by many of the white residents, that when they moved into housing projects open to the two races, they expected serious friction: a vast majority said that they had expected, at the very least, unpleasantness. The actual experience of living in close proximity to Negroes, however, had substantially decreased their expectations of interracial conflicts. Three-fourths of the white people who had at first anticipated serious friction reported afterward that the two races "got along fairly well."²

1. continued: Rose, Arnold, The Negro's Morale (University of Minnesota Press, Mpls, 1949).
Stouffer, Samuel A., et al., The American Soldier, Vol. I, Chapter 10 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1949).
Williams, Robin Mr., Jr., The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions (Social Science Research Council, New York, 1947).
Wolfbein, Seymour L., "Post War Trends in Negro Employment" (Monthly Labor Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington, D. C., December 1947).
2. Deutsch, Morton, and Collins, Mary Evans, "Intergroup Relations in Inter-racial Public Housing: Occupancy Patterns and Racial Attitudes" (Journal of Housing Vol. 7, April, 1950). Merton, Robert K., "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy" (The Antioch Review, Vol. 8, Summer, 1948). Schermerhorn, R. A., These Our People (D. C. Heath, Boston, 1949), pp. 168-171.

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A study of six integrated residential neighborhoods conducted by the Cornell University Social Science Research Center disclosed that both Negroes and whites tended to associate with the nearest neighbor, regardless of race. White residents, however, did not associate so closely or so frequently with their Negro neighbors as with those white neighbors living in equal proximity. No instances of open interracial conflict had occurred in the six neighborhoods. An analysis of the Detroit riots of 1943 indicated that rioting did not occur between Negroes and whites who were living together in integrated areas: the zones between white and Negro areas and the segregated areas of the city were the scenes of the discord.¹ This suggests that the boundary itself and the fear that the boundary may be overstepped are, to a large extent, responsible for actual and open friction between the two races. Unpublished studies at the University of Chicago confirm this suggestion. They indicate that tension between Negroes and whites has been greatest in those sections of Chicago in which Negroes were moving into nearby areas previously occupied only by whites. Here again, the white instinct to maintain a boundary once established, coupled with the fear of property devaluation and the fear of interracial violence may be cited as sources of the tension.

The results of these studies correspond, in some respects, to evidence which the Army derived from its survey among Infantrymen in ETO during World War II. White soldiers, it was found, despite previous apprehension about the inclusion of Negro platoons in their companies, had experienced no trouble in adjusting to the situation. Their subsequent opinions of Negroes were much more favorable than were the opinions of white soldiers who had had no experience of serving with Negro troops. Some white soldiers did express doubts as to whether integration would work as well

Concern
in
New
York
Area

1. Lee, Alfred M., and Humphrey, N. D., Race Riot (The Dryden Press, New York, 1943).

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during long periods in garrison or in recreational facilities as it did in the combat area. The studies in integrated housing projects and neighborhoods, however, seem to indicate that close residence and the common use of recreational facilities did not produce friction in civilian life. It would appear, on the basis of both the military and civilian experience, that the effects which whites fear will result from integration fail to materialize.

Integration in work situations has produced similar results. Among the Northern and Western industrial plants in which integration was attempted during World War II, the majority found that the experiment was successful. Those cases which were unsuccessful usually involved the lack of a firm position on the part of management.¹ Recorded experience has indicated that, when Negroes are integrated into work situations on the initiative of the control groups in the organization, acceptance of the situation by white workers is aided if there is a representation of Negroes in the upper levels of the organization.² This civilian experience lends weight to two recommendations relevant to Army racial policy made by the Gillem Board. That Board admonished that a firm command policy was essential to the working of the racial policy they recommended, a policy calling for close association of whites and Negroes in some cases but not for integration. The Board further recommended an increase in the number of Negro officers. On the basis of civilian experience, these two recommendations would be equally applicable to an Army racial policy which called for integration.

Negroes have been increasingly accepted and have increased their participation in industrial labor unions. As yet, however, they have shown little tendency

1. Davis, John A., "How Management Can Integrate Negroes in War Industries," (New York State War Council, 1942). Haas, F. J., and Fleming, G.J., "Personnel Practices and Wartime Changes" (The Annals, Vol. 244, 1946). MacIver, R.M., "The More Perfect Union" (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1948).
2. Hughes, Everett C., "The Knitting of Racial Groups in Industry," (American Sociological Review, Vol. 11, October, 1946). Rubin, Abraham, and Segal, George J., "An Industrial Experiment," Williams, Op.Cit.

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toward aggressive leadership.^{1.} A study of the association of whites and Negroes in wartime ship crews of the Merchant Marine showed that white seamen who had served in integrated crews more often had favorable attitudes toward Negroes than did those whites who had served in all-white crews.^{2.} To the extent that the conditions of contact included close dependence of the men upon the effective performance of the whole crew in dangerous situations, the results parallel those reported for composite Infantry companies in ETO.

Attitude of Civilians Toward Integration

Surveys among civilian Negroes have indicated that an overwhelming majority of Negro leaders and a smaller majority of all Negro males of military age were opposed to segregation of public facilities by law or administrative practice. Opposition was found to be most pronounced among the better-educated Negroes and among those from Northern states. Those who accepted racial separation explained their acceptance on the grounds of avoiding friction rather than because they approved of segregation in principle. The evidence also suggested that Negroes were most opposed to segregation in employment, housing and public accommodations; they were not so strongly concerned with private social separation.³ Here again, the results of the Army's attitude surveys among Negro soldiers in World War II are exactly paralleled. Among the Negro soldiers questioned, it was the better-educated

1. Northrup, Herbert R., Organized Labor and the Negro (Harper and Brothers, N.Y., 1944).
Rackow, Felix, "Combating Discrimination in New York State" (Research Bulletin No. 5, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Ithaca, New York, November, 1949).
Schermerhorn, Op.Cit.
Weaver, Robert C., "Negro Labor Since 1929" (The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 35, January, 1950).
Weaver, Robert C., Negro Labor: A National Problem (Harcourt Brace & Co., N.Y. 1946).
2. Brophy, Ira N., "The Luxury of Anti-Negro Prejudice" (Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 9, 1945-6).
3. Myrdal, Op.Cit. and Rose, Op.Cit.

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and the Northern Negroes who most resented segregation within the Army. Many of those Negro soldiers who favored segregation stated that they disapproved in principle, but wished to avoid friction between the two races. The more social, as distinct from military, the facilities in question, the more likely Negro soldiers were to state that they favored segregation.

The attitudes of national cross-sections of white adults in the United States, as surveyed in 1942 and 1944, indicated that more than half thought their employers should hire Negroes and that, given the same training as a white person, the Negro could do a particular job as well. When asked whether they would object to working side by side with Negroes in the same jobs, slightly more than half answered that they would not.

Public opinion polls conducted prior to recent Supreme Court decisions, however, indicated that the general public favored separate schools for Negroes. The proportion favoring non-segregated schools was almost identical with the proportion who had attended schools where whites and Negroes were integrated.¹

The aforementioned surveys conducted among civilians to determine their attitudes toward racial integration, provide the following conclusions:

1. the majority of Negroes are strongly opposed to most forms of segregation
2. the majority of whites are not strongly opposed to integration
3. the difficulties anticipated by whites when entering an integrated situation are much greater than the difficulties actually encountered
4. attitudes of whites toward Negroes become more favorable as a result of integration.

The first, third and fourth conclusions correspond with the conclusions derived by

1. Cantril, Hadley (ed.), prepared by Strunk, Mildred, Public Opinion (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1951) pp. 509-510.

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the Army from its attitude surveys among soldiers during World War II. Those factors which still requires further study are the degree of a priori white opposition toward integration, the intensity of that opposition and its probable effect upon actual steps toward integration.

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POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE FRAMING
OF ARMY POLICY RELATING TO NEGROES

I. Introduction

2.1 The place of the Negro in American life has its roots deep in political soil. The Army's policy of integration of Negroes must give due weight to its political aspects. Political situations, reflecting public opinion, are highly volatile and strongly influenced by the circumstances of the day. It is the point of this discussion to recognize that political repercussions must be considered in final policy decisions. It was not considered a part of the mission of this study to assess that area ~~with finality~~, but the following ^{Comments are} summary is offered as a statement of some of the political factors which ^{need to be considered in policy} exist ~~at the present time.~~ ^{decisions?}

II. Basic political factors to be considered

A. The commitment of the present administration to equalize opportunities for Negroes

3. The Democratic party ^{has been} was committed by its platform of 1948 to a program of equal rights for Negroes. It ^{was during its regime} is best represented by a program of anti-lynching legislation, anti-poll tax legislation, and fair employment practices legislation, ^{was pushed, and its policy included} but ~~its broad promises includes~~ such measures as equality of treatment for Negroes in the armed forces. While the ^{former administration was} President has been unable to get ^{all its} most of his program passed through Congress, ^{it was} ~~he nonetheless~~ is firmly devoted to that program.

2. One wing of the Democrat party refused to support the Administration's civil liberties plank in Philadelphia, and parts of the wing actually broke with the Administration to form a States' Rights party in the South which carried four of the southern states in the 1949 election. While this movement has disappeared as an active organized force, and most of its members had come back into the party, the sentiment which brought it forth is still in existence in the deep South. The group

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1. The policy of the current Administration, and the platform of the party in power must be recognized.

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is particularly vigorous in its opposition to any legislation or directives which have the appearance of a re-introduction of Negro rights legislation which the Southern wing of the Democratic party plus elements of the Republican party defeated in 1949.

B. The determination of Negro organizations to get additional rights for their people.

4. A number of Negro organizations, which have grown steadily in power since 1920, have pledged themselves to increase the rights of Negroes in the United States. One of their cardinal principles is the gaining of equality in the Armed Forces. They will resist with great vigor any attempt to reduce any concession which they believe has been granted to them.

2. It is a political fact that the Democratic party since 1932 has gained part of its margin of power from the vote of the Negroes in certain pivotal Northern cities and states. The defeat of a number of Democratic congressmen in the 1950 elections has been attributed to the shift of Negro votes back to the Republican party or to their indifference to the result.

3. Many Negroes have charged the President with lack of good faith in attempting to put through his program, or have held that since he will not get rid of the Southern Democrat leadership in the party organization they must make alliances elsewhere. The Democratic national organization, therefore, is extremely loath to reduce any concessions which may have been made to Negroes.

2. The Republican party has traditionally been the party of the Negro in the United States. Prior to World War I and, indeed, until the Presidency of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, most of the gains made by Negroes as a result of political action came at the hands of the Republican party. As a result of the

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shift of many Negro votes to the Democrats and the leadership of the New Deal elements of the party in getting new rights for Negroes, the Republicans have stressed Negro rights less than they did in the past. Instead, there has been some evidence of occasional coalitions between Republicans and Southern Democrats whereby Republican aid was given against some civil rights legislation in exchange for Southern votes against various Administration measures.

5. With the possibility, as shown in the 1950 election, that Negroes may be willing to swing back to the Republican party, it is possible that Republicans may stress once more the Negro rights stand of their party. No such tendency has been noted in recent months, however. Nonetheless, it must be assumed that on any measure affecting Negro rights, there would be considerable Republican support for concessions to Negroes.

C. The determination of the Dixiecrat wing of the Democratic party to defeat extra concessions to the Negro.

1. The Dixiecrat element of the Democratic party is made up of determined opponents of concessions to the Negroes at the present time. It also contains many people who, while having no strong feelings on the race subject, are willing to support that wing of the party in order to fight the financial policies of the Administration. It can be expected in many cases that vigorous anti-Negro reaction on the part of one part of this group would get some backing from other wings of the Dixiecrat grouping.

2. The Negro question, therefore, is mixed with financial interests of some Southern leaders, and the two are meshed with a basic conflict over the control of the Democratic party in the South, and for control of the national party organization as well. For this reason, some concessions to Negroes which might otherwise be ignored may come under heavy attack as the time for the next convention approaches.

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3. Some segments of Southern political leadership have made an attempt since World War II to meet the continued demands by Northern Democrats for more liberal policies towards the Negro by adopting modified forms of the civil rights program. Thus, while Southern leaders in Congress have helped defeat anti-lynching and anti-poll tax bills, they have in some cases backed similar legislation in the states. Several of the border states and those not in the Deep South have also taken the view that they must yield to the inevitable in accepting recent Supreme Court decisions relating to non-segregation in institutions of higher learning. Two states, however, have definitely warned that they will close their schools rather than permit Negroes to attend them.

5. It may be said generally that for one reason or another--either to anticipate federal action or because of basic changes in social philosophies--many of the Southern states have shown a willingness to accommodate themselves to new concessions to the Negro. This might make them better prepared to accept the idea of integration in the Army.

4. Despite any trend towards moderation of Southern antagonism to Negro rights' programs, it must be assumed that congressmen from the Deep South are aware of the political advantages of raising strong objections to these concessions. While some of the states in this area have indicated in their votes for congressmen and ^{on} other issues that they are capable of change, they have also voted out of Congress as recently as 1950 Southern Liberals whose main fault was support of civil rights legislation. This lesson has not been lost on the incumbents in office.

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5. It should not be forgotten that since Southern States usually have no final election, and since there is a tradition of returning congressmen to office for term after term, that the chairmen of many Congressional committees, under the seniority system, are filled by Southerners. At the present time in each house the Armed Forces Committee is headed by a Southerner-- both from Georgia.

D. How the political factors affect the Army

1. The Army must face the strong determination of the President to put through a program of equality of treatment for the Negro. This determination is backed by all the Northern Democrats and many Republicans, and is not strongly opposed by some of the border state Democrats. No Republicans oppose the measures as such, but are willing, in some cases, to make political arrangements with the Democrats in regard to the defeat of this legislation.

2. Army commanders who desire to question the correctness of the Army's new policies towards the Negro, or who are reluctant to proceed with the Army's directives may feel that they are relatively secure in their position, inasmuch as many vocal elements of Congress would come to their defense. Without doubt several of the senators from the Deep South would make vociferous protests against any attempt by the Department of Defense to remove or transfer an officer on the basis of his view that the implementation of the integration policy was opposed to the best interests of the Army. It could be expected that some Republican support could be gained for such a view. Such a protest would likely be presented on the basis that the Administration was using the matter as a political football.

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(6) The close tie-up of many National Guard units with the political leaders of the various states makes it possible for National Guard commanders, and governors and congressmen of the states from which these units come, to make a strong protest against the extension of ^{within their states} ~~integration to their commands.~~

Army, or even national, policies ^{which may be in conflict} ~~with the laws and practices of~~

~~The~~ Conclusions

~~The~~ Changes in ~~The~~ Army's policies should ^{must} be based on what is clearly and decisively best for the efficiency of the Army. Persons who make the Army's policy ^{give due consideration,} ~~must not be unaware,~~ however, of the amount of political support they are likely to get for these ^{changes} ~~changes~~ or for the number of political obstacles which may be placed in the way of ~~the~~ adoption of these policies.

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Note: V. O. Key, Southern Politics (N. Y. 1949) contains a useful bibliography on some of these topics.

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DISCUSSION

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONSVast Changes of the Last Ten Years:

During the last ten years a number of revolutionary changes have taken place in the world and the United States in the fields of political and social relations that require a close re-examination of many basic assumptions on which the Government and its agencies have previously based their policies. The changed position of the former great powers, the enormous responsibilities in world leadership thrust upon the United States, the threat of atomic weapons, the Communist threat have all changed the framework of national policies within which we formerly operated. As a result many traditional doctrines have had to be overhauled in order to meet the demands of new dangers and responsibilities.

The Army has found its own position greatly altered. Where the attitude of the country was formerly opposed to a large standing Army and armies of occupation, we have now accepted the idea of large overseas forces, the principle of Selective Service in peacetime and, now, the principle of Universal Military Service. Under the menace of atomic weapons and guided missiles, we have started to re-evaluate our weapons and strategy and tactics to deal with these new problems. It has become necessary also to examine the manpower resources of the United States, inasmuch as any all-out war with a country the size of Russia will put terrific strains on the human and economic resources of this country. It is essential that the most careful use be made of men in order that there will be efficient producers in the civilian fields and that there be efficient soldiers for the Army.

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It is against this background that the Army's policies relative to the Negro soldier must be examined. It is clear that the Negro must bear a proper share of the defense of the country. It is also obvious that he must be used in a way to make the most effective contribution to the Army. A scientific approach to these problems requires an analysis of the bases of existing Army policy, and a survey of recent developments which may change some of the traditionally held views on the subject.

The Negro Problem in the Army:

Previous Army experience with the Negro, reinforced by tradition and custom and prejudice, led to the acceptance of several views about the Negro as a soldier: he was not a good combat soldier, his lack of education made him difficult to train, he lacked the qualities of leadership, his use in the Army had to be restricted to a small percentage of the total Army strength, and he could be used only in segregated units. It is possible that all these views were well-founded and that they properly reflected social attitudes of American society for fifty or seventy-five years. The purpose of this study, however, is to ask whether or not the great changes of the past ten years have made any modifications in the case of the Negro which would justify changes in the Army's views on the use of the Negro. It is possible that a liberalization of the South's views towards the Negro, the vast improvement in educational opportunities for the Negro, the improvement of the Negro's environment may make it possible to deal with the Negro somewhat differently. The problem of this paper, it should be noted, is not to prove that this altered situation requires a change. Rather, it is an attempt to show that some of the same factors which make new weapons and new tactics necessary may require new policies on manpower.

The Army has been properly reluctant to engage in social experi-

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mentation. This reluctance was strengthened because of the belief that many white Americans would not cooperate inside or outside the Army to make a policy of integration work. It was also believed that the inferiority of the Negro made it impossible for the Army to absorb Negroes in excess of a quota normally set at ten per cent of the total. At a time when manpower is becoming more and more difficult to get, we must ask if there have been any shifts in the thinking of the white population which would make it possible to attempt integration on a broader scale or to use more Negro troops in the Army.

Recent Changes in the Negro's Position:

The past ten years have witnessed revolutionary changes in the position of the Negro in American society. The President, Congress, the Supreme Court, and leaders in business, labor, the armed services, sports, and politics have all taken a stand for greater Negro rights and participation in all the activities of American society. Changes regarded as impossible for 100 years have been made within a three to five year period. While some Southern reaction has been noted in Congress and in Southern legislatures, the shift of attitudes toward the Negro even in the Deep South have been especially striking since 1945.

Vivid illustrations of the amazing shift in the position of the Negro may be seen in the cases of Negroes like Dr. Ralph Bunche and Jackie Robinson. The case of the latter is especially useful to show the type of changes which are taking place in regard to the Negro. Baseball has long been an extremely conservative sport which held tenaciously to well-established traditions. One of its deep-held convictions was that it would be impossible to use a Negro on a major league team without having friction on

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the team and without getting strong crowd antagonism. It was assumed that since a large percentage of the players on the average team came from the South, it would be almost impossible to develop team spirit with a Negro on the club. Only after long deliberation did Branch Rickey decide to experiment. Three years after his experiment was made, he discovered that the team had accepted Robinson, and that other teams were looking for Negro players. In the past few years it has been possible for Robinson to play in exhibition games in the Deep South with only occasional protest. The experiment, of course, did not work by itself. It required a stern order from the management to the whole team that the new policy be given a chance to work. Once that was made clear, it was possible to shift the question from one of considering the reasons why it wouldn't work to one of how it could be made to work.

The Robinson case is merely one of the best-known cases of the new acceptance of Negroes into areas from which they were formerly excluded. Among other recent developments which have been identified as throwing possible light on the use of the Negro in the Army are the following:

I. Changes of political philosophy toward Negroes since 1945.

A. New developments have created a more liberal attitude toward Negroes.

Among these are:

1. Shifts in Negro population as a result of World War II.
2. Widened social experience of whites and Negroes as a result of shifts of population during the war.
3. Improved educational and economic standards of Negroes.
4. Lowered disease and mortality rates of the Negro.
5. Growth of political power of the Negro in pivotal areas.

6. Recognition by the South of the Negro's importance to the Southern economy as a producer and consumer.

Travel brings broader views toward the Negro. The migrations of white and Negro groups to industrial centers of the country in the course of World War II, and the shifts of population brought about by service in the Armed Forces brought an enormous widening of the social horizons of whites and blacks alike. Many whites visited entirely different parts of the country and often developed new viewpoints regarding the Negro. Others being no longer under local pressure found it easier to accept the Negro in a different light. The Negro himself discovered the advantages given his race in the North and in Europe and was less content with his previous lot.

Shifts of Negroes worry the South. Migrations of the Negro northward and westward led to a sufficient depletion of the labor supply that Southerners became worried in the war period. It was also found that the Negro, as he became better educated and made better wages, was an important consumer and that he was becoming of increasing importance to the South. There was a tendency, therefore, for the South to look on the Negro as more of an asset and less of a social problem.

Improved educational and economic standards make the Negro a better citizen and soldier. Partly, in response to Supreme Court decisions and partly in response to a growing belief that the Negro is worth more to the community if he has some education, if he has greater purchasing power, and if he has good health, the South in recent years has increased its appropriations for Negro schools, has raised the economic standard of the Negro, has cooperated with the Federal Government in Negro housing projects, and has made great efforts to stamp out venereal disease and other health plagues among the Negroes.

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The increased political power of the Negro. A major factor in the changed position of the Negro lies in the fact that he has become a powerful political force in certain key states such as Illinois, Michigan, and New York. As a result both parties have gone on record in favor of increased rights for Negroes and are highly sensitive to Negro demands for greater rights.

Almost overlooked is the fact that Negroes have been voting for a number of years in states like Tennessee, Kentucky, and North Carolina, and that Supreme Court decisions which opened primaries to Negroes have resulted in considerable increases in Negro voting in states such as Florida and South Carolina.

B. Recent governmental actions have extended Negro rights:

1. Presidential backing for civil rights legislation. Special boards on civil rights and on equality of treatment and opportunity for the Negro have attracted widespread attention to Negro demands for greater equality in civilian life and the armed forces.

The President has followed the lead of many of his predecessors in pressing vigorously for equal rights for Negroes.

2. The Supreme Court's decisions in favor of Negroes. For the past five years, the Supreme Court has started a reversal of the traditional view that provision of "separate but equal" facilities for Negroes is a matter to be decided by the states themselves. The courts have inquired into one case after another, and have held that if there is no real equality of facilities, Negroes must be admitted to facilities provided for whites. As a result, a number of Southern Universities have opened their graduate courses to Negroes. To forestall similar court action in the secondary schools, several of the

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states have vastly improved their Negro school systems.

Other decisions have opened primaries to Negroes in most of the Southern states. The court has laid down one ruling after another in favor of equal rights on common carriers in interstate commerce, have struck down covenant clauses in real estate contracts barring Negroes, and have followed a consistent pattern in behalf of Negro rights.

No court test has been made of any Army policies toward Negroes, but it may be assumed that such a case would find the court following a trend which has been established for a number of years.

3. Congress recognizes Negro rights. Although the President's Negro rights program was defeated in the Senate, Congress subsequently refused to accept an amendment forcing the Army to retain segregation in certain units or permitting white troops to refuse to serve in integrated units.

Congress earlier had provided in the Selective Service act for equality of treatment and opportunity for Negroes taken into the armed forces under that act.

4. States recognize Negro rights. Partly in an effort to forestall Congressional action, several of the Southern states have recently abolished the poll tax, passed strong laws against lynching, and outlawed the Ku Klux Klan and other secret organizations pledged to uphold "white supremacy."

A number of Southern cities have elected Negroes to their councils or to various boards formerly open only to whites.

While there has been no complete social revolution in either the North or South relative to the Negro, the last five years have seen incredibly swift changes in the position of the Negro, particularly in the South.

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II. New practices and experiences of the Armed Forces with Negroes.

A. The Armed Forces experiment with integration and the abolition of the racial quota.

The Navy and Air Force began experiments with integration shortly after the close of World War II. Their experiences aroused favorable comment from Negro organizations and may have had some influence on the move to induce similar experiments in the Army.

Studies in the period 1945-50 by Army and civilian boards concerning the equality of treatment and opportunity for the Negro led to abolition of the racial quota and to experiments in integration.

B. Integration was aided by the Army's need for Negro replacements in Korea.

Integration was probably speeded up in Korea because of the need for replacements regardless of race or color.

White soldiers were inclined to accept Negro soldiers on the theory that anyone who would fight was welcome.

The lack of any white female population for whose favors whites and Negroes might compete, and the lack of recreational facilities where the question of racial discrimination might arise have apparently reduced conflicts during the crucial period of initial integration.

C. Integration has proved to be an effective counter-propaganda argument against Russian claims of American discrimination.

Effective Communist propaganda among the colored races has been advanced by the charge that the United States considered colored peoples inferior, and that such peoples should turn for leadership to Russia which had no policy of discrimination. This proved a source of weakness to us in the U.N.

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It has been possible for the U. N. and the United States to answer the Communist charge with evidence that white and Negro troops are fighting in integrated units alongside Koreans.

D. Chances of testing Negro performance increased by integration.

The commitment of integrated units in the same area where an all-Negro regiment is fighting has given the Army the opportunity to contrast the Negro's performance in battle under two different sets of circumstances.

Several studies have been made recently of (1) the dependability of the Negro in combat, (2) the value of the Negro as a combat soldier, and (3) the Negro's care and use of equipment. Tentative conclusions point to the fact that the Negro has been a better soldier in integrated rather than all-Negro units.

E. Integration held up by attitude of some National Guard units.

In one respect the chance of getting a thorough testing of the integration program has been decreased in recent months as a result of the opposition of some National Guard units to the program. In World War II these units were drawn on heavily for cadres and for replacement for other units. Widespread dispersal soon changed the regional characteristics of the personnel of such divisions. The fact that newly called up National Guard units still retain their regional characteristics has led to opposition of integration in Southern units.

III. Need for new approaches to the manpower problem.

A. New responsibilities of the United States require the most effective use possible of American manpower reserves.

The great manpower pools of Russia and Red China will place a frightful strain on the United States in any all-out war.

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It is essential, therefore, that every man be properly used in industry or the Army, and that he be used in the most efficient manner possible.

B. The "percentage of the national population" formula is not statistically sound.

While the practice of establishing racial quotas for the Army in ratio to the percentage that any given racial group has of the national population may appear to be fair and logical, it is not statistically sound. This practice could be valid only if the Negro population were exactly like the white population in age-groups, physical characteristics, education, regional dispersion, mechanical aptitude, occupational background, suitability for combat tasks and the like.

In some cases the Army might need to increase the percentage to 20 or 30 per cent. In other cases 5 per cent might be too much.

Another means of apportioning Negroes, as by experience, or aptitude is called for.

C. Studies of the Negro soldier emphasize the need of working toward a minimum education standard as a military necessity.

The United States has always held that free men must be educated for their responsibilities as voters and citizens. The Army has held that a soldier must be sufficiently trained to understand what he is doing.

The growing mechanization of war and the technical improvement of weapons requires soldiers capable of handling fairly complicated equipment. Inasmuch as the Army is restricted in its opportunities for selecting personnel, the possibility of its getting a large number of men with low-grade intelligence is great.

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Some relief can be gained by the recent directive of Secretary of Defense Marshall preventing any one service from monopolizing the number of men in the upper intelligence groupings. For any overall solution to the problem, however, educational standards of the country must be raised to the point where every man of draft age has the minimum education required for efficient performance of his duties in the Army.

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SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF NEGROES IN THE ARMY

The utilization of Negro manpower during World War II presented certain problems over and above those of total manpower utilization.* One of the many difficulties in the utilization of Negroes was due to the lower level of skills and abilities possessed by Negroes as a group. On the average, Negro performance on Army classification tests was inferior to the performance of whites on these tests. A marked difference between Negroes and whites in terms of skills and abilities is illustrated by their relative performance on the Army General Classification Test. Inasmuch as the administration of this test was a standard procedure throughout World War II, and the score obtained from it was one of the major determinants of Army classification, Negro-white AGCT score differences are of considerable importance and have received a great deal of attention.

The distribution of Negroes and whites in the five AGCT Grades or Groups for the World War II period is shown in Figure 12. Approximately 83% of Negroes tested during this period scored in AGCT Grades IV and V (scores below 90) whereas only approximately 32% of whites were in Grades IV and V. In 1949, Negroes in the Army were still largely concentrated in Groups IV and V (see Figure 13), although to a lesser degree than during the war. Negroes in the two lower grades dropped to 62% in 1949, while whites in these grades remained at approximately 32%.

A similar pattern of Negro-white differences in performance is obtained on various other tests used by the Army. On the Mechanical Aptitude Test, for example, Negroes on the average scored markedly lower than whites. This


* A more complete discussion of Army classification and assignment procedures and practices will be found in the appendix.

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Distribution of AGCT Grades of Negro and White Enlisted Men Processed at Reception Centers March 1941 thru May 1946


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Distribution of AGCT Grades of Negro and White Enlisted Men in the Army 31 March 1949

Figure 13.

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is not surprising in view of the fact that in civilian life occupational experiences and opportunities for gaining mechanical experiences have generally been more limited for Negroes than for whites.

The generally poor performance of the Negro on such tests, plus the limited occupational background of many Negroes, served to increase the problems of classification and assignment by Military Occupational Specialties, and apparently resulted in the utilization in MOS's of Negroes with a level of skills and abilities which was somewhat lower than that of the whites in these MOS's. In an AGO study based on a 2% sampling of Army personnel in 1944, median AGCT scores of enlisted men in various MOS's were computed. For those MOS's with sufficient Negroes to permit a racial comparison, it was found that AGCT medians for Negroes were uniformly lower than those for whites, (see Figure 14)¹.


The utilization of Negroes in Army MOS's during World War II, was further complicated by the fact that for some MOS's there were no Negro authorizations. Thus a Negro with special qualifications for a given military specialty could not actually be used in that MOS if no Negro authorization existed. In a study reported by Major Fowler in his testimony before the Fahy Committee, Army world-wide authorized and actual strength by MOS's as of May 1948 was analyzed and Negro-white comparisons made. Of the 408 MOS's considered in this report, there were 181 for which there were no Negro authorizations, and an additional 100 in which no Negroes were classified.

Closely related to the question of MOS authorizations was the restriction placed on Army School training for Negroes. Davenport, in his testimony before the Fahy Committee, cited a report concerning the number of specialist schools open to Negroes in 1947. He found a total of 87 courses

1. Naomi Stewart, "Relationship between Military Occupational Specialty & Army General Classification Test Standard Score." Educational and Psychological Measurement, VII (winter, 1947), 677-693.

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Median AGCT Scores of White and Negro Enlisted Men in Military Occupational Specialties, Listed in TM 12-427 as Current in Sept., 1944 (M. O. S. 's in Descending Order of Median AGCT Score for Total Group - White, Negro and Unknown; of the 220 M. O. S. 's with at Least 25 Cases Included in the Original Study, 41 Contained a Sufficient Number of Negroes to Permit a Breakdown by Race; Study Based on Data from Machine Records Survey #4, Taken 30 Sept. 1944)

Figure 14.

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listed at the Training Divisions for assignment of personnel, and of these only 25 were available for Negroes. In addition to this restriction placed on courses, there were further restrictions as to the numbers of Negroes who might be assigned to these courses.

Restrictions as to specialist schools and MOS's open to Negroes were, at least to some extent, a function of the bi-racial organization of the Army prior to 1950. Negroes were assigned to segregated units of a limited number and type, and thus the range of jobs in which Negroes could be utilized (and for which they would need special training courses) was more limited than was the case for whites. The number of Negro units was necessarily far less than the number of white units, since the former served only 10% of the Army population. But the type of Negro units was also restricted. Instead of designating a straight 10% of all T/O&E units for Negroes, a preponderance of certain types of units were so designated, thus narrowing the range of jobs available to Negroes. A general indication of the disproportionate allocation of certain types of T/O&E units to Negroes is contained in data reported to the Fahy Committee by Major Fowler. He reported that in 1948 there were approximately 305 T/O&E units designated as Negro; of these 242 (79.34%) were service units, 34 (11.15%) were combat units, and 29 (9.51%) were administrative units.

The efficient utilization of Negro manpower during World War II thus seemed dependent on two factors. One involved the use of personnel whose qualifications for military training and duty were relatively low, as compared with the total Army population; the other involved the assignment of personnel to separate units. Occurring singly, these factors might not have been too difficult to handle, but taken together they created a serious

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problem. While the percentage of low AGCT Grade Negroes was much greater than among whites, their actual numbers were no greater. "The problem.... centered therefore not around the numbers of low-scoring men to be absorbed by the Army (for the total percentages in each grade....was not markedly affected by the inclusion of Negroes) but around the high percentages to be absorbed in specific, separate units."¹. The 489,005 (5.6%) white Grade V men processed between March 1941 and May 1946 could be distributed among the total 8,720,764 white men received during this period, while the 370,216 (35.7%) Negro Grade V men received in the same period (118,789 men fewer) could be distributed only among the total 1,036,819 Negro men received. Thus while the utilization of poorly qualified personnel was an Army-wide problem, the effect on Negro units was greater by far than on white units.

Recent changes in classification and assignment procedures, such as the substitution of the Aptitude Area system of differential classification for the previous system based primarily on a single measure of ability, may be expected to increase the effectiveness of Negro as well as white manpower classification and assignment. Also, a full implementation of SR 600-629-1 would make it possible for Negroes to be assigned and trained in a wider range of Military Occupational Specialties, and to be utilized on a broader unit base than has been the case in the past. The extent to which such changes in the Army personnel system and in Army segregation policy will increase the efficiency of Negro manpower utilization remains to be determined.

1. Lee, Draft History, Ch. X, p.12

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PRINCIPAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF USE OF
NEGROES IN THE ARMY

Introduction:

In the preceding sections of this report, evidence bearing on the problem of utilization of Negro manpower in the Army has been presented, discussed, and evaluated, treating separately each area from which evidence has been derived. In the three sections which follow, generalizations about the Negro soldier, from both individual and group standpoints, are drawn together from the evidence presented in all of the reports and studies analysed. Each generalization is presented, discussed in terms of the evidence supporting or modifying it, and evaluated as to its validity so far as the stage of analysis reached in this preliminary report permits.

THE QUALIFICATIONS OF NEGROES FOR MILITARY SERVICE

The following generalizations concerning the qualifications of Negroes for military service have been made on the basis of a study of Selective Service records, Census Bureau data, data from the Office of The Adjutant General, and material from other sources.

1. Generalization: The physical fitness of Negroes accepted for service in the Army is equal to that of whites.

Evidence: Selective Service physical examination data show that of the men rejected for military service, proportionately fewer Negroes than whites were disqualified on the basis of physical defects. This finding does not necessarily indicate that the physical fitness of Negroes compared favorably with that of whites. Selective Service data on defects were based on 10 to 20 per cent samples of available reports, which may not have been a representative sampling of the total. Physical standards and reporting systems varied to some extent from place to place. Also, complete data on defects were not always given, and there was a tendency to record or summarize only the most serious defects in the case of many Negro re-

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registrants, also in evaluating the relative causes of Selective Service rejections it must be remembered that a much higher percentage of Negro registrants than white registrants were rejected, and that of the Negroes inducted into the Army a larger proportion were those who barely met the minimum induction standards.

There is some evidence available on the health of Negroes within the Army. In the Army Service Forces Manual, "Leadership and the Negro Soldier," incidence of disease among Negro troops is reported approximately equal to or even slightly less than among whites. The hospital admission rate for all diseases except venereal diseases has generally been less among Negro than among white troops.

The evidence which has been examined tends to support the generalization that the physical fitness of Negroes accepted for service in the Army is equal to that of whites. Other data should be analyzed before this generalization is regarded as conclusive.

2. Generalization: Occupational qualifications of Negroes are substantially inferior to those of whites.

Evidence: Documentary evidence compiled by the Bureau of the Census points out that, on the basis of their proportion in the population, Negroes in 1940 and 1944 were heavily concentrated in agriculture and domestic service. Although the shift from the farm to the factory was considerable during the war years, it must be pointed out that in 1944 a large proportion of the Negro labor force was still engaged in unskilled operations and service activities, and that very little improvement in the occupational distribution of the employed Negro in relation to the white could be found.

3. Generalization: Literacy levels are substantially lower for Negroes than for whites of comparable military age.

Evidence: According to a 20 per cent sample of Selective Service records, of the men rejected in 1942-43, 17.8 per cent of the Negroes as compared with 5.2 per cent of the whites were disqualified on grounds of educational deficiency (education below the fourth grade level). In 1944 and 1945 the educational deficiency

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category was not used by Selective Service. A broader category, "mental deficiency," included failure to meet minimum intelligence standards; morons, imbeciles, and idiots; and mental deficiency not classified as to type or degree. Men who formerly would have been classified in "educational deficiency" were included in this broader grouping. Of the men rejected in 1944, 40.1 per cent of the Negroes and 9.7 per cent of the whites were disqualified on grounds of mental deficiency. Comparable figures for the first part of 1945 were 53.8 per cent for Negroes and 8.8 per cent for whites. The proportion of Negroes rejected on the basis of illiteracy and mental deficiency was thus substantially greater than the proportion of whites rejected on these grounds.

Further evidence of higher illiteracy rates among Negroes may be derived from an analysis of data on personnel entering the Army Special Training Units. During 14 months in 1943-44, proportionately eight times as many Negroes as whites entering the Army were classified either as AGCT Grade V or illiterate and were sent for special training.

The evidence strongly supports the generalization regarding the higher incidence of illiteracy among Negroes than among whites.

4. Generalization: Educational qualifications of Negroes are substantially inferior to those of whites.

Evidence: Studies of the educational background of Negroes and whites have shown a consistently lower level of educational achievement for Negroes than for whites. In a War Department study based on a 5 per cent sample of enlisted men in 1943, it was found that 30 per cent of the whites and 57 per cent of the Negroes sampled had only a grade school education; 29 per cent of the whites and 26 per cent of the Negroes had some high school education; 28 per cent of the whites and 11 per cent of the Negroes were high school graduates; and 13 per cent of the whites and 6 per cent of the Negroes had some college training. There are differences between Negroes and whites not only in amount of education, but also in the nature

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and quality of education. In the South the educational facilities for Negro children have been inferior to those for whites; the average yearly expenditure per Negro pupil in nine Southern states was \$18.82 in 1939-40, compared with \$58.69 for the white pupil. This was the period when the present military population was in school.

Census data show significant increases from 1940 to 1950 in school attendance at both the high school and college age levels for Negroes, but these same increases are also found for whites.

Evidence to support the generalization that Negroes have a poorer educational background is clear-cut. Negroes as a group may be expected to attain a higher educational level in the future, but the time when Negro educational status will approach white educational status is beyond the period for which the Army must now make its plans.

5. Generalization: During World War II Negroes in general were markedly inferior to whites in their indicated ability to learn the duties of a soldier.

Evidence: On the Army General Classification Test, designed to classify men according to their readiness to learn the facts, skills, and techniques necessary for military duty, Negroes obtained considerably lower scores than whites. During World War II approximately 17 per cent of Negro enlisted men, as compared with 68 per cent of white enlisted men, were classified in AGCT Groups I, II, and III (scores 90 and above); approximately 83 per cent of Negroes, as compared with 32 per cent of whites, were classified in Groups IV and V (scores below 90).

These percentages are based on tests given to approximately one million Negroes and over eight million whites, and thus the over-all picture of Negro-white differences in AGCT performance is a reliable one.

~~SECRET~~TRENDS IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF NEGRO TROOPS

Study of the kinds of work which Negroes have performed and are performing in the Army reveals certain basic trends:

1. Generalization: The number and proportion of Negroes in the Army is increasing.

Evidence: On both absolute and percentage scales, Negroes in the Army are increasing. This increase is in accordance with census data which show that both Negroes and whites are increasing in number as part of the general growth of population, but that Negroes are increasing slightly more rapidly because of their higher birth rates. The slight differential is more pronounced among men presently of military age because Negro birth rates declined less than white during the depression. For the Army, this means that increasing dependence must be placed upon Negroes in accomplishing the Army's mission. All available data, including the Army's strength figures, support this generalization.

2. Generalization: The Army has opened an increasing number of occupational specialties to Negroes.

Evidence: In the past, the Army has placed a low estimate upon the capabilities of individual Negroes, with the result that the positions open to them prior to World War II were extremely limited. During World War II, the manpower situation required a much wider employment of Negroes. Despite the fact that the bulk of Negroes (about four-fifths) were used in service organizations, while only about one-eighth saw combat service, the Gillem Board took cognizance of their widening skills by recommending their use as overhead, etc. By 1949, Negro authorizations existed for about 336 of the Army's 490 active MOS's, and in January 1950, 40 additional MOS's were opened to them. As an incident of the Korean situation, Negroes have had to be used in places where they would not normally have been employed. This may induce the opening at some future time of still more positions.

There is nothing in the evidence to indicate that this trend will be reversed in the immediate future. In the long view ahead, assuming a close relationship be-

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tween educational achievement and military usefulness, the future promises to bring to the Army more and more Negroes with higher qualifications than has been the case in the past. The 1950 census figures would seem to indicate that a large number of Negroes of close-to-white educational standards will start entering the Army after 1955.

It is probable that the Army, at least up until the end of World War II, has made as full use of the mass of Negro troops as their capabilities for military life permitted. This is not to argue that the relatively few well qualified Negroes have been used to the best advantage. This point is developed further later in the study.

3. Generalization: The Army has opened an increasing number of units to Negroes.

Evidence: Except for the period of World War I, there were four Regular Army units open to Negroes from the end of the Civil War to the beginning of World War II. After World War II, there was no reduction in Negro units comparable to that following World War I. Indeed, in May 1951, there were 329 Army units open to Negroes. At the present time there is an unwillingness to authorize additional Negro units to accommodate the flood of Negro enlistees who have entered the Army since the removal of the entrance quota on Negroes; this unwillingness may prove to be a dictate of wisdom after Negro entrances into the Army have leveled off, even if the leveling off occurs at a point above the traditional 10 per cent.

Because of the exigencies of the Korean situation, where the only available replacements have sometimes been Negroes, the actual number of units in which Negroes are serving has been increased, even though the authorized number is being held at the present level.

But whether policy or emergency has dictated the trend, the trend toward the use of Negroes in increasing numbers of Army units appears to be well established.

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4. Generalization: Army tradition with regard to the Negro has been and remains a deterrent to the fullest and most effective use of the Negro.

Evidence: Civilian criticism has been focused on two major aspects of the utilization of Negro personnel: the quota system and segregation. When the first all-Negro units were authorized after the Civil War, the step was intended as a reward to the Negro for his service in that War; and it was probably so regarded by the Negro. There seems to have been no particular criticism of the use of segregated units in World War I, except after the fact. World War II saw a rising wave of attack on the segregation policies of the Army and the attack has continued into the postwar period, reaching a climax in the report of the Fahy Committee.

Meanwhile, despite rising clamor, the Army has held officially to the policy of segregation, as evidenced in the reports of the Gillem and Chamberlin Boards and in the present structure of the Army.

Closely associated with the policy of segregation is the policy of quota. With a limited number of units open to Negroes, the number of Negroes taken in to fill those units must be limited; failure to limit numbers produces the present situation in which some Negro units are operating at 100 per cent overstrength in order to absorb the great numbers of Negroes who have entered the Army since the removal of the entrance quota. The alternative to overstrength operation of Negro units, granted continuance of segregation, is the activation of more and more Negro units, with the attendant problems of providing replacements while they exist and of consolidating and deactivating such units should there be any considerable downward trend in Negro entrances.

In short, the social situation in the United States is changing rapidly and traditional adherence to ideas of quota and segregation is impeding the Army's adjustment to the new, but still changing, situation. A fresh approach, violating old traditions, may be necessary. A new-type Army, in a new world situation, receiving Negroes with new levels of capabilities, must find new solutions to a problem of race relations that is older than the nation.

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THE PERFORMANCE OF NEGRO TROOPS

The main business of the Army is fighting, and the chief test of its effectiveness is the type of performance given by its troops in battle. This all-important factor in judging the worth and success of the Army's plans and training is the most elusive to measure.

If a given unit wins a specific battle, it is possible to say that it performed well. But when, as more often happens, it merely contributes to the overall success, it is far more difficult to assess the relative performances of different units. The reasons for this are the many unequal and intangible factors in a unit's successful performance that cannot be measured or compared scientifically. Instead, we must rely on informed opinion that a given unit has done better or worse than another unit would have done in the same position. When an attempt is made to compare the performance of a given unit with a highly successful or unsuccessful unit, some of the same difficulties arise. In every case, instead of being able to apply scientific measurement, we are faced with the necessity of relying on educated judgments and opinions.

1. Generalization: Negro units of regimental and larger size have performed unsatisfactorily.

Evidence: The majority of officers testifying before the Gillem and Chamberlin Boards expressed the opinion that the 92nd and 93rd Infantry Divisions, as well as a majority of all-Negro regiments, have performed unsatisfactorily. This testimony could not be separated into a dichotomy of officers with and without experience with Negro units. Documentary evidence on the 92nd Division, the only all-Negro Division employed in combat in World War II, tends to support their opinions.

2. Generalization: Negro units of smaller size (platoon to battalion) performed better than those of larger size.

Evidence: The consensus of opinion of witnesses before the Gillem and Chamberlin Boards was that Negro units up to battalion strength, with properly trained and

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selected officers, have proved satisfactory, but somewhat less satisfactory than comparable white units. The greatest combat efficiency was attributed to Negroes organized into platoons within white companies; reports of the First and Seventh Armies in Europe rated Negro platoons in armored units as moderately successful and Negro platoons in white rifle companies as excellent (in these cases the Negroes were volunteers). These reports were supported by I&E Division surveys.

3. Generalization: Negro combat units of a close-support type in general performed better than those of front-line, direct-combat type.

Evidence: The majority opinion of commanders consulted by both the Gillem and Chamberlin Boards was that Negro units of the close-support type (armor, field artillery, and antiaircraft artillery), performed quite satisfactorily, especially when led by properly trained and selected Negro officers. Opinions on their performance in infantry units was less favorable, except for the rifle platoons referred to in the preceding generalization.

4. Generalization: In close and sustained infantry combat, "bugging out," "melting," and "straggling" are more frequently mentioned in connection with Negro than with white units.

Evidence: Documentary evidence on the performance of a number of Negro regiments and battalions in close and sustained infantry combat shows that they suffer greatly in effectiveness because of "bugging out," "melting," and "straggling." A special board appointed by the Commanding General of the Mediterranean Theater to investigate the performance of the 92nd Infantry Division stated that "in comparable situations, all-Negro units of the 92nd, despite orders to take the objective, stagnated by repeated delays and time-outs for regrouping and reorganizing, while white units advanced steadily." This was attributed to lack of a determined will to fight.

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5. Generalization: Loss and abuse of equipment are greater among Negro units than among white units.

Evidence: Reports from various theaters of operations as well as from the Zone of Interior tend to support the opinion that Negroes abused their equipment to a greater extent than whites. Loss of equipment in training was substantially higher. Dependable evidence on the relative losses in combat is not available, but the opinion of commanders with some experience is that losses of equipment by abandonment have been higher for Negroes than for whites.

6. Generalization: Negro units of a service type in general performed better than those of combat types, but not as well as white units, except for heavy labor duties.

Evidence: Reports from theaters of operations indicate that Negro units whose mission did not require proximity to combat operated more efficiently than those which operated in forward areas. Units with a strictly service-type mission, such as Engineer general service regiments, port battalions, Transportation companies, and Quartermaster units, rendered relatively efficient service. Responsible commanders attributed the performance in these cases to the fact that the troops were performing duties closely approximating those performed in civilian life.

7. Generalization: With the same officer strength, Negro units perform less well than similar white units.

Evidence: Combat experience in Korea shows that all-Negro units require constant exertion of discipline on the part of officers. Negroes in all-Negro units responded only to physical leadership in battle (that is, with officers leading the men into battle and constantly "showing" along the front). The commander of the 15th Infantry Regiment stated that the one Negro battalion in his regiment had given a good account of itself, but that the toll on the white officers leading it had drained the good officers out of his other battalions.

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8. Generalization: Days lost from duty because of VD is 7 to 10 times greater for Negro than for white troops.

Evidence: During World War II, the Negro venereal rate averaged 7 to 10 times the white rate. In 1943, the approximately one-twelfth part of the Army that was Negro accounted for about one-half of all venereal disease. These rates are so high as to constitute a material interference with the effective operation of Negro units.

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SPECIAL PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE USE OF
NEGROES IN THE ARMY

Introduction:

In the three sections which follow, the major problems relating to Army policy in the use of Negro troops are considered, using the same mode of presentation as in the preceding sections.

LEADERSHIP

On the amount and kinds of leadership required in Negro units, and on the point of the Negro's capacity for leadership, there are several generalizations which may be derived from the evidence at hand.

1. Generalization: Negro units require more officers than white units of similar size and type.

Evidence: The opinion of officers on this subject is unanimous. Officers who have expressed such opinions have been men with a sound basis of experience with and knowledge of the problem, and their opinions must be respected. In support of their opinion, the evidence discussed under Generalization 3, below, may be applied.

Lack of motivation on the part of the Negro soldier may have bearing on this point. A man lacking the drive to do well in whatever job he is doing will require more direction, closer supervision, and more follow-up than a more highly motivated man. The Negro rifle platoons which fought in Europe may constitute an interesting exception to this generalization because of the factor of high motivation.

2. Generalization: Casualty rates for officers assigned to Negro units are higher than for officers of white units of similar size and type.

Evidence: Here again is a subject on which the opinions of officers are unanimous. In this case, an excellent factual basis is provided by the record of replacements required in Negro units in comparison with white units. The element of "physical" leadership, discussed above under the performance of Negro troops, goes far in

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accounting for this phenomenon. The generalization is apparently valid, given existing conditions.

3. Generalization: Negro troops require more time for training than do white troops.

Thus more officer time is required in the training process.

Evidence: Opinions of officers on this subject agree that Negro troops require more time and personnel for training. These opinions are supported by census data on the limited education, background, and skills of the Negro population. The experience of educators shows that such limitations retard learning and make more repetition and review necessary.

In addition, educators agree that speed of learning may also be retarded by lack of motivation. Opinion surveys conducted during World War II showed some feeling on the part of Negroes that they were fighting a "white man's war," and some evidence that the Negro did not appreciate why he was fighting.

Another set of facts, probably uniquely true for World War II, has indirect bearing on this generalization. During World War II, approximately one out of every seven Negroes in the Army required literacy training of eight to twelve weeks' duration.

On the basis of the evidence, the generalization is valid and will remain so until such time as the differential in background, especially educational, between Negro and white has been reduced.

4. Generalization: Negro strength of the peacetime Army failed to fulfill its cadre purpose of supplying proportionate numbers of commissioned and noncommissioned officers for wartime use.

Evidence: This widely held opinion is supported by the statistics on the relative numbers of commissioned and noncommissioned officers among Negroes in the Army. Inasmuch as a disproportionate percentage of the low AGCT personnel in the Army is Negro, one reason for the low leadership potential may be that leaders among the

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Negroes must be drawn from a narrower segment of the Negro strength of the Army than is the case with whites. Further, the fact that the number of LDS's open to Negro troops was restricted may mean that there has been a correspondingly restricted opportunity for Negroes possessing qualities of leadership to exhibit them, or for Negroes possessing leadership potential to develop it. Accordingly, the generalization must be qualified to allow for these factors.

5. Generalization: Negro troops express a preference for Negro officers.

Evidence: During World War II, there was an opinion widely held by officers that Negroes preferred white officers. Data from Korea indicate that this opinion is still held to some extent, particularly by a number of senior officers.

Evidence from a 1943 study of Negro preferences regarding officers failed to give any support to such an opinion. Instead, Negroes in large majority said that they preferred to serve under Negro rather than white lieutenants. Although the questions on this survey specified lieutenants, the answers were so overwhelmingly in favor of Negro officers that a reversal in preferences with respect to captains and higher officers was considered very unlikely.

To some extent these attitudes may have been influenced by the tendency of Negroes in segregated units to reduce their dislikes and discomforts to a racial basis, and by their lack of experience with a sufficient cross section of officers. Officer preferences of Negroes now in integrated units should be analysed before this generalization is accepted as valid. There has been some evidence from Korea that Negro soldiers feel that qualification of officers is the primary concern, and that the best men should have the job, regardless of race.

QUOTAS

The following generalizations pertaining to quotas and allocations have been derived from examination of records, reports, and studies.

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1. Generalization: The Army no longer has a quota system for Negroes.

Evidence: Effective 1 April 1950, all commands were directed to open enlistments to qualified personnel without regard to race or color. This ended the long-standing policy of the Army to restrict Negro strength in the Army to the proportion of Negroes in the general population. This change was in accord with, and probably the result of, the Fahy Committee's recommendations. This brought the Army's policy into line with the President's policy as announced in 1948.

2. Generalization: Many officers believe a racial quota necessary in order to assure combat efficiency in the Army.

Evidence: The second Chamberlin Board report of March 1951, after considering the testimony of many officers, recommended that the 10 per cent ceiling on Negro personnel in the Army be re-established and that other steps be taken to prevent an increase in the number of low-caliber men in the Army.

3. Generalization: The legality of any racial quota system in the Army has been questioned.

Evidence: Evidence in the files examined reveals that the question of the legality of the Army's 10 per cent quota has been made the matter of court action. However, the issue of the quota has never been made a test case before the Supreme Court. Despite this, there is a belief in some quarters that the Court might regard the quota as an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of Negro citizens.

4. Generalization: The Army's quota restriction was the object of serious criticism.

Evidence: Negro pressure groups and the Negro press continually attacked the Army's 10 per cent quota as being another visible prop of the Army's attitude of discrimination toward Negroes. It was pointed out that the other branches of the Armed Forces had no such quota. Also, these groups, as well as others, felt that the quota system was wasteful of potentially useful manpower that was denied ad-

mittance to the Army because of the quota. The Gillem Board recognized this fact and suggested denying re-enlistment to "professional privates" in order to permit higher-type Negroes to enlist in the vacancies thus created. The Fahy Committee attacked the quota as being wasteful and was instrumental in effecting its abolition.

5. Generalization: The abolition of the quota system has created a new problem of allocation within the Army in order to absorb the relatively larger number of Negro enlisted men.

Evidence: Data presently available to the Operations Research Office show that the flow of Negroes into the Army is such that the present number of Negro TO&E units, overhead assignments, and oversea replacement stream requirements cannot use the number of Negroes currently entering the Army.

6. Generalization: A new quota system has been established for the military services, based on mental qualifications, with no restriction on race or color.

Evidence: The directive of the Secretary of Defense of 2 April 1951 announced this policy and specified that quotas were to be based on mental groups as established by the Armed Forces Qualification Test, effective 1 May 1951.

INTEGRATION VS. SEGREGATION

1. Generalization: The traditional policy of the Army prior to 1950 has been to utilize Negroes in separate units.

Evidence: Although a small number of Negroes served as slaves or freemen in integrated units during the American Revolution, the Army practice in succeeding wars has been to use Negroes in separate units. The establishment, after the Civil War, of four Negro regiments in the Regular Army, lent legal sanction to the maintenance of segregated units. Two all-Negro divisions were activated in World

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War I and were reactivated in World War II. The Board of General Officers which convened after World War II to recommend a policy for the utilization of Negro manpower re-affirmed the established pattern of segregation. A new policy announced in January, 1950, subsequent to the recommendations of the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity, encouraged the formation of integrated units.

2. Generalization: The policy of segregation in the Army has had direct legal sanction by Congress.

Evidence: After the Civil War, Congress, in order to honor the Negroes for their efforts during the war, created six Negro regiments in the Regular Army. The number was later reduced to four by an act passed in 1869. This act had the effect of compelling the Army to keep some elements of these regiments on the rolls at all times.¹ It also set a pattern of segregation within the Regular Army which was expanded to include Negroes inducted in time of war.

3. Generalization: The adoption of a policy of integration was indirectly facilitated by the Army Reorganization Act of 1950.

Evidence: The Army Organization Act of 1950² superseded previous legislation by Congress concerning the organization of the Army. Included in the superseded legislation was the provision made after the Civil War for the establishment of Negro regiments. In effect, therefore, the Congressional sanction for segregated units was removed. Authority for the racial composition of its units is now, therefore, lodged solely with the Army.

1 Major Ulysses G. Lee, "The Employment of Negro Troops," Ch. I (Ms. in Office of Chief of Military History, Department of the Army).

2 Subsection 401 (1), P. L. 581, 81st Cong., Army Organization Act of 1950; see ltr, U. P. Brooks, Jr., Lt. Col., GCS, to ORO, 4 June 1951.

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4. Generalization: Integration within the Army has been of recent origin, coming primarily since 1950.

Evidence: In the ETO during World War II, composite Infantry companies were formed by the inclusion of Negro platoons in white companies. The need for replacements under combat conditions resulted in a certain degree of de facto integration within these companies. The racial policy established by the Army after World War II allowed for the formation of composite, though not of integrated, units.¹ The President's Executive Order 9981 made no statement about integration within the armed forces. The Fahy Committee, however, seeking to implement the President's general policy of equality of treatment and opportunity, made recommendations to the Army which were designed to result, eventually, in a large measure of racial integration. In February 1950, the Army took its first active steps toward integration in the WAC center at Fort Lee and in the training centers at Fort Ord and Fort Riley.² On the Korean front, late in 1950, the increased demand for replacements, the availability of Negro personnel, and, in some cases, mistakes in assignment, resulted in the progressive integration of combat units.³ As of May 1951, 61 per cent of the line Infantry combat companies in the 8th Army were integrated.

5. Generalization: Prior to 1950, white officers interviewed overwhelmingly favored segregation, and believed that integration would decrease the efficiency of units to which Negroes were assigned.

Evidence: When a War Department staff member suggested, in November 1942, that

1 Circular No. 124, "Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy," 27 April 1945, p. 1.

2 "The Segregation of Negroes in the Army," Report by Committee No. 7, Army War College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 12 October 1950, p. 6.

3 Preliminary Report, "The Utilization of Negro Troops in Korea," by International Public Opinion Research, Inc., n.d., pp. 2-3.

4 Ibid., p. 5.

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Negroes and whites be placed within the same units in a ratio of 1 to 10.6, General McNair, Commander of the Ground Forces, declared that the infusion of Negroes, with their extremely low AGCT average, into combat organizations would impair the general quality of the fighting forces.¹ The Chamberlin Committee, meeting in 1949-50, considered the opinions of war-tested leaders as the best evidence on how Negro manpower should be used within the Army. Almost without exception, these officers vigorously opposed integration. They feared that the strain in relations which would result from integration would impair military efficiency; consequently, they recommended the retention of Negro units. The Chamberlin Committee concurred in that view.²

6. Generalization: Most officers who commanded integrated units in Korea or who observed such units prefer integration to segregation.

Evidence: The seven officers testifying before the second Chamberlin Board who had either participated in or observed fighting in Korea stated they favored integration of white and Negro troops. The three officers who opposed integration had not been in Korea.³ A report prepared by Lt. Col. Homan D. Hoover, G-3 D/A, while on a field trip in Korea during March and April 1951, indicates that 90 per cent of the combat commanders interviewed there favored integration. Although the percentage was not so high among commanders of service units, the majority expressed a preference for integration. Generals Almond and Ruffner were cited as the only two senior officers disapproving.⁴ General John H. Michaelis, in commenting on his experience in Korea, expressed the opinion that Negro and white soldiers should be integrated in

1 AGF Memo (S) for WD G-3, 11 November 1942, referred to by Major Bell I. Wiley, in The Training of Negro Troops, Study No. 36, Historical Sec, AGF, 1946, pp. 2-3.

2 "Report of the Board of Officers on Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army," 9 February 1950, p. 4.

3 "Summary of Views of Experts Testifying before the Second Chamberlin Board" (unpublished).

4 Report prepared in draft form by Col. Hoover, March-April 1951.

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the same units.¹ The results of a recent survey disclose that the consensus of expert military opinion in Korea is that integration is the most effective means of utilizing Negro manpower.²

7. Generalization: Most white enlisted men who have served in integrated units or who are familiar with them favor integration.

Evidence: The IPOR study as well as I&E division attitude studies tend to support the opinion that contact with Negro troops results in attitude changes on the part of whites, making them more favorable to integration and, in general, more favorably disposed toward Negroes. An I&E survey of morale attitudes of enlisted men regarding the integration of Negro soldiers with whites indicated that opposition to integration was inversely related to the amount of contact with Negro soldiers and was, furthermore, related to the educational level of the whites in question and to the region of their origin. The white soldiers most opposed to integration were men from the South who had not gone beyond grade school. Those least opposed were from the Northeast. High school graduates from the South did not differ markedly in their opinions from men with similar education from other regions. Men who had worked with Negro soldiers were less opposed to integration than were those who lacked such experience. This survey was conducted in September 1949.

8. Generalization: Most officers who favor integration suggest restricting the number of Negroes in a unit to 10-15 per cent of strength.

Evidence: Of the 17 officers who, in testifying before the second Chamberlin Board, reported that they favored racial integration in the Army, 12 expressed the view that efficiency required a limitation upon the percentage of Negro manpower

1 Briefing by Gen. John H. Michaelis at the Pentagon, 15 May 1951. See also a special statement prepared for this study, reproduced in Appendix ____.

2 IPOR Report, pp. 12-13.

within any combat unit. Seven believed that the proportion should approximate that in the civil population (about 11 per cent). Three suggested an upper limit of 15 per cent, and the remaining two felt that a proportion of 15-20 per cent would be just as effective.¹ The commander of a battalion in the integrated 10th Infantry Division estimated that integration worked well when the strength of Negroes within a unit ranged between 10 and 20 per cent.² In his briefing of 15 May 1951, General Michaelis cited 15 per cent as the proportion of Negro strength he felt to be most practical.

9. Generalization: State and local laws and customs differ so widely that a uniform Army policy will inevitably conflict with some of them.

Evidence: Powers not delegated to the Federal Government in the Constitution and its amendments are reserved to the states. Military jurisdiction is exclusive over military personnel on military reservations. Civil authorities have concurrent jurisdiction over acts of military personnel in civilian areas. Discrimination by state or local governments is prohibited under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The state or local government is obliged either to permit Negroes to share the same public benefits accorded white citizens or to provide Negroes with substantially equal but separate facilities. Evidence indicates that the established practice in the South, in providing separate but equal facilities for Negroes, has placed the Negro in a disadvantageous position. Neither civil rights laws nor segregation laws have any force beyond the borders of the state in which they have been enacted. The wide variance among the racial laws of the several states precludes the possibility that any racial policy adopted by the Army will correspond to the laws and customs of all places where military personnel are stationed.

1 Summary Views of Experts Testifying before the Second Chamberlin Board (unpublished).

2 Statement by Lt. Col. George B. Sloan, CO, 2nd Bn., 86th Inf. Regt., 10th Inf. Div., in Report by Committee 7 (cited above), Encl. 1, p. 1.

10. Generalization: Army policy has recently affirmed the principle of equality of treatment and opportunity for all personnel.

Evidence: In response to recommendations by the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, the Army distributed, on 16 January 1950, Special Regulation No. 600-629-1. This regulation opened all military occupational specialties to all enlisted personnel regardless of their race or color. The quotas determining admission to Army schools were abolished and the selection of trainees on the basis of their qualifications alone was directed. The Regulation further states that qualified Negro personnel are to be assigned to any T/D or T/O & E unit without regard to race or color: this provision allows for the assignment of Negroes to units formerly exclusively white.

Another recommendation of the President's Committee, that the quota limiting Negro strength to 10 per cent of the total strength of the Army be abolished, was fulfilled by a Department of the Army dispatch dated 27 March 1950. The policies enunciated in Regulation 600-629-1 and the subsequent dispatch, although they make no statement about integration, affirm the principle of equality of treatment and opportunity. These directives are currently in effect.

11. Generalization: The Army policy on equality of treatment and opportunity has not been effectively communicated to all command levels.

Evidence: One of the findings of the IPOR study in Korea is that present Army practices on the use of Negro troops show considerable variation dependent on the interpretations of officers at various levels of command. The fact that such wide variation in practice can exist is attributable to the lack of clarity and consistency in the Army's present treatment of Negro troops.

12. Generalization: The principle of integration within the Army is in accord with the President's expressed policy of equality of treatment and opportunity.

Evidence: On July 26, 1948, the President issued two Executive Orders expressing a policy of non-discrimination. Order 9980, requiring fair employment practices

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throughout the Federal Government, was followed by Order 9981, enunciating the policy of equality of treatment and opportunity within the Armed Services. The order states that, since it is essential to maintain the highest standards of democracy in the Armed Services, there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity regardless of race, color, religion, or national origin. Although the wording of the President's Order does not necessarily imply racial integration, the Fahy Committee recommended steps toward integration within the Army as the most effective means of realizing the President's objectives.

13. Generalization: National Guard units are under the "control" of the states and reflect the laws and customs of the states.

Evidence: The National Defense Act of 1920 stated that the Army of the United States consisted of the Regular Army, the Organized Reserves, and the National Guard. National Guard troops were to remain state forces, under the jurisdiction of the Governor and administered in accordance with the laws of the state, until called into Federal service. Any Negro units requested by the states were to be separate organizations in addition to the 18 National Guard Divisions which had been authorized. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, state National Guard units adhered to segregation policies; following World War II, many of the Northern states instituted integration. There are still, however, many segregated units.

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SUPPLEMENTARY COMMENTS

A SOCIOLOGICAL SUMMARY ON NEGROES IN THE ARMY

Negro Units

One justification for Negro units is based upon the conclusion of military men that Negro outfits have often had a low fighting quality, and hence Negroes had best be concentrated in service and supporting units. The crucial point here is the use of the combat effectiveness of all-Negro units as a measure of the fighting ability of the individual Negro soldier. Sociologists believe that any Negro unit, because of the very fact that it is an all-Negro unit, operates under a handicap which even good equipment, thorough training and fine leadership cannot entirely remove.

Though some Negro units developed fine records under the challenge to show what their race could do, the evidence indicates that most Negro soldiers operating in all-Negro units did not respond to segregation as an incentive. This applies both to combat and to supporting units. In addition, the presumed advantages of Negro units in averting friction between Negroes and whites may be spurious. Some sociologists believe the evidence indicates that interracial troubles are magnified under segregation and diminished under integration.

Quotas

Similarly, a quota limit on the number of Negroes accepted into the Army raises issues and creates additional problems in attempting to solve other problems. A quota system tends to restrict the number of Negroes entering the Army without selecting them on a basis of competence to perform military duties. Furthermore, the use of a quota exposes the military to civilian pressures at the hands of social reformers. The real military problem may not be one of restricting the number of Negroes in the Army but in restricting the number of personnel in AGCT classes IV and V of which there are now a larger proportion among Negroes than among whites.

In combat situations evidence is mounting to indicate integration is a more efficient policy than segregation. The situation in garrison in the U. S. may be another story. It is not to be implied that a directive ordering complete integration will solve the problems involved in the use of Negro manpower. Integration in the Army must be based primarily upon the requirements of military efficiency while being responsive to civil law and democratic principles. Important phases of integrated problems concern the use of low scoring personnel, the arrangement of recreational and social opportunities and the establishment of a special staff section to study continuously the improvement and implementation of Army policy.

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Use of Low Scoring Personnel

The reason why so large a proportion of Negroes fall within the lowest AGCT classes is attributable to deficiencies in their schooling and general environment rather than to innate disabilities. This fact undermines arguments in favor of barring Negroes from opportunities for training and advancement but does not alter the fact that there is now a high proportion of Negro soldiers in the lowest categories. The problem of low scoring personnel in the Army will be alleviated by the recent Defense Department directive allocating personnel by AGCT classes among the Air Force, Navy and Army, but the question of the best utilization of the low scorers remains. Concentrating them in particular units, such as Port Battalions, will make such units manpower catch-alls and, because of the preponderance of Negroes in the low classes, of making them Negro units.

Three specific measures should be taken to enhance the military efficiency and improve the utilization of low scoring personnel. (1) Special training for low scorers should be scientifically devised and systematically set up. There has been considerable success in civilian occupations in raising the capacities of such individuals by training particularly adapted to their needs. (2) Research should be conducted to ascertain which tasks within every type of unit are best suited for low scorers. It may turn out that certain clerical, inspection, and combat tasks can be done as well, or even better, by men in the lower two categories as by men in the upper three. (3) Controls should be instituted within the Army, comparable to those now in effect among the three Armed Services, to insure that no large unit becomes flooded with low scoring personnel, if its efficiency would be materially lowered by such personnel.

Social Relations

The matter of the integrated use of recreational facilities is a special problem, especially in the South. The problem becomes particularly touchy where women are a factor, as in dances. The problem arises much more in garrison situations in the United States than in combat zones. Possibly, a local commander should be given a directive to bring about integration in recreational and social matters to the degree considered proper by him after receiving the advice of a local consulting committee brought together by the Red Cross representative on the post and composed of Negro and white, could be represented on some formal or informal basis to advise on intra-post matters. In this way the local commander could have a steady source of communication and information on the subject of social relations and would be able to direct his procedure into smoother channels than would otherwise be possible.

Thus a commander might discover that racial tensions building up within his command could be allayed by the stationing of more Negro WACs or Negro service club hostesses on the post. Or, to take another example, he might learn that one white church group in a neighboring community was glad to help him in the matter of off-post recreational

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facilities for Negro soldiers while another church group wanted no part of the matter. The commander would thus have better intelligence to work with than is ordinarily available.

Staff Section

The success of these measures and of similar steps necessary for the smooth development of integration will depend on careful planning of the stages of this development, the proper briefing of local commanders and key officers, and a continual study of the progress of integration. The latter requirement is especially important because there are now few systematic and reliable sources of information on the matter available to those who direct policy. Such planning, briefing, and study must be the responsibility of a special staff section specifically assigned to these tasks.

The section need be only a comparatively small one, but if it is to be effective its personnel must be well qualified for the job and should make sure of research facilities within the Army organization and employ civilian consultants professionally qualified to advise on the problems with which the section is concerned.

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HQ, ASF, I&E Div. Post-War Re-Enlistment Plans of Soldiers. 21 pp. with charts, 15 Dec 1944, Report No. B-127. I&E No. 46.

Answers to questionnaires indicate that 1.6-9.8% of the current strength of white EM, 0.8-13.4% of Negro EM, and 10.3-34.87 of white company grade officers plan to re-enlist. Definite re-enlistments were small.

HQ, ASF, Morale Services Div. Reactions of Negro and White Soldiers to the Film, "The Negro Soldier". 3 pages, 17 Apr. 1944, Report No. B-102. I&E No. 5.

Over 70% of Negroes said the film gave a true picture and 20% said it was mostly true. Among whites 2/3 rated the film "very good" and 8/10 thought showing it to Negro and white soldiers and civilians "would create better understanding."

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HQ, COMZONE, NATOUSA. Desire for Combat and Other Aspects of Morale: A Further Study of the Attitudes of Enlisting Personnel of the Former Cavalry Division, 52 pages, with 12 figures, 21 tables, 37 questions, 12 Oct 1944. Report No. NATOUSA-5 (MTO-5). I&E No. 9.

Based on 867 questionnaires from men stationed in Italy a majority of those who proposed to remain in service jobs and 90% of those who preferred combat believed that Negroes do not have a fair opportunity to participate in the War effort.

HQ, COMZONE, NATOUSA: Research Branch, I&E Sec. Post-Hostilities Educational Survey, Part 4: Study of An Engineer Battalion (Negro)., 5 pp. with 3 tables, 31 Oct 1944. MTO-7. I&E No. 11

Factual data on 18 officers and 502 EM in a rear area battalion indicate "the greater extent of illiteracy and the greater scarcity of men qualified to conduct the program in a unit that is composed of Negro troops."

HQ, ETOUSA, Research Branch, G-1 Div. A Preliminary Report on Attitudes of Negro Soldiers in ETO (during Nov 1943). 12 pages with 9 charts, 7 Feb 1944. ETO-B-2. I&E No. 4.

Individual comments and statistics of answers to questions given by 3000 troops in UK.

HQ, ETOUSA, Research Branch, I&E Division. The Utilization of Negro Platoons in White Companies, 20 pp. 11 charts, 4 tables, June 1945. Report No. E118 (ETO-82?, in pencil). I&E No. 13

HQ, ETOUSA, WD Observation Bd. Observations of Signal Corps Activities, Cherbourg Peninsula, France. 10 pages and Tabs A-Q, 19 July 1944, Report No. 63. CLEAR No. 27. Pt. I, pp 4,5: "The 29th Signal Construction Battalion (colored)---(was doing) a rapid and excellent job of open wire construction...." about 50 mi of field wire was constructed per company of 8 teams per day. The average rate for permanent pole lines per company "in combat" was 4 miles per day.
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HQ, MTOUSA: Research Branch, I&E Section. Post-Hostilities Education Survey, Part 5: Study of A Cross-Section of Personnel in Negro units in MTOUSA. 22 pp., 10 tables, 1 figure, 30 Nov 1944. MTO-8. I&E No. 12.

Negroes and whites of the same amount of education were interested in about the same activities and courses."...only about one-half as large a proportion of the personnel in Negro as white outfits are qualified to teach in the unit schools."

HQ, MTOUSA; Research Branch, I&E Section. VD Problems of White Enlisted Men in MTOUSA. 75 pp., 41 tables, 10 Sep 1945. Report No. MTO-69. I&E T-7 No. 22.

HQ, MTOUSA, Research Branch, I&E Section. VD Problem of Negro Enlisted Men in MTOUSA. 17 pp., 5 tables, 25 Sep 1945. Report No. 122 M-2, I&E No. 16.

Survey of 863 EM ". . . the Negro soldier is up against a different situation (than the whites) and reacts differently to it."

HQ, MTOUSA, Research Branch, I&E Section. What Enlisted Men serving in Italy think should be done for Italy. 15 pp., 4 tables, 1 Sep 1945. Report No. MTO-64. I&E No. 55.

". . . a cross-section of 2052 EM . . . white and Negro, combat and service troops . . ." Negroes were more likely than white troops to feel that we should help Italy.

HQ, SOS; Memo for the C/S. Induction of Illiterates. 1 p. with attachments. 21 May 1942. AG 324.71(5-21-42) CLEAR No. 73

See Appendix ___ for digest.

HQ, SOS, NATOUSA, Morale Services Section. Desire for Combat Among Enlisted Personnel of the Former Second Cavalry Division, 20 pp, 18 Aug 1944. MTO-3, I&E No. 6.

Replies of 1854 EM to a questionnaire are compared with those of 1640 white EM from white service units. "There is reason to believe that" transfer to a combat unit rather than to volunteer as a general replacement would be preferred. Possible plans for future organization and training are presented.

HQ, USAF, CBI; I&E Division, Research Unit, Special Services Section. Malaria; A study of the attitude, knowledge, and prevention practices related to malaria among two groups of soldiers in CBI. 21 pp, 14 Oct 1944. Report No. CBI-10. I&E No. 44.

Among about 140 each of Negro and white EM in Burma and in Upper Assam 30-40% did not take precautions because it "was too much bother," "they didn't really care whether they got malaria." About 40% of the Negroes "didn't know enough about what to do."

HQ, USAF, CBI; Research Department, Special Services Section. A Study of Attitudes, Actions, and Knowledge Related to Venereal Disease among Two Groups of Soldiers in CBI. 14 pp. with tables. Report No. CBI-6. I&E No. 8.

Compares about 140 each of literate Negro and white EM at A (90 mi from a large city) and B (in Upper Assam).

HQ, 6701st Invasion Training Center (Provisional), APO No. 600, U. S. Army
Observations on Amphibious Landing Conducted by VI Corps in the
Vicinity of Anzio, Italy, 5 pp., 29 Jan 1944, AGF:OR:P51. CLEAR No. 26.

"General Service Engineers (colored) brought in early to handle
supplies in Shore Engineer Dumps were doing nothing while
the Shore Engineer personnel wer hauling rock (etc.)" The GSE's
"should be given something to do"

Harms, H. E., F. J. Kobler, and F. J. Sweeney. Negro Army Psychiatric Casualties.
War Medicine, May 1945, Vol. 7, No. 5, pp. 309-312. CLEAR No. 66.
Library of Congress No. RC970.W3.

Study of 100 Negroes from Negro Engineer Corps outfit sent to mental
hygiene clinic for treatment and disposition. Found characteristic
symptoms present in nearly all cases prior to enlistment. (No compara-
tive data for whites.)

Hooland, Carl I., Arthur A. Lundsane, and Fred D. Sheffield. Experiments
on Mass Communication. Vol. III of Studies in Social Psychology in
World War II. Princeton University Press, 1949. 345 pp. CLEAR No. 71.
ORO Library: U22.58.

Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D. C. Full Utilization
of Manpower Resources; Rusk, Howard A. 21 pp., 11 Jan 1950.
Publication No. L50-68. CLEAR No. 54

An unedited transcript of an Extemporaneous lecture.

Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D. C. The Problems of
Manpower; Caron Levenstein. 19 pp, 5 Jan 1950. Publication No. L50-64.
CLEAR No. 53.

Address with questions and answers.

Kenworthy, E. W. The case against Army segregation. The annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, May 1951, Vol. 275,
pp. 27-33. ORO No. 45.

See Appendix ___ for digest.

Library of Congress: Bibliography. Negroes in the Armed Services of the
United States from the earliest times to the present. 22 pp, 7 Apr 1949.
CLEAR No. 14.

Mandelbaum, David G. Utilization of Negro Manpower. University of California,
Department of Anthropology--Manuscript prepared for the Working Group
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Marshall, Thurgood. The Supreme Court as the Protector of Human Rights: Equal Protection of the Laws. The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May 1951, Vol. 275, pp. 101-110.

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Maryland Conference on Military Contributions to Methodology in Applied Psychology: Proceedings. New Methods in Applied Psychology. 30 pp. 27-28 Nov 1945. CLEAR No. 65. Library of Congress: U21.M27:1947

Myrdal, Gunnar, Richard Sterner, and Arnold Rose. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. New York, Harpers, 1944. 2 vol., 1483 pp. CLEAR-67. Library of Congress: #185.6.M95.

Navy, Dept. of: Research Div., BuPers. Characteristics of Enlisted Personnel not Recommended for Re-enlistment. 11 pp., 2 tables, 5 graphs. 1 Feb 1950. A1Nav89-49. CLEAR no. 57. RESTRICTED.

Analyzes 119 out of 450 records reviewed.

Nelson, Dennis D., Lt (D), USNR. The Integration of the Negro into the US Navy, 1776-1947. Thesis submitted in connection with MA degree. Howard University, 212 pp. NAVEXOS-P-526. CLEAR no.11.

ORO: CLEAR: Memorandum Lt. Col. W. P. Brooks, GSC, to Dr. Hausrath. Legal Restrictions Pertaining to Negro Units. 1 p. 4 June 1951. G4F2. CLEAR No.82. CONFIDENTIAL

A recent JAG study indicated that "it was the clear intent of Congress to remove obsolete restrictions on the organizational structure of the Army".

ORO-T-&(EUSAK) Technical Memorandum. Notes on Infantry Tactics: Marshall, S.L.A. (2) pp., 2 tables. 28 Feb 1951. CLEAR no. 32. SECRET.

RAND Corporation, The: The American Soldier and the Sociology of Military Organization: Spicer, Hans. 34 pp., 1 app. 9 May 1950. Report P-119. CLEAR no. 20.

Reddick, L. D. The Negro Policy of the United States Army, 1775-1945. Journal of Negro History, January 1949, Vol.34, pp. 9*29. Library of Congress: E185.J86.

"As citizens may we be hopeful that the modernization does take place before it is too late. ... It is about time that all citizens, together, share the obligations and the privileges, the duties and the honors of defending our native land."

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p. 284: "Negro rejections constituted 18.7% of the total in Class IV-F.....on physical, mental, and moral grounds." p.289: "The high rate of rejections for educational deficiency remains one of the unsolved problems of Negro registrants four times that among white registrants." pp.294-5: "... a proportional number of Negroes is being called in every state."

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See Appendix _____ for digest.

TAG Letter to CG's ACF, etc. Policy on Promotion and Assignment of Negro Officer Personnel. 3 pp. 7 Jan. 1944. File: AG 210.31 (3 Jan.44) OB-S-4-M. CLEAR No. 2B, Tab L., CONFIDENTIAL.

Various Authors. The American Negro in World War I and World War II. Journal of Negro Education, Summer 1943, Vol, XII, pp. 263-584. Yearbook No. XII. CLEAR No. 63. Library of Congress: LC 2701.J6.

Thirty chapters by different authors. pp. 579-584: Bibliography of 188 items.

WD Pamphlet No. 20-6. Command of Negro Troops. 19 pp., check list. 29 Feb. 1944. RESTRICTED

Discusses the special problems of Negroes in the Army as they relate to military service and to suggestions for their solution.

WD: ARMY TALK. Part I; Negro Manpower in the Army; Part II; Negro Platoons in Composite Rifle Companies, World War II Style; Part III; What About Minorities: 36 pages 12 April, 1947. I&E No. 17.

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WD. Report of Board of Officers on the Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army. 24 pp., 18 tabs. 17 Nov 1945. WDGAP 291.2(24 Nov 45). CLEAR No. 2A. Gillem Report, Part I. SECRET.

Includes recommendation for development of means required and a plan for implementation.

WD. Supplemental Report of a Board of Officers on Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army. 14 pp., Tabs A-L, Tabs 1-12. 26 Jan 1946. CLEAR No. 3. Gillem Report, Part III. SECRET.

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WD. What the Soldier Thinks: A monthly digest of WD studies on the attitudes of American troops: No. 5. 16 pp. April 1944. I&E No. 30.

p.6: Reactions of Soldiers to the Film, "The Negro Soldier".

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A study of all available EM in a Negro QM Service Battalion, on dock work in the Pacific Area, indicated that good leadership of Negro troops calls for special adjustment to meet special needs.

WD,AAF, Memo for C/S: by Lt. Col. Nippert. Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War Military Establishment. 28 pp., Tabs A-T. 17 Sep 1945. CLEAR No. 41. SECRET.

"it is ... and has been, a basic policy of the AAF that there shall be equal opportunity for training and utilization for all military personnel." ... "train Negro troops wherever possible in areas where unfavorable impact on civilian communities will be avoided. Train in time of Negro units ..(is).. in general, longer."

WD, AC/S to CG's, ASF, AGF, AAF. Disturbances among Negro troops.

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1 p. 9 Aug 1943. CLEAR No. 38. CONFIDENTIAL.

Disciplinary training is to be intensified and emphasized.

WD: Memo AC/S to TAG. Assignment of Negro Troops. 2 pp, with 2 attachments. 4 May 1942. CLEAR No. 40. CONFIDENTIAL.

"So far as practicable negroes will be assigned to installations in the general areas in which they were procured."

WD,AGF, Study pursuant to a memorandum from Director, Special Planning Div. to CG's. Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War Military Establishment. File: 31 July-20 Oct 1945. AG 291.2. CLEAR No. 46. SECRET.

Memos and replies from Theatre CG's.

WD,AGF: Historical Sec. The Training of Negro Troops. 78 pp. with 348 notes. 1 Sep 1946. File: 31417(1 Sep 1946) GNHIS. CLEAR No. 17. SECRET.

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WD,ASF. Leadership and the Negro Soldier. 104 pp. Oct 1944. Manual M5, Training. CLEAR No. 9.

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Tab 34: Extracts from reports by theatre commanders, and a Historical Report of Typical Irritations or Disorders arising from Racial Conflicts. Tab 54: Comments on Gillem Board report.

WD,ASF: Fourth ASF Training Conference. Unit Training: Col. L. B. Wyant, G.S.C. 7 pp. 15-17 May 1944.

See App ___ for digest.

WD,ASF, I&E Div. Monthly Progress Report - Section 10. Information and Education. 32 pp. 30 June 1945. CG-18. CLEAR No. 6. RESTRICTED.

p. 8: Opinions about Negro Infantry Platoons in White Companies of 7 Divisions. See also: HQ,ETOUSA, Research Br., I&E Div. Report No. E118, June 1945. RESTRICTED.

Contains: List of Overseas Reports on Soldier Attitudes, (Suppl. No. 2).

WD,ASF: Special Services Div.: What the Soldier Thinks, No.2. 116 pp. with charts. Aug 1943. Report No. 58. I&E No. 25.

pp. 14-15: Do Negro Soldiers Accept Their Soldiers Role?
p. 32: "The better a Negro is educated, the more likely he is to believe that he is more useful to his country as a soldier than as a civilian war worker."

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p. 58: "From 38 to 48% of negro soldiers out of 7000 tested considered some form of separation a good idea."

WD,C/S to CG's AAF, AGF, ASF. Negro Troops. 2 pp. 13 July 1943.
CLEAR No. 39. CONFIDENTIAL.

Concerning riots of a racial character: "Under no circumstances can there be a command attitude which makes allowances for the improper conduct of either white or Negro soldiers, among themselves or toward each other."

WD,GS,G-3: Memo for AC/S G-3. Employment of Grade V Personnel in the Army. 4 pp., with file of correspondence and Tabs A-K. 19 March 1943, and later. File No. AG 201.6 (19 Mar 43). CLEAR No. 74.

See App ___ for digest.

WD,SOS, Special Services Div. What the Soldier Thinks: Digest, with charts, of a year's research studies indicating the attitudes, prejudices, and desires of American troops. 71 pp, with charts. Dec 1942. Report No. 46. I&E No. 24.

p/32: "Most soldiers white troops in 3 combat divisions, northerners and southerners alike, favor some form of segregation policy."

WD,SOS, Special Services Div., Research Br. Attitudes of Enlisted Men Toward Negroes ~~in Air Force~~ for Air Force Duty, based on a survey of 5872 white EM in 6 AAF tactical units and 3 AAF training schools. 11 pp., 4 charts, 8 tables. 30 Nov 1942. Report No. 13. I&E No. 3.

Charts show only 1 in 10 opposed to training negroes for AAF duty. Majority favor segregation during and after training. Non-coms, Northern and Southern, less willing than privates to work with negroes.

WD,SOS, Special Services Div., Research Br. Attitudes of White Enlisted Men Toward Sharing Facilities with Negro Troops; based on a survey of representative cross-sections of three divisions in May 1942. 9 pp. with 4 charts, 2 tables. 30 July 1942. Report No. 18. I&E ~~XXXX~~ No. 2.

Based on 2360 EM in Regular Infantry, Armored, and National Guard Divisions.

WD,SOS, Research Div., Special Services Br. Some New Statistics on the Negro Enlisted Man. 17 Feb 1942. Report No. 2. I&E No. 1.

Considers migration and education.

WD, Troop I&E Div., Troop Attitude Research Br. Attitudes of Officers and Enlisted Men Toward Certain Minority Groups: Sec. II, Negro Troops. 9 pp. 14 July 1947. Sp. Memo. No. 21-309C-MP-c/88C,0. I&E No. 18. CONFIDENTIAL.

Anonymous studies of cross-sections of officers and EM in U.S. and in European Zone of Occupation.

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White, W. What the Negro Thinks of the Army. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, September 1942, Vol. 223, pp. 67-71. Library of Congress: H1.A4.

"Negroes are still skeptical about the sincerity ... of most white Americans who assert that this is a war for the Four Freedoms. But there is still hope, faith, and loyalty to the democratic ideal among Negroes of every section and class. Whether America is wise enough to utilize the enormous possibilities of these thirteen million citizens, who, ironically, must fight for the right to fight for democracy, as yet is an unanswered question. But upon answering it in the affirmative may conceivably depend the fate of not only of all Americans, but of the democratic way of life, as well."

Wolfbein, Seymour L. Postwar Trends in Negro Employment. April 1947.

In CLEAR No. 1, (Chamberlain Report), App. III, Tab 19.

Wyant, L. B., Col. Unit Training. Fourth ASF Training Conference, Fort Monmouth, N. J., 15-17 March 1944. 7 pp. CLEAR no. 72.

See App ____ for digest.

Byers, Jean. A Study of the Negro in Military Service. June 1947. 263 pp. CLEAR No. 12.

A monograph, with foreword by James C. Evans, Civilian Assistant to the Secretary of Defense dated Jan 1950.

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